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ABSTRACT 
 
Abstract 
Mandatory disclosure rules force firms to make annual reports publicly available. The 
publication of (accounting) information, however, is not always in line with their interests 
as it entails proprietary costs, which can outweigh firm-level benefits. This dissertation 
analyzes how private firms respond to such mandated disclosure and focuses on manage-
rial discretion to mitigate potentially adverse effects. 
The first part (Regulation) clarifies the purpose of financial accounting in a private firm 
setting and discusses aspects of the regulation. In the absence of capital markets, limited 
ownership-induced agency conflicts, and a strong reliance on debt financing and relation-
ship banking, private firms use financial accounting mostly as a contractual device. Thus, 
SME accounting is shaped by socio-economic factors and is deeply embedded in coun-
tries’ institutional environments. Consistent with this notion, we empirically demonstrate 
that participants in a public consultation (conducted by the European Commission) sup-
port further harmonization and internationalization of SME accounting only for larger 
firms that use non-EU regulated capital markets. 
The second part (Timeliness) provides evidence on private firms’ timing decisions of 
mandatory disclosures. Timeliness crucially determines the informational value of (non)-
financial data and thus influences associated indirect costs. We exploit a regulatory set-
ting, where private firms have a great deal of discretion in disclosure timing and are even 
in the position to “buy” time beyond the legal deadline, when accepting monetary sanc-
tions. The results suggest that firms facing higher proprietary costs exhibit significantly 
longer reporting lags and are more likely to overrun the statutory period. We identify 
performance, the competitive environment and ownership as influencing factors. Moreo-
ver, it seems that disclosure timing complements other channels by which a more opaque 
information environment can be established.  
The third part (Narratives) focuses on the characteristics of the extensive textual elements 
of private firms’ disclosures. Namely, we approximate the informativeness of firms’ man-
agement reports by relying on the degree of year-over-year similarity (copy-paste). The 
results indicate that firms with strong incentives to be more opaque systematically modify 
and update their narrative reports to a lower extent. In line with our expectations, we 
further find reports with a high degree of copy-paste to be less useful. The content of 
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high-similar reports is less consistent with current accounting numbers and a worse pre-
dictor of future earnings. We conclude that firms succeed in creating a more opaque in-
formation environment by exploiting copy-paste activities. 
The final part (Overall) acknowledges that creating opaqueness is not a binary decision 
but rather the interplay of different managerial choices. Following this notion, the meth-
odologically approach of cluster analysis allows to consider data on earnings properties, 
textual characteristics and timeliness simultaneously. The clustering outcomes, therefore, 
provide for a more holistic view on the financial reporting practice. As such, the algorithm 
groups firms that share financial reporting characteristics and identifies heterogeneous 
financial reporting profiles, which are mostly sticky over time. The results reveal com-
plementary and substitutional associations among aspects from different domains (e.g., 
textual modification and timeliness). Moreover, the choice of a certain financial reporting 
strategy seems to be related to firms’ fundamentals.  
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“Silence is Golden” 
 
Transparency is a virtue that appears in various domains of daily life and typically has a 
positive connotation. Within the meaning of financial reporting, transparency can be seen 
as a firm’s characteristic of being open and forthright with stakeholders by granting ac-
cess to information that allows them to better understand the company, its future devel-
opment and the reasons for actions and decisions (Dapko 2012). Transparency is seen as 
a prerequisite for the efficient allocation of resources and it seems to be honored by capital 
markets. A rich field of research deals with the relationship between the quality of finan-
cial reporting as one indicator of transparency and capital market outcomes. It documents 
positive effects of transparency, as less information asymmetry that results in lower costs 
of capital, higher liquidity and increased share prices (for a review, see, e.g., Beyer et al. 
2010, Leuz and Wysocki 2018 or Roychowdhury et al. 2019).  
However, in the absence of capital markets and a lack of benefits, non-listed firms (private 
firms) are not always as receptive to transparency as their listed counterparts. Given that 
mandatory disclosure rules do not exist for private firms, this is not a major issue in many 
parts of the world, for instance, in the United States (US) or in Canada. Based on individ-
ual contracts, firms share information on a voluntary basis and determine the optimal 
level by themselves (market solution). In the European Union (EU), the situation is dif-
ferent. The regulator decided to also require private firms to prepare financial reports and 
disclose them publicly (regulatory solution).1 In addition to the obvious direct costs for 
preparation and publication, there are more or less important indirect costs, which are 
multilayered and manifest, for example, in an erosion of firms’ competitive position or 
the privacy of their owners.  
In Germany, the Mittelstand as the often-quoted backbone of the economy (e.g., Fülbier 
and Klein 2015), is directly affected by the regulatory solution. Associations of undertak-
ings such as the “Bund der Deutschen Industrie”, “Stiftung Familienunternehmen” or 
other organizations regularly express their concerns in terms of mandatory disclosure and 
                                                 
1  For a detailed discussion of pros and cons of both regimes, see, e.g., Grottke et al. (2016) or Shroff and 
Minnis (2017). 
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highlight related threats. Lobbying against was prevalent around 2007, following the in-
troduction of a new enforcement system regarding mandatory disclosure. It has also been 
the case with more recent initiatives such as the Country-by-country Reporting or the 
Transparency Register (e.g., Schäfers 2019, Stiftung Familienunternehmen 2018). In a 
similar vein, the German business press habitually draws attention to firms’ reluctance 
and the jeopardy associated with detailed mandatory disclosure requirements.2 
Given the practical importance of this issue, this thesis concentrates on disclosure require-
ments based on Article 325 of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch). All 
German corporations with limited liability are obliged to publicly file annual financial 
statements (including the balance sheet, income statement and notes), a management re-
port and other documents, which potentially contain sensitive and confidential infor-
mation.3 The origin of the rule dates back a long time. However, since a major piece of 
legislation in 20064, the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) effectively enforces the disclo-
sure requirements. Non-compliance is subject to monetary fines, repeated as long as a 
firm fails to submit the required documents. Consequently, disclosure rates increased dra-
matically after 2006 from single-digits to nearly 100 % (e.g., Fülbier et al. 2019). More-
over, the regulatory act introduced a digital data filing and retrieval infrastructure, the so-
called “Electronic Federal Gazette” (elektronischer Bundesanzeiger). This online plat-
form facilitates information acquisition for transacting stakeholders, as well as for other 
parties. The access is free of charge, does not require any registration and is designed to 
be user-friendly, as there is a full-text search and no restriction on when or where data are 
retrievable. Hence, the German Federal Gazette is considered to be a convenient and use-
ful tool to gather information about legal entities.5 Based on these two major amendments, 
                                                 
2  Headlines from the German business press read, e.g., as follows: “Firmendaten frei Haus” [Company 
data on demand] (Kirchdörfer 2019), “Firmen zahlen lieber, als ihre Daten preiszugeben” [Companies 
prefer to pay rather than disclose their data] (Müller and Heide 2018), „Renitente Verschwiegenheit“ 
[Renitent secrecy] (Müller et al. 2016), „Staat zwingt Firmen zu mehr Transparenz“ [Legislator forces 
companies to be more transparent] (Fockenbrock 2010), „Zittern vor den offenen Büchern“ [Being 
afraid of open books] (Mönninghoff 2008). 
3  There are some exemptions for small and medium-sized entities. 
4  Gesetz über elektronische Handelsregister und Genossenschaftsregister sowie das Unternehmensregis-
ter (EHUG) [Act on Electronic Commercial and Registers of Cooperatives and Business Registers]. 
5  According to a business register survey conducted by the European Commission (EC), only five of 27 
member states do not charge for financial statement information. Furthermore, Kaya and Seebeck 
(2019) classify the German Federal Gazette as one of the most useful company registers in terms of data 
availability, accessibility and serviceability among register of 90 countries. 
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it is less surprising that private firms consider the Act a “transparency shock” (Laschew-
ski and Nasev 2018), which inevitably leads to the question of how corporations deal with 
increased transparency and its associated indirect costs. This, however, is not a new issue.  
About 40 years ago, Robert E. Verrecchia analytically modeled the costs of disclosed 
information that is proprietary in nature and the distribution of which is potentially harm-
ful (Verrecchia 1983). He has referred to this form of disclosure-related costs as “propri-
etary costs”. A large amount of research has followed, “however, we know relatively little 
empirically about the likely prevalence and the magnitude of proprietary costs in practice” 
(Lang and Sul 2014, p. 265).  
The German accounting literature has also been addressing adverse effects of public dis-
closure for some time. Wagenhofer (1990) refers to the costs arising from the use of in-
formation by third parties to the detriment of the disclosing company as “indirekte Aus-
weiskosten”. In 1962, Adolf Moxter noted that firms that are unable to withdraw from 
mandatory disclosure seek precautionary actions to avoid impending cuts in profits (Mox-
ter 1962). Based on younger legal developments, as briefly outlined above, however, pri-
vate firms’ discretion in mandatory disclosure has widely been reduced. Since 2007, firms 
are no longer in a position to decide about whether to disclose information. Instead of 
simply ignoring disclosure rules, firms need to reflect on a variety of managerial choices 
in order to achieve the desired level of transparency. Thus, seeking opaqueness shifted 
from a binary decision to a much more complex exercise. Given mandatory disclosure 
rules, firms are only left the chance to influence their information environment by ex-
ploiting discretion in content (what to disclose?) and timeliness (when to disclose?). I 
examine these two potential “channels”. After a regulation-based introduction that clari-
fies the purpose of financial accounting in a private firm setting and discusses aspects of 
the underlying regulation the structure of this thesis, therefore, follows the elaborated 
questions of what? and when? (Figure 1).6 
Part A which is a joint project with Marcus Bravidor and Rolf Uwe Fülbier, theoretically 
describes the role of accounting while differentiating between firms ownership structure 
                                                 
6  Although I dedicate a separate chapter to when? and what?, I do not focus more closely on the perspec-
tive of “whether to disclose” (Figure 1) for three reasons. First, the German enforcement mechanism 
prevents loopholes and ensures compliance. Accordingly, avoiding disclosure is not an option. Second, 
all financial reports that are subject of my empirical analyses have been audited and issued with an 
unqualified audit opinion. Thus, I presume that filings contain all required items and firms would have 
failed if they wanted to withhold information. Third, there is already some recent research focusing on 
“whether” (e.g., Bernard 2016).   
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and main stakeholder group. Based on a strong reliance on bank financing and a lower 
extent of principal-agent conflicts, it becomes apparent that typical private firms rather 
use accounting as a contractual device. The valuation aspect of accounting is significantly 
less pronounced. Moreover, we show that SME accounting is shaped by socio-economic 
factors and is deeply embedded in countries’ institutional environments. Given this, we 
ask whether initiatives for an EU-wide harmonization and internationalization of account-
ing are meaningful. To address this question, we review results of prior literature and 
empirically analyze the opinion of European stakeholder groups using comments on a 
public consultation conducted by the European Commission (EC) in 2015. In particular, 
respondents support a further harmonization of accounting requirements for larger SMEs, 
which use non-EU regulated capital markets, but oppose an extension to all SMEs. 
Part B, which is a joint project with Marcus Bravidor, covers “when”– the disclosure 
timing decision. Timeliness is a fundamental characteristic that heavily determines the 
relevance of information. The older an information, the less useful it is, since each unit 
Figure 1: 
Potential channels to achieve opaqueness 
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of elapsed time reduces the capability to create value to third parties. The German legis-
lator allows a period of twelve months to fulfill the annual disclosure requirement. Be-
yond that period, firms are able to neglect legal deadlines and further delay the public 
availability if they accept monetary sanctions. Namely, firms can “buy” time in order to 
decrease the informational significance of mandatory disclosed information. Conse-
quently, a rational manager will delay submission as long as the indirect costs of disclo-
sure are higher than the cumulative fines. In addition to the absence of pressure from 
capital markets and the absence of significant litigation concerns, this setting provides an 
interesting opportunity to indirectly study the costs of mandatory disclosure.  
Based on a manually collected sample of approximately 1,000 firms over a period of six 
years, we find that firms completely exhaust the legal deadlines. Moreover, the descrip-
tive results reveal that financial statement preparation, audit and approval are completed 
well in advance of the filing date. This finding indicates a major gap between “a firm is 
able to disclose” and “a firm is actually disclosing”. Despite that, the reporting lag exhib-
its a high variance, implying that firms are not homogenously engaged in delaying dis-
closure. Examining the determinants of the reporting lag reveals performance, ownership 
and the competitive environment as influencing factors consistent with theoretical pre-
dictions. While loss-reporting firms significantly enhance the reporting lag, firms that 
beat prior years’ earnings file faster. However, we find a u-shaped relationship between 
disclosure timing and performance, which suggests that under- and overperforming firms 
exhibit incentives to file less promptly. This finding is in accordance with agency and 
proprietary costs theory. We also find that family firms and firms in a more competitive 
environment withhold their filings for longer. In particular, firms that report a loss and 
family-owned firms are more likely to accept monetary fines. Lastly, we document that 
timeliness is complementing other dimensions of financial reporting quality, e.g., discre-
tionary accruals and the amount of disclosure.  
Part C refers to “what”. It is a joint project with Marcus Bravidor and Thomas Loy. In 
comparison to many other prior studies, we do not analyze the accounting numbers but 
rather focus on the narrative content of firms’ annual reports. Private firms are obliged to 
disclose a management report that contains various textual information, for example, 
about the economic position, risk and opportunities, research and development, or fore-
casting. These narrative elements inherently entail a great deal of managerial discretion, 
such that their usefulness heavily depends on the author’s willingness to design the report 
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in an appropriate fashion. We use techniques from computational textual analysis in order 
to capture the properties of firms’ narrative disclosures. In particular, we rely on the year-
over-year similarity of firms’ narratives to capture the extent of non-updates or non-mod-
ifications (stickiness). Namely, we compute the cosine similarity of the management re-
port as well as of the forecast section. We assume that a high share of copy-paste impairs 
the usefulness, as it word-for-word repeats old content and provides no new information. 
Thus, we analyze the firm-level determinants of copy-paste intensity and show that firms 
with incentives to create a more opaque information environment systematically exploit 
this strategy. Namely, habitual disclosure avoiders, financially constrained firms, firms 
that act in less concentrated industries and firms with abnormally high margins are sig-
nificantly more engaged in copy-pasting. In contrast, we find that firms facing greater 
demand for financial reporting update their reports to a higher degree. All results are con-
sistent to our expectations. We conclude that firms adapt the informativeness of their nar-
rative reports in a way that meets their preferences and needs. 
To reinforce that some firms use copy-paste in order to avoid revealing useful infor-
mation, we further analyze whether firms succeed with this strategy. A narrative report is 
considered useful if the content is consistent with current accounting data and allows for 
predicting future performance. Hence, we analyze the consistency and the predictive abil-
ity of the content of firms’ management reports with respect to its copy-paste intensity. 
Our results indicate that the content of reports with a high share of copy-paste is less 
coincided with current accounting numbers and exhibits less predictive power in terms of 
future earnings. We conclude that private firms systematically file copy-paste reports to 
lower the value of publicly available information. 
The last chapter (Part D) provides a more holistic view on the managerial discretion of 
financial reporting choices. Using cluster analysis, I group firms that share financial re-
porting characteristics from three different domains (earnings properties, textual proper-
ties and timeliness). This approach allows me to identify common disclosure strategies. 
Based on seven firm-level measures, I identify distinctive patterns in the financial report-
ing properties of private firms. The results imply complementary and substitutional rela-
tionships among certain measures. As such, it appears that the extent of the textual year-
by-year modification of firms’ management reports and the disclosure delay are posi-
tively associated. I also show, that cluster affiliation is related to firms’ fundamentals, 
performance and ownership structures. Moreover, tracking firms’ cluster affiliation over 
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the investigation period allows for insights in the variability of financial reporting 
choices. During the sample period, most firms remain in their original cluster; however, 
some firms switch cluster affiliation. A more detailed analysis of the decision to switch 
cluster affiliation could be a promising research opportunity to enhance our understanding 
about the financial reporting incentives of private firms.  
In summary, this thesis should contribute to the ongoing debate on the financial reporting 
requirements of private firms7 by providing empirical insights to better understand incen-
tives and needs. As such, I present large-sample evidence on the reporting characteristics 
of German private firms based on comprehensive data that capture multi-domain aspects 
of financial reporting (accounting numbers, narrative requirements and timeliness). It be-
comes apparent that mandatorily disclosing information is not always in line with private 
firms’ interests. The results suggest that firms systematically exploit managerial discre-
tion in order to reduce the informational significance of disclosed documents. 
Given the increasing availability and efficiency of big data analytics, text mining and 
machine learning, the challenge of being not too transparent will continue to be important 
in the future. Adverse effects of disclosing information might intensify when considering 
that enhanced technological opportunities even enable analyzing unstructured data and 
gaining insights through connecting data. Admittedly, it is not very likely that certain 
information, e.g., from the management report or the income statement, is harmful to a 
firm’s prospect. However, this could significantly change when financial statement data 
is meaningfully connected with information from other sources. Exploiting linked data 
and building relationships between facts is a powerful approach. As such, so-called uni-
form resource identifiers facilitate the integration of a wide range of information on single 
entities.8 Another example is the Semantic Web, which allows for presenting multi-do-
main knowledge from heterogeneous open and commercial databases. The right data in 
the right context, processed by the right algorithm, may enable a more precise prediction 
of peers’ future actions, needs and weaknesses. Thus, being silent will remain a decisive 
issue for some firms.
                                                 
7  This is not only debated in Europe, but also a current topic in the US. In consequence of a significant 
decline of listed companies and a drastic raise of private capital, calls for also regulating private firms 
become more and more prevalent (e.g., DeFontenay 2017). 
8  For instance, in 2017, the operator of the German Federal Gazette, the “Bundesanzeiger Verlag GmbH”, 
has been certified by the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) and already uses the Legal 
Entity Identifier System (GLEIS), which allow for an unambiguously identification of legal entities and 
data integration (Bundesanzeiger Verlag 2017). 
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A b s t r a c t  
In this paper, we analyze the demand for a further harmonization and interna-
tionalization of the accounting requirements for small and medium-sized en-
tities (SMEs) within the European Union (EU). From a theoretical perspec-
tive, SME accounting is closely linked to contractual and legal obligations. 
Hence, it is shaped by and must account for socioeconomic and national dif-
ferences. Whereas empirical studies provide evidence on the positive effects 
of accounting harmonization for the adopting companies, those do not offset 
the additional costs for users and preparers. Accordingly, respondents of the 
public consultation to the EU Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union 
support a further harmonization of accounting requirements for larger SMEs, 
which use non-EU regulated capital markets, but opposed an extension to all 
SMEs. 
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1 Introduction 
The financial reporting of small and medium-sized entities (SME) significantly differs 
from large listed companies.9 While the latter must provide value-relevant information to 
anonymous shareholders in a timely manner, the financial reporting of private firms is 
more strongly aligned to the needs of their main stakeholders. In particular, banks, sup-
pliers and other capital lenders are the primary financial statement users. Accounting in-
formation provides the basis for funding decisions as well as regular reviews of contrac-
tual relationships. For example, debt covenants often rely on accounting figures and their 
violation could induce increases of interest or even the withdrawal of loans (Leuz et al. 
1998, Haghani et al. 2014, Zülch et al. 2014). Moreover, SME accounting has a strong 
national character as it is closely embedded in the regulatory environment. Accordingly, 
national differences regarding company law, insolvency law, or the enforcement of con-
tracts are responsible for cross-country differences in SME accounting (e.g., Fülbier and 
Gassen 2010, Gassen and Fülbier 2015).  
The internationalization and harmonization of accounting requirements based on the cap-
ital-market orientated International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has always 
been accompanied by the question of whether they should affect firms not using capital 
markets. In particular, the European Commission (EC) – a body that is highly receptive 
to harmonization – has recently taken up the idea again in the context of the new Green 
Paper Building a Capital Markets Union. However, it is controversial whether the inter-
nationalization and the harmonization of SME accounting makes any economic sense at 
all, for example, if it facilitates the funding of private firms. The present study aims to 
contribute to the clarification of open issues. After providing a brief evaluation of the 
characterizing features of SME accounting and a short overview of the regulatory setting 
(Section 2), we review the literature on relevant accounting research (Section 3). After-
wards, we empirically analyze the public opinion regarding a further internationalization 
and harmonization of SME accounting (Section 4). The underlying research questions are 
twofold: First, we examine whether respondents support an expansion of harmonization 
and if so, which regulatory basis (IFRS, IFRS for SMEs or a new EU-wide standard) they 
prefer. Second, we analyze the influencing factors of this decision. 
                                                 
9  The term public firm or capital-market orientated firm is based on Article 264d of the German Com-
mercial Code (GCC) and defines firms using organized (and EU-regulated) capital markets. 
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2 Purpose and regulation of SME accounting 
2.1 Financial reporting in a private firm setting 
The overall objective of accounting lies in the mitigation of information asymmetries re-
garding firms’ economic situation between stakeholders as “outsiders” and the manage-
ment as better-informed “insiders”. However, when distinguishing between firms using 
capital markets and private companies, there are sub-functions that vary in their im-
portance (e.g., Fülbier and Gassen 2008): On the one hand, accounting aims to provide 
timely and useful information to predict future developments and to allow a continuous 
valuation of companies’ shares (valuation). For firms with a strong separation of owner-
ship and management, the perspective of current and potential shareholders dominates. 
They attempt to precisely evaluate equities traded on secondary markets. On the other 
hand, the second purpose of financial accounting focuses on the coordination of contrac-
tual relationships such as dividend distribution, payout restrictions, taxation, or providing 
the basis for determining interests or the compensation of management (contracting).  
Apart from regulated capital markets, SME accounting is primarily characterized by the 
second purpose. Owners of privately held firms are not interested in a daily valuation of 
their shares and do not need to rely on accounting information. Close ties to the manage-
ment guarantee privileged channels to obtain information even beyond the scope of ac-
counting. Moreover, the special contractual relationships of their main stakeholders (lend-
ers, customers, employees, or tax authorities) require an accounting regime that considers 
the domestic company and tax law, as well as further national peculiarities.  
In contrast, large public companies operate in globalized markets with more homogene-
ous requirements. The IFRS reflect this homogeneity as they are consequently aligned to 
capital markets’ needs and are motivated by a strict focus on valuation. In comparison, 
however, the group of privately held firms is much more heterogeneous in firm charac-
teristics, as well as in stakeholder needs (Fülbier et al. 2010). For example, larger private 
firms with a broader group of shareholders or those which use unregulated markets (e.g., 
via SME bonds at the non-EU regulated over-the-counter market) are more likely to be 
influenced by valuation than small firms with simple ownership structures relying on re-
lationship lending (Nobes 1998).  
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2.2 Recent steps toward the internationalization of SME accounting  
Due to their great importance for economic development, the EC has paid more attention 
to SMEs during the last decade. The Small Business Act in 2008 visibly established the 
principle of think small first. The aim of the initiative is to reduce the bureaucratic burden 
of complying with legal rules and standards. This was also the leading principle of the 
latest accounting directive (2013/34/EU), which was implemented in Germany by the 
Accounting Directive Implementation Act (BilRUG) in 2015. A possible and intensively 
discussed adoption of the IFRS for SMEs (European Commission 2011a) – a simplified 
version of (full) IFRS – was neither addressed nor implemented by the directive. As early 
as 2010, the EC launched a public consultation on the IFRS for SMEs and already docu-
mented very heterogeneous opinions. While representatives from Eastern Europe and 
from countries with an Anglo-American tradition welcomed the adoption, continental 
European countries in particular clearly expressed their concerns (European Commission 
2010, Quagli and Paoloni 2012). The major role of accounting in code-law countries as a 
tool for coordination (assessment of dividends, tax or bankruptcy) may explain these re-
sults. Capital-market based accounting systems such as IFRS or IFRS for SMEs, which 
are exclusively designed to convey useful and value-relevant information, are less appro-
priate for contracting purposes (Fülbier and Gassen 2010, Ball et al. 2015). Moreover, 
firms in code-law countries traditionally rely more heavily on debt financing. The lending 
(house) banks are able to individually determine and secure their information needs and 
access channels beyond financial reporting (e.g., individual conversations or soft and con-
fidential non-accounting information).  
Particularly in Germany, an introduction of the IFRS for SMEs is not to be expected as 
the German legislator positioned the local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) against international standards. In 2009, the Accounting Law Modernization Act 
(BilMoG) significantly revised the local accounting rules, which are now seen as a more 
cost-efficient and simpler alternative (German Bundestag 2008). However, there are 78 
countries around the world (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 2016) that 
apply the IFRS for SMEs or a modified version. Since SMEs in some European countries 
are even obliged to follow (variants of) full IFRS, the question regarding an EU-wide 
harmonization is sensible and still en vogue. Recently, for example, the Green Paper 
Building a Capital Markets Union (European Commission 2015a) addressed the possi-
bility of a further harmonization for SMEs using the non-EU regulated capital market. 
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Although public opinion is mainly positive (see Section 5), it was not pursued in the sub-
sequent action plan (European Commission 2015b).  
3 Prior empirical research on SME accounting 
The internationalization of SME accounting is only rational and economically meaningful 
if a positive net benefit exists. For large and capital market-oriented companies, there are 
numerous empirical studies which show positive (capital market) effects of IFRS adop-
tion (for an overview, see, De George et al. 2016, more critically, Brüggemann et al. 
2013). The studies measure and document a significantly enhanced earnings quality. 
Based on higher transparency and a more efficient allocation of capital, firms benefit from 
lower costs of capital (equity and debt) (e.g., Daske et al. 2008, Daske et al. 2013). How-
ever, it is hard to disentangle IFRS adoption effects from other institutional changes (e.g., 
enforcement). Even if there should be advantages for larger firms, it remains doubtful 
whether they are also valid for SMEs. The argumentation of the IASB is based on the 
(continuing) globalization of product markets. Hence, private firms should also benefit 
from increased transparency, better comparability and ceteris paribus, lower transaction 
costs (IASB 2009, BC 36–37). In addition, it facilitates cross-border financing opportu-
nities and opens access to capital markets. Apart from technical simplifications of group 
accounting and consolidation, these arguments are solely based on the valuation aspect 
of accounting.  
A large number of empirical studies also deal with the acceptance and suitability of inter-
national standards for SMEs. In particular, survey-based evidence emphasizes the high 
importance of the contracting role of accounting (coordination). Most of these studies 
analyze the perception of preparers. Only a few consider financial statement users (e.g., 
banks). Table 1 provides an overview of studies with German participants.10 Asked about 
their perception regarding valuation-based accounting systems, such as the IFRS or IFRS 
for SMEs, participants are rather critical. Both systems receive only a small degree of 
acceptance, suggesting that (voluntary) adoption is not an option for the majority of firms 
(Eierle et al. 2007, Eierle and Haller 2010, Grottke et al. 2011). The survey participants 
cite the complexity of the rules, significant conversion and follow-up costs, and higher 
earnings volatility as essential arguments. Firms seem to be aware of the advantages, but 
                                                 
10  For a review of international survey studies on SME accounting, see, Mages (2009).  
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Table 1: 
Survey studies on the perception of international accounting standards 
Study Sample Subject 
Major findings 
Reasons for adaption 
(pros) 
Reasons against adaption 
(cons) 
Marten et al. 
(2002) 
1,200 members of “Deut-
sche Vereinigung für Fi-
nanzanalyse und Asset 
Management (DVFA)“ 
IFRS 
 
Participants welcome IFRS also for private firms; private 
firms often underestimate the benefits of an IFRS adaption. 
Mandler 
(2003b) 
145 academics IFRS Compared to firms, academics are more positive regarding 
the application of IFRS for private firms.  
Mandler (2003a, 
2004) 
400 member firms of the 
“IHK Mittelhessen” 
IFRS Enhanced international com-
parability. 
Significant costs for adap-
tion. 
Wetzel (2003) 8,364 private firms; reve-
nue > 35 m. € or total as-
sets > 13 m. € 
IFRS Substantial interest in the adaption of IFRS; about two thirds 
of private firms consider an adaption. 
v. Keitz and 
Stibi (2004) 
4,556 firms from 
North Rhine-Westphalian, 
revenue > 20 m. € 
IFRS Improves corporate finance 
opportunities; facilitates con-
solidation. 
High complexity; costs of 
adaption, negative impact on 
taxation. 
DIHK and PwC 
(2005) 
Members of the “DIHK”, 
response: 600 question-
naires 
IFRS Improves presentation of as-
sets, financial positon and 
performance. 
Costs of adaption and follow-
up costs. 
Oehler (2006a) 250 banks from the „Bun-
desverband deutscher 
Banken“ 
IFRS Banks use different rating tools for large companies than for 
SMEs; no major facilitations for financial analysis; adaption 
of IFRS does not per se lead to a better rating. 
Oehler (2006b) 1,800 firms from Franco-
nia, employees < 500, rev-
enue < 50 m. € 
IFRS IFRS adaption only if it 
would be claimed by banks; 
more informative value of 
accounting figures. 
Costs of adaption, costly em-
ployee training; complexity. 
Ochs and 
Leibfried (2006) 
600 firms, employees 
< 500, revenue < 50 m. 
IFRS Enhances international com-
parability. 
High complexity, costs of 
adaption and follow-up costs. 
Danne et al. 
(2007) 
60 large family firms IFRS Enhances comparability with 
peers. 
Increased costs for financial 
statement preparation, higher 
earnings volatility. 
v. Keitz et al. 
(2007) 
4,780 firms from 
North Rhine-Westphalian, 
revenue > 20 m. € 
IFRS Access to alternative financ-
ing opportunities; facilitated 
consolidation. 
High complexity; costs of 
adaption, negative impact on 
taxation. 
Kajüter et al. 
(2007) 
971 firms from Berlin, 
revenue > 5 m. €, em-
ployee 50-500  
ED IFRS 
for SMEs 
Enhances comparability with 
peers. 
Additional personnel is re-
quired, high complexity. 
Eierle et al. 
(2008) 
4,000 firms, revenue 
> 8 m. € 
ED IFRS 
for SMEs 
Many accounting issues that are simplified by the ED-IFRS 
for SMEs are not/less relevant for participating firms; evalu-
ation of certain accounting rules is mixed; 16 % of firms 
consider an adaption. 
Zülch and Löw 
(2008) 
2,430 employees from 
1.544 banks 
IFRS Firms do not perceive any benefits in credit ratings per se; 
only two participants would advise their clients to adapt 
IFRS; no improvements in credit condition through adap-
tion.  
Kajüter et al. 
(2008) 
1,593 SMEs form France, 
Germany, Netherland, 
Spain and UK 
ED IFRS 
for SMEs 
Overall, there is a need for harmonized accounting rules; 
however, evaluation is mixed; greater support from the UK; 
Italian and Spanish participants are more receptive than 
France and German respondents; the latter two are most crit-
ical. 
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classify them as less relevant. The assessment of international accounting from the per-
spective of banks’ is less homogenous, but the critical aspects dominate as well. Although 
banks as financial statement users welcome internationally comparable accounting data, 
only a small fraction sees significant advantages for their SME clients. Moreover, the 
results do not suggest substantial improvements in rating or credit costs. Nevertheless, 
cross-country evidence is mixed and the results are in line with expectations based on 
countries’ legal origin. The mostly negative view of German and French firms is offset 
by a much more positive perception of countries such as the United Kingdom, the Neth-
erlands and Spain (Kajüter et al. 2008). 
Table 1:  
continued 
Study Sample Subject 
Major findings 
Reasons for adaption 
(pros) 
Reasons against adaption 
(cons) 
Haller et al. 
(2009) 
59 employees from re-
gional banks 
IFRS Financial statements are relevant for capital lending; interna-
tional comparable information is also important for SMEs; 
however, participants do not see any need for special ac-
counting rules (IFRS for SMEs). 
Mages (2009) 2,767 partnerships, reve-
nue > 40 m. € 
IFRS Required by parent company; 
facilitates consolidation. 
Costs of adaption and follow-
up costs. 
Becker et al. 
(2009) 
113 medium-sized firms 
from Franconia 
IFRS Only a small proportion has ever dealt with IFRS or IFRS 
for SMEs; no major interest in adaption. 
Hane and  
Müller (2011) 
6,927 firms, employee 
< 250 
IFRS/ 
IFRS for 
SMEs 
IFRS for SMEs is advantageous compared to full IFRS; 
however, considering the purpose of accounting, participants 
prefer the modernized German GAAP (BilMoG). 
Eierle et al. 
(2011a) 
4,000 private firms, reve-
nue > 10 m. €,  
IFRS for 
SMEs 
Compared to a prior study, need for international compara-
bility has increased; evaluation of certain rules of the IFRS 
for SMEs is mixed; 14 % of firms consider an adaption.  
Eierle et al. 
(2011b) 
342 private firms, revenue 
> 20 m. € 
IFRS for 
SMEs 
Compared to the full IFRS, the IFRS for SMEs has a better 
cost-benefit ratio; only a few firms see advantages in a (hy-
pothetical) change from full IFRS to IFRS for SMEs. 
v. Keitz et al. 
(2011) 
4,564 firms from 
North Rhine-Westphalian, 
revenue > 20 m. € 
IFRS Enhanced comparability with 
peers; harmonization of fi-
nancial reporting and man-
agement accounting. 
Complexity; costs of adap-
tion and follow-up costs. 
Grottke et al. 
(2011) 
2,930 member firms of 
HWK, IHK and LSWB  
Bavaria 
IFRS for 
SMEs 
Participants reject an adaption; detailed notes entail indirect 
costs; no need for international comparability; only 5 % of 
participants consider the adaption to be useful. 
Müller and Hil-
lebrand (2014) 
58 large family firms  IFRS/ 
IFRS for 
SMEs 
Enhanced international com-
parability. 
Costs of adaption; high com-
plexity. 
Notes: Table comprises prior survey-based literature on the perception of international accounting rules for private 
firms of either full IFRS and/or the IFRS for SMEs indicated by column “subject”. Moreover, last column is twofold 
and sums either most cited or most relevant reasons for (pros) and against (cons) of a potential adaption. If the research 
design does not allow such a distinction, last column presents major findings. 
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Table 2: 
Archival studies on financial reporting properties of private firms 
Panel A: Differences in accounting quality 
Study Sample Major findings 
Ball and  
Shivakumar (2005) 
UK private firms 
1990-2000 
Compared to public companies, private firms exhibit financial re-
porting properties of lower quality. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) private firms from 13 
European countries 
1997-2003 
Compared to public companies, private firms exhibit a greater ex-
tent of earnings management; a strong legal system negatively af-
fects earnings management for public and private firms. 
Goncharov and  
Zimmermann (2006) 
Russian private firms 
2001-2002 
Compared to listed companies, private firms are stronger engaged 
in downsizing earnings in order to save taxes. 
Garrod et al. (2008) Slovenian SMEs 
2003 
SMEs systematically use asset write-downs to reduce their tax 
bills. 
Peek et al. (2010) private firms from 13 
European countries 
1993-2000 
Listed firms exhibit more asymmetric timeliness of income recog-
nition (conservatism) than private firms; results suggest that credi-
tors of public firms demand asymmetric timeliness.  
Hope et al. (2013) US private firms 
2001-2009 
Listed firms exhibit higher accrual quality and report more conser-
vatively than private firms. 
Kosi and  
Valentincic (2013) 
Slovenian SMEs 
2004-2005 
SMEs use asset write-downs to reduce their tax bills. 
Szczesny and  
Valentincic (2013) 
German SMEs 
2003-2006 
Significant associations between write-downs and profitability, fi-
nancial debt and dividends. 
Liu and  
Skerrat (2015) 
UK firms 
2006-2013 
Compared to private firms, listed companies exhibit a higher ac-
counting quality; large and medium-sized private firms exhibit a 
lower accounting quality compared to small and micro companies. 
Gassen and  
Fülbier (2015) 
European private firms 
1998-2007 
Income smoothing is positively related to the extent of debt fi-
nancing. 
Bigus et al. (2016) German small firms 
1996-2004 
The legal form is associated with accounting quality; compared to 
one-person businesses, corporations exhibit a higher degree of in-
come smoothing, conservatism and timely loss recognition  
Panel B: Benefits of financial reporting, accounting quality and audit 
Study Sample Major findings 
Allee and Yohn (2009) US small private firms 
2003-2004 
Firms that provide accrual-based financial statements exhibit 
lower interest rates than firms using cash accounting. 
Chen et al. (2011) private firms from 
emerging markets 
2002-2005 
Accounting quality is positively associated with investment effi-
ciency. 
Minnis (2011) US private firms 
2001-2008 
Firms with financial audits exhibit significantly lower costs of 
debt; accounting numbers (accruals) from audited financial state-
ments better predict future cash flows.  
Lennox and Pittman 
(2011) 
UK private firms 
2004 
Firms that voluntarily choose an audit receive improvements in 
rating. 
Karjalainen (2011) Finish private firms 
1999-2006 
Perceived audit quality is associated with lower cost of debt capi-
tal. 
Hope et al. (2011) private firms from 68 
countries 
2002-2005 
Firms with greater financial reporting credibility experience sig-
nificantly lower perceived problems in gaining access to external 
funding. 
Dedman and Kausuar 
(2012) 
UK small firms 
2004 
Private firms that retain to be audited voluntarily receive higher 
credit rating scores than those that opt out of audit. 
Van Caneghem and  
Van Campenhout (2012) 
Belgian private firms 
2007 
Information quantity and quality is positively associated with lev-
erage of SMEs. 
Van Bauwhede et al. 
(2015) 
Belgian private firms 
1997-2010 
Accrual quality is negatively associated with effective interest 
costs. 
Notes: Table comprises archival studies on accounting properties of private firms. The overview briefly shows a se-
lection of studies from a recent literature review by Singleton-Green (2015).  
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Another strand of the literature employs archival data and uses statistical methods to study 
the accounting properties of SMEs. Most of the studies aim to document differences in 
financial reporting and accounting behavior between small and large firms, private and 
public firms, or between owner- and externally managed firms. Table 2 shows a selection 
of studies based on a recent literature review by Singleton-Green (2015). The results im-
ply that accounting properties depend on the listing status (e.g., Burgstahler et al. 2006), 
the level of debt financing (e.g., Gassen and Fülbier 2015), or the country of origin. The 
latter in particular supports the initially stated thesis of high interdependencies between 
the socio-economic backgrounds and SME accounting. Hence, differential accounting re-
quirements based on country-level idiosyncrasies and company characteristics (e.g., list-
ing status) seem to be an adequate approach. An evaluation of further harmonization 
should therefore not only be based on a presumably enhanced accounting quality. Rather, 
the costs and benefits will vary with respect to jurisdiction, the type of SME (distance to 
capital markets, internationality, or size) and among the main stakeholders (shareholders, 
banks, suppliers, etc.). However, there is a lack of differentiated empirical support. Thus, 
we address this issue by analyzing the cross-country perception of further harmonization 
of SME accounting in the EU.  
4 Empirical evidence on the public opinion within the EU 
4.1 Research question and data 
In this section, we examine the public opinion on a further harmonization of SME ac-
counting and its dependence on socio-economic factors. We therefore analyze the com-
ments on the Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union of the European Commis-
sion (2015a). It discusses various initiatives aiming to increase and diversify the financing 
opportunities of private firms and to reduce the costs of raising capital for SMEs (EC 
2015). Among others, it addresses the question of whether standardized accounting 
should also be extended to firms on "SME Growth Markets", introduced by the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II). The SME Growth Markets are a separate 
segment or sub-category of multilateral trading facilities (MTFs).11 Currently, there are 
151 MTFs in the EU, of which 14 are located in Germany (ESMA 2016). Although MTFs 
fulfill similar functions as a stock exchange, they are not part of the regulated market. 
                                                 
11  According to the EU directive, SMEs are defined as companies with less than 200 m. € market capital-
ization (Article 4 (13) of MiFID II). 
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This allows several simplifications, which make it easier for SMEs to obtain a listing and 
to comply with follow-up requirements. For example, there is no ad-hoc disclosure and 
no general IFRS obligation, because the operator of the MTF specifies the conditions and 
requirements. 
Analyzing the comments on the Green Paper allows a picture of the public opinion toward 
further harmonization of SME accounting to be drawn. Indeed, this primarily covers the 
segment of larger SMEs using non-EU regulated capital markets (MTFs). Nevertheless, 
the results are indicative of the overall acceptance of further harmonization (and interna-
tionalization) of SME accounting.12 Moreover, we examine the determinants of ac-
ceptance. There are many influencing factors, such as the opportunistic behavior of the 
participants (lobbying) or the institutional setting and legal environment of participants’ 
origin. The different and often competing intentions of interest groups (e.g., users, pre-
parers, regulators, accounting profession, etc.) have already been highlighted by various 
studies (e.g., Jorissen et al. 2012). For example, auditors are more likely to exhibit greater 
interests in regulatory changes because this creates additional audit and advisory needs. 
In contrast, preparers will weigh the benefits of switching to a new system (e.g., compa-
rability) against the incurred costs. We expect increased support for harmonization from 
countries that already allow or require (modified) international standards as costs for 
adoption are relatively low. However, in these countries, additional benefits are limited. 
There is also no clear prediction regarding the countries’ current SME funding situation. 
On the one hand, liquid equity markets and frictionless access to debt capital (from banks 
or debt markets) can reduce incentives to gain additional (international) investors. On the 
other hand, companies that already use these sources could benefit from increased com-
petition between suppliers and financing alternatives, i.e., they are more likely to prefer 
harmonization. If firms are mostly interested in the contracting purpose of accounting, 
they will be confronted with higher costs as they need a second set of reporting instru-
ments. Further, cost-benefit considerations depend on complexity, the administrative bur-
dens of financial statement preparation and the international comparability of accounting 
figures (Hail et al. 2010).  
                                                 
12  The raised question is as follows (Q8): “Is there value in developing a common EU level accounting 
standard for small and medium-sized companies listed on MTFs? Should such a standard become a 
feature of SME Growth Markets? If so, under which conditions?” (EC 2015a). 
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4.2 Methodological approach and research design  
In sum, the EU received 376 comment letters during the consultation period from 
18th February to 13th May 2015.13 The following analysis is limited to comments that 
contain statements on the harmonization of financial reporting. Since we aim to assess 
the opinion of European stakeholders, we exclude comments from international institu-
tions and non-EU countries. Furthermore, we drop double submissions (e.g., in different 
languages), which result in a final sample of 191 comment letters.  
First, we conduct a qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2015). Since the relevant section 
of the Green Paper ends in an open question, we are not able to formulate any ex-ante 
expectations on proposed accounting systems and the type of argumentation. Hence, we 
build the categories inductively. All comments are coded twice. In a first step, we prede-
fine appropriate categories. During the second coding, we reduce the number of catego-
ries and check consistency. This two-stage procedure enhances the validity of the inher-
ently subjective approach.  
Next, we transform the categories into quantitative data. The combination of qualitative 
and quantitative content analysis is a common approach to statistically evaluate results 
(Mayring 2001). Moreover, it allows merging data from other sources. By employing 
logistic regressions, we finally analyze the influence of individual factors on the ac-
ceptance (decision behavior) of a further harmonization of SME accounting.  
All dependent variables IFRS, IFRSforSMEs, NewStandard and NoReference are binary 
and take the value of “1” if the respondent agrees with the introduction of one of the 
respective (new) accounting systems (otherwise “0”). Agreement includes both positive 
comments regarding the introduction of the original standards of the IASB, as well as a 
participant preference for a modified version. The variable Harmonization captures the 
overall acceptance regardless of the proposed accounting system. It takes the value of “1” 
if one of the four above-mentioned variables is equal to one. 
The independent variables (covariates) cover four different aspects. The first category 
(market & regulation) comprises six country-level measures, which describe the current 
accounting regulation and financing opportunities of respondents’ origin countries: Eq-
uity proxies the strength of the local equity markets, Loans represents the availability of 
                                                 
13  All comment letters can be obtained from the website of the European Commission (EU Survey) 
(https://goo.gl/JVkcQE). 
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debt capital and Reporting refers to the quality of financial reporting in respondents’ 
countries. All three variables are based on the Global Competitiveness Report of the 
World Economic Forum (2015), which obtained the indicators by surveying 13,264 pro-
fessionals from 144 countries. The values refer to the year 2015, i.e., the last complete 
year before the Green Paper was issued. The variables range from "1" (poor) to "7" 
(good). TaxLink indicates the alignment of financial accounting and taxation (book-tax 
alignment as it is the case in Germany). The variables IFRSentity and IFRSgroup are equal to 
one if domestic regulation permits or requires IFRS for individual (entity) and consoli-
dated financial statements (group).  
The second group of variables indicates countries’ legal origin. The differentiation is 
based on La Porta et al. (1997) (English origin, Legoruk; French origin, Legorfr; German 
origin, Legorge; Scandinavian origin, Legorsc). The third set denotes the type of respond-
ent. We classify all participants based on the scheme of Larson (2007): financial statement 
users (User), firms and industry organizations as financial statement preparers (Pre-
parer), accounting, tax and auditing firms (Profession), governmental institutions and 
regulators (Regulators) and all others, such as academics (Other).  
The last group of variables captures participants’ arguments obtained from the qualitative 
analysis. We define three pairs of binary measures: increasing (Costsup) and decreasing 
costs (Costsdown), an increase (Compareup) or decrease (Comparedown) in the comparability 
of accounting data, and simplified (Simple) or increasing accounting complexity (Com-
plex) through further EU-level harmonization. All variables are defined in more detail in 
Appendix A. 
5 Results 
Overall, there is a high level of acceptance (Figure 2), as 62 % of the respondents support 
a further harmonization of SME accounting in Europe. However, there are major differ-
ences regarding the specific configuration and the regulatory basis for harmonization (Ta-
ble 3). A new EU-wide standard for SMEs listed on non-regulated capital markets (MTFs) 
is predominantly rejected (40 %). In particular, the group of accounting profession (65 %) 
is opposed. Moreover, there is only little support for the IFRS for SMEs, which is pre-
ferred by 10 %; 3 % of respondents prefer a modified form. The (full) IFRS achieves the 
greatest amount of approval among all interest groups. About 16 % favor the IFRS as a 
basis for further harmonization, while another 21 % support the adoption of a modified 
PART A: REGULATION 
24 
version. Some respondents propose the UK-GAAP as a possible reference for modifica-
tions.14 Among others, the British regulator significantly reduced the amount of notes, 
resulting in less complex requirements and a less costly application. Of course, a modified 
standard for SMEs will not fully allow international comparability because other SMEs 
apply local GAAP or even full IFRS. However, compared to a completely new standard, 
this would still improve comparability. Before the pros and cons are discussed further, 
we first characterize the participants and their origins in more detail.  
In other comment letter analyses with a focus on accounting, the users of financial state-
ments are generally underrepresented, which might be due to their decentralized organi-
zation (e.g., Holder et al. 2013). In this case, however, users make up the largest group of 
                                                 
14  Private firms from the UK are allowed to use a modified version of the IFRS (Financial Reporting 
Standard (FRS) 101) or a modified version of the IFRS for SMEs (FRS 102) (Financial Reporting 
Council 2015). 
Figure 2: 
Responses regarding a regulatory basis for further harmonization 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts results of content analysis regarding the preferred regulatory solution for further 
accounting harmonization. The first bar shows participants’ overall perception regarding a further harmo-
nization for SMEs listed on MTFs. The coding scheme differentiates between the original standard, a mod-
ified version (mod.) and if participant prefers an option for a voluntary application. Comments without a 
reference to a preferred standard (NoReference) are not depicted. Multiple answers possible. 
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participants (54 %). The broad thematic focus of the Green Paper, which does not explic-
itly refer to accounting expertise, may provide a possible explanation for this. In particu-
lar, a comparable high number of bank and analyst associations as well as shareholder 
representatives participated. This group is otherwise less involved in, e.g., the due pro-
cesses of the IASB. The majority of comments are from countries with a French legal 
origin (Legorfr, 44 %). However, this concentration in relation to nationality and other 
Table 4: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Market & regulation 
Equity 191 4.157 0.604 3.861 4,252 4.532 
Loans 191 3.113 0.613 2.690 3,328 3.349 
Reporting 191 5.504 0.446 5.464 5,573 5.791 
TaxLink 191 0.717 0.452 0 1 1 
IFRSentity 191 0.639 0.482 0 1 1 
IFRSgroup 191 0.979 0.144 1 1 1 
Legal origin 
Legoruk 191 0.225 0.419 0 0 0 
Legorfr 191 0.440 0.498 0 0 1 
Legorge 191 0.267 0.444 0 0 1 
Legorsc 191 0.068 0.253 0 0 0 
Interest group 
User 191 0.545 0.499 0 1 0 
Other 191 0.026 0.160 0 0 0 
Preparer 191 0.157 0.365 0 0 0 
Profession 191 0.105 0.307 0 0 0 
Regulator 191 0.168 0.374 0 0 1 
Argument 
Costsup 191 0.419 0.495 0 0 1 
Costsdown 191 0.010 0.102 0 0 0 
Compareup 191 0.372 0.485 0 0 1 
Comparedown 191 0.178 0.384 0 0 0 
Simple 191 0.110 0.314 0 0 0 
Complex 191 0.152 0.360 0 0 0 
Notes: Table depicts descriptive statistics of independent variables. All variables are defined as described 
in Appendix A.  
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macroeconomic and regulatory determinants is not surprising when considering the re-
striction on comments from EU countries. The variables Equity and Reporting show high 
values. With a mean of 5.5, the quality of financial reporting is already considered to be 
relatively high. More than 70 % of comments are from countries with book-tax conform-
ity (TaxLink).15 Moreover, about 64 % (98 %) of participants are from countries, which 
allow or require IFRS for individual statements (consolidated statements). Higher ex-
pected administrative costs for preparers (Costsup, 42 %) and increasing the comparability 
of financial statements (Compareup, 37 %) are the most cited arguments. Only 1 % of 
participants expect a cost reduction through harmonization (Costdown). The arguments re-
garding a proposed increase in complexity vs. potential simplifications are balanced 
(15 % vs. 11 %). Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics. 
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of independent variables. There are partly high cor-
relations (> 0.5) between the variables capturing the macroeconomic and legal environ-
ment. However, the variance inflation factors of all logistic regressions are well below 
3.5, indicating only moderate multicollinearity, which should not affect the results 
(Wooldridge 2009). 
Results from logistic regressions are depicted in Table 6. The coefficients show marginal 
effects that quantify the increase in the probability of an approval of harmonization when 
the independent variable increases by one unit. Likewise, the coefficients of Models (2-
5) indicate the marginal increase in acceptance of the regulatory alternatives (full IFRS, 
IFRS for SMEs, etc.). Model (1) shows the influence of determinants toward the harmo-
nization of SME accounting regardless of the underlying accounting system. The ac-
ceptance enhances if the marginal costs of the potential change of the accounting system 
are low. This is the case if the country already possesses a high-quality domestic account-
ing system (Reporting) or allows financial statements in accordance with the IFRS 
(IFRSentity). Both variables are positively associated. Moreover, respondents from coun-
tries with a French legal origin, which do not extensively rely on capital-market based 
funding, are more likely to support harmonization. It is probable that they will benefit 
from more simplified access to (foreign) capital markets through harmonization. The 
highly significant coefficients of Compareup and Simple presumably show the influence 
                                                 
15  We do not include a binary variable, capturing the (voluntary) application of the IFRS for SMEs of the 
country of origin, as it correlates almost perfectly with TaxLink (correlation amounts to -0,94). 
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Table 6: 
Determinants of perception of further harmonization 
 (1) Harmonization 
(2) 
IFRS 
(3) 
IFRS for SMEs 
(4) 
New Standard 
Market & regulation     
Equity -0.182 -0.217* 0.026 0.101 
 (-1.56) (-1.77) (0.27) (0.95) 
Loans -0.221* -0.005 -0.126 0.020 
 (-1.69) (-0.03) (-1.20) (0.20) 
Reporting 0.654*** 0.389** 0.087 -0.063 
 (3.86) (2.16) (0.72) (-0.45) 
TaxLink 0.237 0.168 0.064 -0.089 
 (1.54) (1.07) (0.56) (-0.73) 
IFRSentity 0.252** 0.148 -0.073 0.042 
 (2.54) (1.43) (-0.99) (0.54) 
IFRSgroup -0.384* -0.600*** n.a. -0.101 
 (-1.80) (-3.39) (.) (-0.82) 
Legal origin     
Legoruk 0.187 0.370** -0.073 -0.155 
 (1.00) (2.25) (-0.61) (-1.00) 
Legorfr 0.306* 0.302** -0.154 0.059 
 (1.93) (2.24) (-1.62) (0.56) 
Legorge 0.013 -0.110 -0.174* 0.072 
 (0.09) (-0.75) (-1.84) (0.63) 
Interest group     
Other 0.030 -0.073 n.a. 0.111 
 (0.16) (-0.39) (.) (0.99) 
Preparer -0.053 -0.008 -0.036 0.079 
 (-0.62) (-0.08) (-0.46) (1.32) 
Profession 0.150 0.307*** -0.076 0.067 
 (1.19) (3.02) (-0.90) (0.90) 
Regulators -0.049 0.028 0.021 -0.105 
 (-0.54) (0.34) (0.35) (-1.03) 
Argument     
Costsup -0.047 -0.071 0.026 0.036 
 (-0.71) (-1.09) (0.53) (0.76) 
Costsdown 0.000 -0.404 0.000 n.a. 
 (.) (-1.44) (.) (.) 
Compareup 0.204*** 0.115* 0.039 -0.044 
 (3.13) (1.93) (0.83) (-0.84) 
Comparedown 0.139 0.253*** -0.061 n.a. 
 (1.44) (3.51) (-0.91) (.) 
Simple 0.513*** 0.065 0.174*** 0.198*** 
 (2.73) (0.68) (2.95) (3.25) 
Complex 0.044 0.072 0.017 -0.090 
 (0.44) (0.87) (0.25) (-1.15) 
     
n 189 191 189 191 
VIF 2.96 2.97 3.15 3.13 
AUC 0.81 0.83 0.77 0.78 
Pseudo R² 0.231 0.277 0.155 0.160 
     
Notes: Table depicts logit regression results with either (1) Harmonization, (2) IFRS, (3) IFRSforSMEs and (4) 
NewStandard as dependent variable. For parsimony, (5) NoReference is not depicted. All variables are defined as de-
scribed in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
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of financial statement users, who expect a simplified handling of financial information 
through enhanced international comparability. 
Model (2) represents the support for harmonization through the introduction of (modified) 
IFRS. The results are similar. The accounting profession group is significantly more 
likely to propose IFRS as regulatory basis for further accounting harmonization.16 Like-
wise, respondents from countries with an English or French legal origin significantly sup-
port IFRS.17 The significant coefficient of Comparedown suggests that respondents desire 
increasing comparability between all companies, regardless of the type of public capital 
market they use. Consequently, they are not interested in a further fragmentation of Eu-
ropean accounting regulations (28 national systems plus IFRS). Moreover, this highlights 
the importance of the valuation aspect of accounting from the user’s point of view. 
The remaining Models (3-5) analyze the support for the (modified) IFRS for SMEs, the 
introduction of a new set of EU-level accounting rules and general support for further 
harmonization without reference to a certain standard. Due to the missing variance, some 
variables are omitted ("n.a."). The IFRS for SMEs, as well as a potential new EU-wide 
standard, are seen as an opportunity for simplification, however, are not associated with 
increased comparability. This seems reasonable, since the alternatives neither guarantee 
comparability to other SMEs that prepare their accounts according to national standards 
nor to public firms using IFRS. 
The explanatory power of the employed models is two-fold. Models (1) and (2) show a 
pseudo R² of above 20 %, while Models (3-5) are well below.18 Accordingly, the results 
of the former appear to be more valid. In addition, the low variance of the independent 
variables weakens the power of the models examining the preference for certain account-
ing systems. Overall, this study allows some tentative but interesting inferences. The par-
ticipants are very interested in the further harmonization of SME accounting. However, 
they focus less on small, “private” firms (typical SMEs) and more on larger companies 
listed on regulated capital markets or MTFs. In accordance with the valuation purpose of 
accounting, they give more weight to gains in comparability on the user side than to ad-
ditional costs. Hence, the comments do not reveal a clear indication regarding preferences 
for harmonization or internationalization for firms beyond capital markets. In particular, 
                                                 
16  The reference category is User. 
17  The reference category is Legorsc. 
18  The values of the Area Under the Curve (AUC) are higher than 0.8 and are thus at a good level (Back-
haus et al. 2016). 
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variables that represent the coordination purpose (TaxLink and Loans) are either not as-
sociated or are negatively associated. On the basis of these comments, effort regarding 
further harmonization should preferably be limited to firms that are closer to capital mar-
kets.  
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper analyzes the harmonization and internationalization of SME accounting in 
Europe. First, we discuss its functional characteristics, the focus toward contracting (co-
ordination purpose) and the strong linkage with countries’ institutional environments. The 
results of prior empirical studies are mixed. Survey studies reveal the dominance of the 
contracting purpose of accounting and a high sensibility regarding the cost-benefit con-
siderations of private firms. In particular, German survey participants are rather skeptical 
when asked about a potential application of international accounting standards. However, 
quantitative evidence documents benefits that enhance valuation purpose of financial ac-
counting and thereby support the necessity of differential accounting. Second, we exam-
ine the perception of a further harmonization and internationalization of SME accounting 
based on comments on the EU Green Paper Building a Capital Markets Union. Overall, 
the respondents support a further harmonization for SMEs that are listed on non-regulated 
capital markets (MTFs). In particular, the comments welcome enhanced comparability 
with public firms when applying IFRS as the basis for further harmonization. Neverthe-
less, concerns regarding higher administrative costs are prevalent. Effort on a further har-
monization beyond capital markets is only supported if there are substantial administra-
tive simplifications, e.g., by reducing complexity of legal requirements. 
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Appendix A: 
Variable definitions and data sources 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables 
Harmonization Is a binary variable equal to one if respondent supports further account-
ing harmonization of firms listed on MTFs. 
IFRS 
IFRSforSMEs 
NewStandard 
NoReference 
Are binary variables that equal 1 if respondent supports a further ac-
counting harmonization of firms listed on MTFs and therefore either 
prefers (a modified version of) IFRS, (a modified version of) the IFRS 
for SMEs, a new EU-wide accounting standard, or provides no refer-
ence. 
Market & regulation 
Equity Is a country-level variable capturing the ease of financing through the 
local the equity market from 1 “extremely difficult” to 7 “extremely 
easy”. It is based on question 8.03 of the Global Competitive Report 
(GCR) 2014 (World Economic Forum 2015). 
Loans Is a country-level variable capturing the ease to obtain a bank loan from 
1 “extremely difficult” to 7 “extremely easy”. It is based on question 
8.04 of the GCR 2014. 
Reporting Is a county-level variable capturing the strength of auditing and report-
ing standards from 1 “extremely weak” to 7 “extremely strong”. It is 
based on question 1.18 of the GCR 2014. 
TaxLink Is a binary variable equal to one if respondents’ country has book-tax 
conformity according to European Commission (2011b). 
IFRSentity 
IFRSgroup 
Is a binary variable equal to one if respondents’ country allows IFRS 
for the entity-level account (entity)/the consolidated account (group) as 
exempting financial statement.  
Legal origin 
Legoruk 
Legorfr 
Legorge 
Legorsc 
Are binary variables equal to one if the legal tradition of respondents’ 
country is either English origin (uk), French origin (fr), German origin 
(ge), or Scandinavian origin (sc) according to La Porta et al. (1997). 
Interest group 
User Is a binary variable equal to one if respondent is a financial statement 
user as a financial services corporation, an investor, a bank or an analyst 
(organization). 
Profession Is a binary variable equal to one if respondent is a public accounting 
firm, tax advisor firm or a professional accountancy body. 
Regulator Is a binary variable equal to one if respondent as regulator as a govern-
mental agency, a private standard setter or a stock exchange operator. 
Preparer Is a binary variable equal to one if respondent as financial statement 
preparer as a firm or industry associations. 
Other Is a binary variable equal to one if respondent is not assignable to one 
of the above groups as academics.  
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Appendix A:  
continued 
Variables Definition 
Arguments 
Costsup 
Costsdown 
Are binary variables equal to one if respondent cites arguments associ-
ated with increasing costs (up)/decreasing costs (down) through further 
harmonization. 
Compareup 
Comparedown 
Are binary variables equal to one if respondent cites arguments associ-
ated with an increasing comparability (up)/decreasing comparability 
(down) through further harmonization. 
Simple 
Complex 
Are binary variables equal to one if respondent cites arguments associ-
ated with a more simplification (simple)/higher complexity (up) through 
further harmonization. 
 
 
  
 
  
  
Part B: 
Timeliness 
The later, the better? 
Disclosure timing behavior of German private firms 
 
 
A b s t r a c t  
We analyze the determinants of the disclosure timing decision of private 
firms. Without capital-market pressure, lower litigation risks and higher rele-
vance of private communication channels, firms face different cost-benefit 
considerations regarding the public availability of financial statements com-
pared to listed firms. We argue that firms exploit discretion in timeliness to 
handle related costs. Our analysis is based on a hand-collected sample of 
1,000 large private companies from Germany. All firms are subject to the 
same mandatory disclosure rules, enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. 
Our results suggest that disclosure delay is particularly pronounced for firms 
facing higher proprietary costs. Loss-reporting as well as outperforming firms 
significantly delay filing requirements. Moreover, firms exhibiting higher 
perceived competition and family-owned firms tend to withhold financial 
statements for a longer period. Many companies even accept monetary sanc-
tions for overrunning legal deadlines. Finally, we show that disclosure timing 
seems to complement other channels to create a less transparent information 
environment. Our results have practical implications as they shed some light 
on the perception of mandatory disclosure and emphasize that proprietary 
costs can be substantial.  
 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Marcus Bravidor. A paper version is available as Wittmann 
and Bravidor (2019). Some descriptive results are published as Fülbier et al. (2019). 
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1 Introduction 
According to European regulations, even private firms are required to publish annual fi-
nancial reports. Compared to many other parts of the world, the European disclosure re-
quirements for private firms are stricter and more far-reaching. For example, in the US 
and Canada, financial accounting is largely unregulated and mandatory disclosure is re-
stricted to stock-listed companies. In Germany, the implementation of the EU directive 
2003/58/EC in 2006 led to two fundamental changes in the disclosure regime. First, the 
regulation strengthened the hitherto weak enforcement mechanism. If a company fails to 
comply with its disclosure obligations, the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) now fines it 
automatically. Less surprisingly, this has led to a significant increase in compliance and 
disclosure rates (e.g., Henselmann and Kaya 2008, Löffelmann 2010). Second, the overall 
disclosure procedure and data storage were modernized in terms of a digital infrastruc-
ture, the Electronic Federal Gazette. This nationwide platform replaced former physical 
registers, maintained by local courts. As a consequence, both the filing process, and data 
retrieval have been facilitated by digitalization. Anyone from around world is able to ob-
tain information about a company free of charge. Needless to mention, that useful data 
are also provided to non-transacting stakeholders19 as (potential) competitors to the dis-
advantage of the disclosing company. Hence, in addition to administrative costs, disclos-
ing firms face increased indirect costs; in particular, so-called proprietary costs (Verrec-
chia 1983). 
With a fixed set of disclosure requirements (what to disclose) and an automated sanction-
ing mechanism in place (whether to disclose), companies can only decrease indirect costs 
by varying the timeliness of publicly available financial information (when to disclose). 
Timing is crucial when it comes to influencing the relevance of the information and its 
capacity to create value for third parties (Elliot and Jacobson 1994). Hence, the magnitude 
of proprietary costs and the usefulness of publicly available filings diminish over time. In 
other words, proprietary costs are a function of time (Verrecchia 1983). Thus, firms are 
                                                 
19  Following Breuer et al. (2019a) we use the term “transacting stakeholder” as “the subset of stakeholders 
who consume the firms’ public disclosures and exchange other goods with the firm” (e.g., banks, sup-
pliers or customers). “Non-transacting stakeholders” are stakeholders who are interested in, but do not 
interact with the firm (e.g., competitors or neighbors). 
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able to dissipate the inherent indirect costs of mandatory disclosure by exploiting discre-
tion in timing. The resulting and observable delay correlates with firms’ incentives to 
withhold information (Bigus and Hillebrand 2017). 
To comply with the legal rules, annual financial statements have to be filed within twelve 
months after the end of the fiscal year. Firms are allowed to fully exhaust the statutory 
deadline. Hence, managers possess discretion in timing. It could be even rational to delay 
filing beyond the legal deadline in order to further reduce the indirect costs of disclosure. 
If a firm is willing to accept financial penalties, it can “buy” some time and withhold 
publication as long as the cumulative fines are below the anticipated disclosure costs. 
Empirical (survey) evidence supports the practical relevance of this strategy (e.g., Grottke 
et al. 2012). However, prior literature on disclosure timeliness mainly concentrates on 
listed companies (e.g., Givoly and Palmon 1982, Alford et al. 1994, Sengupta 2004, Cao 
et al. 2016). Given differences in regulatory requirements and in the incentive structure, 
it is doubtful whether these results are also valid for private companies. In contrast to 
well-investigated public counterparts, private firms naturally possess a smaller number of 
stakeholders and exhibit a more concentrated ownership. Considering the lack of interim 
reporting, ad hoc reporting and a lower media coverage, annual filings are often the only 
source of information for third parties. Hence, the public available financial statements 
are of a higher relative importance. In the absence of pressure from capital markets, pri-
vate firms do not have to follow certain earnings release patterns or disclosure paths. In 
turn, they are not subject to external pressure and have more discretion in choosing an 
optimal filing date. Lower litigation risk as well as the existence of private channel infor-
mation enhance flexibility.  
The German economy is characterized by a high importance of private companies. They 
add approximately 58 % to German GDP (IFM Bonn 2019). Many of those companies 
are highly specialized technology firms and leading industrial manufacturers (“hidden 
champions”). Publishing detailed information about profitability, margins or the product 
pipeline may undermine their competitive position (Breuer et al. 2019c).  
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Germany’s Federal Gazette is considered to be reliable and easy to access from a user’s 
perspective.20 Moreover, strict enforcement ensures a level playing field for all compa-
nies. It is therefore less surprising, that the regulation of 2006 is regarded as a“transpar-
ency shock” (Laschewski and Nasev 2018). Featuring these aspects, the German regula-
tory environment provides a unique setting to observe firms’ (un)willingness to provide 
public information, which in turn allows for inferences on the indirect costs of mandatory 
disclosure. We thus examine the determinants of the disclosure delay (reporting lag) 
based on a sample of 1,000 German private firms over a six-year period. Using multivar-
iate regressions, we further investigate whether private firms pursue strategic timing be-
havior.  
Our results indicate that German private firms fully use their discretion on disclosure 
timing. Whereas the overall disclosure compliance rate is very high, only 38 % of annual 
reports are filed within legal deadlines. It takes up to 16 months before 90 % of financial 
statements are publicly available. We show that this lag is not caused by financial state-
ment preparation and auditing processes. In line with prior research on listed companies 
(e.g., Kothari et al. 2009), we find a strong association between firm performance and the 
reporting lag. The disclosure delay of loss-reporting firms is significantly longer. In loss-
years, companies are even more likely to delay and to accept financial penalties. This is 
consistent with rising agency costs. We find further support and even stronger effects in 
cases where reporting incentives change. Companies significantly shorten (extend) the 
reporting lag if they report a profit (loss) after a loss (profit) in the prior year. In line with 
the proprietary-costs hypothesis, we also find a u-shaped relationship between profitabil-
ity and the reporting lag, which is comparable to the results of Muiño and Núñez-Nickel 
(2016). Outperforming firms significantly delay disclosure as well, indicating disclosure 
timing as a strategy to hide high margins to deter potential competitors from entering 
prospering markets. Based on a firm-specific measure of competition using textual anal-
ysis, we also find a positive association. Firms in more competitive markets tend to delay 
financial statements to a significantly greater extent and are more likely to go beyond 
legal deadlines. This again suggests proprietary concerns to be substantial costs of man-
                                                 
20  Data retrieval from the German Federal Gazette is completely free of charge, without any user registra-
tion requirements or verification mechanisms, allows for full-text searches and mobile access (applica-
tion), and provides multi-lingual guidance. Based on a self-developed index by Kaya and Seebeck 
(2019), which captures data availability, accessibility and serviceability, the German Federal Gazette 
achieves one of the highest scores among company registers from 90 countries. 
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datory disclosure. Next to proprietary costs, we also find evidence that privacy costs af-
fect the disclosure timing decision. Family ownership is positively related to the reporting 
lag. Put differently, family firms exhibit longer reporting lags, presumably to impede in-
formation on the wealth and income position of the family from being leaked to the pub-
lic. Finally, we find slight support to indicate that the timing decision is exploited as a 
complementary channel to decrease firms’ information environment. Timing is associated 
with other financial reporting decisions, as late filed financial statements are shorter in 
length and exhibit a higher degree of discretionary accruals. 
Overall, we document private firms’ reluctance regarding the public availability of finan-
cial statements and provide evidence that private firms exploit discretion in timeliness to 
handle indirect costs of mandatory disclosure. Our paper contributes to several strands of 
the literature. First, we add to the research on disclosure timing behavior. Prior literature 
predominantly focuses on public companies. Second, we emphasize and analyze differ-
ences in the incentive structure of private and public companies, e.g., the relation with 
proprietary or privacy costs. We also suggest disclosure timeliness as a measure to indi-
rectly operationalize them. Third, according to the results of Anderson et al. (2013), fam-
ily-owned firms tend to prefer a more opaque information environment. We add to this 
aspect of the family-firm literature and reveal significantly longer reporting lags for them. 
Fourth, our study contributes to the ongoing policy debate regarding the regulation of 
private firms’ accounting disclosures. In this way, we contribute to a better understanding 
of the financial reporting practice of private firms and increase the awareness of proprie-
tary costs in a mandatory disclosure regime. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutions, historical devel-
opment and contemporary status of the regulatory landscape for private company disclo-
sures in Germany. In Section 3, we provide a short overview of the relevant literature and 
derive a theoretical frame for the incentive structures of private companies. We also in-
troduce potential determinants of the disclosure timing decision. Section 4 contains a de-
scription of our research design, the model specification and the sample. We present our 
results in Section 5. Additional analysis and robustness tests are provided in Section 6. 
The paper concludes with a short summary and discussion in Section 7. 
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2 German regulatory environment 
The mandatory disclosure regime in Germany dates back to the 19th century. However, 
more recent amendments such as the Accounting and Reporting Law of 1985 
(Bilanzrichtliniengesetz (BiRiLiG)) and the Qualifying Partnerships Act (Kapitalgesell-
schaften-und-Co.-Richtlinie-Gesetz (KapCoRiLiG)) of 2000 aligned the German regula-
tory environment with European requirements (Eierle 2005). The scope of mandatory 
disclosure extends to all companies with limited liability which covers public limited 
(AG) or private limited companies (GmbH) as well as partnerships without a personally 
liable individual as shareholder (e.g., GmbH & Co. KG). The German Public Disclosure 
Act (Publizitätsgesetz (PublG)) complements the regulations and even requires large21 
firms with unlimited liability to disclose annual financial accounts. The rules require 
firms to file at least the balance sheet, the income statement, notes and the appropriation 
of net profit. Large companies must add a management report and the report of the super-
visory board. Small and medium-sized companies enjoy certain flexibility to avoid over-
burdening bureaucracy (Eierle 2005), including shortened accounts, the omission of cer-
tain positions (e.g., revenues) or the income statement as a whole, as well as certain notes 
(see Table 7 for details).  
All documents have to be filed within 12 months after the fiscal year-end. Despite the 
outlined mandatory disclosure obligation, many firms ignored the legal requirements in 
the past.22 Prior to 2007, local register courts lacked sufficient instruments to enforce the 
disclosure rules. Prosecution required a formal complaint by a third party. As this was 
rarely the case, firms did not need to fear considerable consequences. The disclosure re-
quirements could therefore be described as “quasi-voluntary”. Unsurprisingly, disclosure 
rates were at a very low level. Empirical investigations reveal that only a small fraction 
of companies complied with the rules (Ballwieser and Häger 1991, Marx and 
Dallmann 2004, Theile and Nitsche 2006). Nevertheless, this was not a major issue. In 
light of the prevalence of debt financing in Germany (Fülbier and Klein 2015), banks and 
other major stakeholders directly obtain inside information via private channels.  
                                                 
21  According to the German Public Disclosure Act (PublG), an unlimited-liability firm is qualified as large 
if it meets at least two of the following thresholds in two consecutive years: (i) total assets > 65 m. €, 
(ii) revenues > 130 m. €, and (iii) number of employees > 5,000. 
22  For empirical evidence, see Section 3.2. 
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To comply with European regulation, Germany significantly changed its disclosure re-
gime in 2007. Among others, the Act on Electronic Commercial and Registers of Coop-
eratives and Business Registers (EHUG) included a revision of the disclosure enforce-
ment system. The newly established FOJ now automatically imposes sanctions (ex offi-
cio) if disclosure obligation is not fulfilled in time. To prevent a monetary bailout, the 
fine is repeated until required documents are submitted. In detail, the enforcement proce-
dure is designed as follows: If a company does not file its financial statement within 
twelve months (Article 325 of the German Commercial Code (GCC)), the FOJ allows an 
extension of six weeks charging only moderate administrative fees. Afterwards, it im-
poses repeated fines between 2,500 € and 25,000 € until the financial statement is filed. 
Furthermore, the EHUG has modernized the overall disclosure procedure. With the intro-
duction of the Electronic Federal Gazette, the physical registers at local courts were re-
placed by a new digital platform. Since then, all documents must be filed electronically. 
From the user’s perspective, the digital platform allows for easier, faster and uncondi-
tional access to mandatory disclosures for every interested party. The financial statements 
can be retrieved free of charge at any given time. In particular, companies, which have 
avoided disclosure for many years are now exposed to significantly increased transpar-
ency. 
Table 7: 
Disclosure requirements by size categories 
Size category in 
German language Size class 
Financial reporting element 
Income 
 statement 
Balance  
sheet Notes 
Management 
report 
Kleinstkapitalge-
sellschaft 
micro  
corporation / 
reduced 
(deposit) / / 
Kleine Kapitalge-
sellschaft 
small  
corporation / reduced 
regarding the 
balance sheet / 
Mittelgroße 
Kapitalgesellschaft 
medium-sized 
corporation reduced 
complete with 
exemptions complete complete 
Große Kapitalge-
sellschaft 
large  
corporation complete complete complete complete 
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3 Literature review and determinants of disclosure timing 
3.1 Indirect costs of disclosure as a function of time 
Firms face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of (mandatory) disclosure. However, 
compared to their public counterparts, where disclosures provide essential information to 
anonymous shareholders and market participants, individual benefits for private firms are 
not that obvious. The major justifications are economy-wide benefits and improved social 
welfare through reduced information asymmetry among market participants, resulting in 
more efficient resource allocation (Shroff 2016, Minnis and Shroff 2017). Consequently, 
research on the (net) benefits in a private firm mandatory disclosure setting is scarce. 
There is only evidence that mandated public filings facilitate transactional banking and 
improve access to bank debt (Arruñada 2011, Breuer et al. 2018, Deno et al. 2019). Public 
information reduces the reliance on relationship banking and therefore provides broader 
financing opportunities. Moreover, it helps to reduce uncertainty and positively affects 
firms’ precautionary behavior by enabling a more accurate evaluation of expectations, 
trends and peers. Supporting this notion, Ortiz (2018) finds a decline in firms’ costly cash 
holdings (liquidity buffer) after the introduction of mandated disclosure. Overall, publicly 
available information helps to ensure that economic decisions are made based on a higher 
level of information. Put differently, mandatory disclosures reduce information asymme-
tries, enhance market transparency and confidence, and thus facilitate arm’s length deal-
ing (Breuer 2018). Firm-level benefits are manifested in better (investment) decisions, 
(trade) credit conditions and financing opportunities (Barry 2006, Arruñada 2011). Addi-
tionally, the standardized format for and public access to financial information allow for 
benchmarking over time (intracompany) and between other companies (intercompany).  
However, these more or less vague private benefits are accompanied by much more ob-
vious costs and disadvantages for the disclosing company, which often significantly out-
weigh the benefits. First, there are direct administrative and compliance costs. Legally 
required data must be gathered, edited and transferred into the appropriate format. To 
comply, firms need personnel and IT infrastructure.23 Additionally, disclosing companies 
have to pay for filing (submission fees).24 Second, there are indirect costs, which are hard 
                                                 
23  Thus, in particular, small firms often outsource the filing process.  
24  Fees are graded and depend on the number of characters as well as the format of the submitted docu-
ments (e.g., from 0.13 ct to 1.25 ct for each character using XML or XBRL; 15 € each figure) (Bun-
desanzeiger Verlag 2016). 
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to quantify but potentially more substantial. Particularly, proprietary costs are of great 
significance (Verrecchia 1983). Firms can no longer control the group of beneficiaries 
and face the risk of presenting relevant information to non-transacting stakeholders. Com-
petitors often pay close attention to the financial report of their rivals and thus can gain 
advantageous insights into liquidity and financial stability, strengths, weaknesses and ex-
pectations. They can also learn from price and capacity changes, expenditure on research 
and development, investments or divestments, or any other activities. Hence, public in-
formation helps them to develop a better understanding of their peers, to better predict 
future action of rivals and to adjust own activities to the detriment of the disclosing firm. 
The management accounting literature refers the systematic research on peers, where an-
nual financial statements appear to be a major source of information as “competitor ac-
counting” or “competitive intelligence” (Subramanian and IsHak 1998, Hoffjan 2003).  
In addition, higher transparency allows rivals to identify lucrative targets for takeovers 
(Bernard 2016). Competitive disadvantages and predatory threats arise. Particularly less 
diversified firms with small product portfolios involuntarily provide insights into cost 
structures and profit margins by publishing annually income statements. Successful busi-
ness models attract new competitors, which could enter the market, and diminish future 
profits. Thus, concerns regarding a loss of a competitive edge are directly linked to man-
dated disclosure. Further, high rents or outperformance might arouse monetary desires 
even among contractual partners. Customers and suppliers could exploit their knowledge 
on margins or sales in price negotiations. The same holds true for employees and labor 
unions. Taken together, the restrictions in secrecy and informational self-determination, 
that follow mandatory disclosure, can lead to significant adverse effects. The problems 
become even more severe if there are close financial ties between the firm, owners and 
management. Any information about a firm also carries details on the income and wealth 
position of the owner, resulting in an erosion of privacy (Barry 2006, Arruñada 2011, 
Schenke and Teichmann 2018, Muhn and Gassen 2019). Hence, owners of closely held 
firms are confronted with privacy costs.  
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A key to manage indirect costs is timeliness, which is an essential element of information 
relevance. “Generally, the older the information is the less useful it is” (IASB 2018, CF 
2.33), as, e.g., the IASB notes in its recent conceptual framework.25 Information naturally 
loses the ability to contribute to decision-making, as time goes by.26 Thus, elapsing time 
reduces the capacity of information to create disadvantages such as proprietary costs from 
mandatory disclosure (Elliot and Jacobson 1994). As a consequence, observable disclo-
sure timeliness is partly the result of firms’ weighting of individual costs (and benefits).  
With a lack of net benefits, private firms have incentives to withhold certain information 
as long as possible. However, the legal regime forces private firms to comply. If firms 
withhold disclosures, they will be sanctioned monetarily. Assuming firms anticipate re-
lated costs, entities will delay submission as long as the expected costs of disclosure (pro-
prietary and privacy costs) exceed the imposed sanctions. Based on the assessment of 
                                                 
25  The US standard setter argues the same: “If information is not available when it is needed or becomes 
available so long after the reported events that it has no value for future action, it lacks relevance and is 
of little or no use. Timeliness alone cannot make information relevant, but a lack of timeliness can rob 
information of relevance it might otherwise have had.” (FASB 1980). 
26  The more that time elapses, the later the decisions can be made or the less information there is at the 
time of the decision (Feltham 1972). 
Figure 3: 
Total costs of disclosure as a function of time 
 
Notes: Figure depicts decreasing proprietary costs, increasing costs of delay and total costs by time. Legal 
disclosure deadline is denoted as tr and minimum of total costs as t*.  
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these two opposing effects (decreasing proprietary costs and increasing costs of delay), a 
firm’s management will choose the optimal filing date, that is when the total costs of 
disclosure are minimal. Figure 3 illustrates both curves resulting in a minimum of total 
costs in t*. In the example, the entity is willing to accept fines in order to delay filing 
beyond the legal deadline (tr).  
3.2 Prior literature on disclosure timing 
To identify determinants and influencing factors of the timing decision, we review the 
extant literature. We start with descriptive investigations from Germany, which primarily 
focus on the question as to whether private firms disclose their accounts at all. Consist-
ently, they reveal low compliance rates prior to the EHUG. For example, Ballwieser and 
Häger (1991) find that only 12 % of their sample firms file financial statements at the 
local register courts. Marx and Dallmann (2004) report similar results for the fiscal year 
of 2000 (6.6 %). Over the period from 1996 to 2004, Theile and Nitsche (2006) reveal 
rates between 10 % and 17 %. Moreover, the firms file documents with mistakes and 
irregularities (Ballwieser and Häger 1991, Paschen 1992, Buchheim 2010). All these find-
ings reflect an adverse and negative attitude among German private firms regarding pub-
lic disclosure requirements. One of the first post-EHUG studies carried out by Hensel-
mann and Kaya (2009) reveals an essential increase in disclosure rates (67 % to 73 %, 
depending on the region) for the fiscal year of 2006. However, only a small amount of 
financial statements (about 10 %) are filed by the legal deadline (Henselmann and Kaya 
2009). The effectiveness of the EHUG is also highlighted by Löffelmann (2010) who 
documents accelerated disclosure timing after the regulatory change. In line, Schlauß 
(2010) shows a drastic increase in compliance (whether to disclose), which reached a rate 
of about 90 % for accounts for the fiscal year of 2007. Additionally, the number of sanc-
tion proceedings and appeals against mandatory disclosure drops in 2008 (Schlauß 2010), 
but statutory deadlines are still violated (when to disclose). Consistent with this notion, 
Eierle et al. (2011) document (i) an overall increase in compliance with a disclosure rate 
of nearly 100 %. However, (ii) only 30 % of the 2007 financial accounts were filed in 
time and (iii) it took 20 months after the balance date to achieve 90 % availability. More 
recent studies also reveal that firms fully exhaust legal deadlines or even go beyond (Pel-
lens et al. 2014, Dilßner and Müller 2017). Table 8 provides an overview of the descrip-
tive studies investigating the disclosure practice of German private firms regarding com-
pliance and/or timing.  
PART B: TIMELINESS 
47 
There is also some survey evidence documenting private firms’ reservations about man-
datory disclosure rules. When asked about the Federal Gazette, representatives of private 
firms emphasize concerns regarding secrecy and privacy as well as the distortion of com-
petition (Grottke 2011). Overall, they feel negative towards mandatory disclosure and see 
Table 8: 
Descriptive studies on the disclosure behavior in Germany 
Study Sample Main findings regarding disclosure avoidance and/or disclosure timing 
Schildbach et al. 
(1990) 
274 medium-sized and large com-
panies with limited liability 
(GmbH) from the trade register of 
Munich 
1987 
Sample firms exhibit a disclosure rate of 36 %. 
Only 50 % of disclosing firms file their ac-
counts within the statutory deadline; larger 
firms file management reports of higher quality. 
Ballwieser and 
Häger (1991) 
150 medium-sized companies with 
limited liability in Lower Saxony 
1988 
Sample firms exhibit a disclosure rate of 12 %. 
Paschen (1992) 53 medium-sized and large limited 
liability companies (GmbH) from 
the trade register of Hanover 
1987-1989 
Disclosure rate of 24 %; on average disclosing 
firms file 1.6 accounts in three years. 
Marx and 
Dallmann (2004) 
Partnerships with limited liability 
(in particular GmbH & Co. KG) 
from the trade register of Bremen 
2000-2001 
6.6 % of sample firms are compliant and dis-
close financial statements in 2000 (2001: 
4.5 %). 
Theile and 
Nitsche (2006) 
271 firms with limited liability 
from the trade register of Bochum 
1996-2004 
About 75 % of sample firms avoid disclosure; 
authors document disclosure rates from 14 % to 
17 %; about 74 % of financial statements are 
filed within statutory deadline. 
Henselmann and 
Kaya (2009) 
5,726 limited liability companies 
(GmbH) from Kassel, Ingolstadt 
and Kiel 
2006 
Significantly increased disclosure rates after 
new regulation (EHUG), sample firms reveal 
rates of 72 % to 78 %; adjusted samples reveal 
even higher rates of nearly 90 %. 
Buchheim (2010) Partnerships with limited liability 
(in particular GmbH & Co. KG) 
from the trade register of Berlin 
2006-2008 
Disclosure rates range around 72 %. In 2006, 
about 38 % of accounts are filed in time; rate 
increases to 67 % in 2007. 
Eierle et al.  
(2011) 
210 small and 241 medium-sized 
companies with limited liability  
2007 
Sample firms exhibit a disclosure rate of 92 %; 
however, only 33 % of small and 25 % of me-
dium-sized firms file the financial accounts 
within the statutory deadline. 
Pellens et al. 
(2014) 
202 medium-sized companies with 
limited liability 
2006-2009 
Reporting lag of 66 weeks in 2006; declining 
trend (2009: 54); firms fully exhaust and violate 
statutory deadline; heterogeneity regarding the 
length of disclosed management reports. 
Dilßner and  
Müller (2017) 
110 medium-sized and large com-
panies 
2015 
28 % of sample firms file the financial account 
prior to statutory deadline; 65 % are able to file 
accounts after six months but choose to delay 
disclosure. 
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disadvantages due to proprietary costs. Another study by Grottke et al. (2012) reveals 
similar results. The benefits of higher transparency are classified as less relevant. While 
most participants state that they consciously delay submission, a minority even consider 
fully refusing to submit. Recent survey evidence from Eierle et al. (2019) again supports 
the notion that private firms are interested in disclosing as little information as possible. 
Given the lack of data availability (among others), research on the determinants of dis-
closure timing and the magnitude of the reporting lag of private firms is scarce. Therefore, 
we initially take a brief look at the public firm literature, which is much more exhaustive. 
As a result of being among the first to examine the relationship between the reporting lag 
(difference in time between fiscal year-end and disclosing date) and corporate attributes 
of Australian firms, Dyer and McHugh (1975) are considered as pioneers in this disci-
pline. They find company size to be an influencing factor and argue that higher pressure 
due to greater public awareness leads to faster disclosure. Courtis (1976), Davis and Whit-
tred (1980), and Whittred (1980b) find similar results by adding industry patterns and 
profitability as further influencing factors. Performance reasons are discussed more 
broadly in the subsequent literature. Especially, the “good news early, bad news late” 
hypothesis is tested in several settings. Results from Kross (1981), Givoly and Palmon 
(1982), Chambers and Penman (1984), Kross and Schroeder (1984), Bowen et al. (1992), 
and Begley and Fischer (1998) support the claim that bad news is published later than 
good news. Conover et al. (2008) document that the relation between bad performance 
and timing is more pronounced for firms in common law countries. Notwithstanding, 
there are also some studies rejecting “good news early, bad news late” (Easton and Zmi-
jewski 1994, Annaert et al. 2002).  
Other studies reveal that determinants such as the information demand from investors and 
litigation concerns to be negatively associated with the reporting lag, while concentrated 
ownership, greater accounting complexity, proprietary cost concerns and the extent of 
debt financing are positively correlated (Leventis and Weetmann 2004, Senguptha 2004, 
Henselmann et al. 2017). More recent literature links the reporting lag to internal pro-
cesses. Based on information from the notification of late filing (Form 12b-25), Impink 
et al. (2012) find internal control weaknesses to be associated with the incidence of late 
filing. Moreover, the quality of the information system and firms’ intensity of information 
technology are associated with improvements in financial reporting timeliness (Bartov et 
al. 2017, Du and Wu 2018, Ashraf et al. 2019). This also holds true for firms using XBRL 
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(Johnston and Zhang 2018). In addition, managerial ability (Abernathy et al. 2018) and 
managerial incentives based on remuneration (Gong et al. 2019) seem to influence the 
timing decision. 
Next to studies on determinants, another strand of the literature analyzes market reactions 
and the consequences of delayed disclosure. These studies document lower market reac-
tions to reports with longer delays than for those that are published in time (Zeghal 1984, 
Atiase et al. 1989, Henselmann 2017). There is also some indication that investors view 
delayed announcements as less credible and generally discount both, negative and posi-
tive news (Chen et al. 2018). Appendix A provides a more comprehensive and detailed 
overview of (aforementioned) studies related to disclosure timing decisions of public 
firms.27 The fourth column indicates whether the respective study refers to earnings an-
nouncements and/or the annual report (mostly 10-K). This differentiation is crucial when 
interpreting results related to public firms.28 
The findings stated above with respect to public firms provide useful insights into the 
possible determinants and influencing factors of the timing decision. However, they are 
not directly transferable to private firms. In the absence of capital markets, the managerial 
incentives and the regulatory environment are completely different. Private firms face 
less legal scrutiny, capital market pressure as well as litigation concerns, and therefore 
have much more discretion regarding disclosure timing. Overall, there is a lack of litera-
ture concerning disclosure timing in a private firm setting. To the best of our knowledge, 
we only identify five (relatively recent) studies that are either directly related to the timing 
decision of private firms or at least consider it as a dimension of reporting quality. 
Clatworthy and Peel (2016) provide evidence on the timing decision of private firms’ 
following a regulatory change in the UK, which shortened the legal deadline from ten to 
nine months after the fiscal year-end. Unsurprisingly, there is a significant reduction in 
the reporting lag, but the incidence of late filing increases by 46 %. The results show that 
the reporting behavior is largely regulatory-driven, but is not homogenous. The reporting 
                                                 
27  There is also a broad strand of literature analyzing the audit lag of public firms. Abernathy et al. (2017), 
Durand (2019), and Habib et al. (2019) provide current and comprehensive literature reviews.  
28  While the date of an earnings announcement refers to the preliminary earnings release, the annual report 
dates refer to its publication (mostly 10-K or 10-Q). In this context, Arif et al. (2018) find that firms are 
increasingly inclined towards concurrently announcing earnings and disclosing 10-Ks.  
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lag is significantly shorter for firms, which are assumed to produce accounting in-
formation for outside stakeholders. For a Belgian sample, Luypaert et al. (2016) study 
determinants of the filing lag of small private firms. The accounts are filed very close to 
the legal deadline. The authors identify company size and an external audit to be nega-
tively associated. The former is attributable to the severity of agency conflicts, compa-
nies’ resources and accounting capabilities. Moreover, firms systematically delay the re-
lease of unfavorable information and late-filed financial statements tend to exhibit lower 
quality. In sum, the authors conclude that public filing is not demand-driven. Bigus and 
Hillebrand (2017) analyze financial reporting quality in the context of relationship bank-
ing. One of their measures (next to discretionary accruals and disclosure amount) relates 
to timeliness. Based on the proprietary costs theory and the presence of private commu-
nication, the results suggest that private firms relying on relationship banking file their 
accounts in a less timely manner. The authors argue that firms do so in order to keep 
information private and achieve a more opaque information environment. Lastly, Breuer 
Table 9: 
Studies on the disclosure timing of private firms 
Study Sample Main findings regarding disclosure timing 
Clatworthy and 
Peel (2016) 
31,147 private firms from the UK 
2009-2010 
Disclosure timing is driven by the regulatory 
deadline but not homogenous; firms report more 
timely if they produce accounting information in 
order to inform outside investors. 
Luypaert et al. 
(2016) 
22,108 firm years from Belgian and 
Luxembourgian small private firms 
2006-2008 
About 30 % of financial statements are filed af-
ter the legal deadline (seven months); about 
93 % are filed before sanctions are applied (eight 
months); firm size and external audit negatively 
affect the reporting lag; late-filing is associated 
with lower financial statement quality. 
Bigus and Hille-
brand (2017) 
1,068 firm years from medium-
sized private firms from Germany 
2009-2012 
Firms with fewer bank relationships exhibit 
weaker financial reporting quality including less 
timely filing of financial statements. 
Breuer et al. 
(2019a) 
About 1.4 m. firm years from  
private firms from Germany 
2006-2012 
The number of transacting stakeholders drives 
firms’ disclosure decisions; among others, the 
number of stakeholders is positively associated 
with timeliness.  
Breuer et al. 
(2019b) 
 
“Comprehensive” dataset from  
German private firms 
2006-2011 
 
Mandatory disclosure regulation crowds out vol-
untary disclosure; results indicate that “unregu-
lated” firms exhibit less amount of disclosure as 
predicted in a voluntary regime; additional anal-
yses show that “unregulated” firms extend the 
“disclosure gap” by increasing the reporting lag 
(compared to “regulated” firms). 
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et al. (2019a) develop an economic framework, which suggests that the number of trans-
acting stakeholders shapes private firms’ disclosure decision. The authors employ the 
amount of disclosure, timeliness, and the presence of an audit as indicators for financial 
reporting quality and find support for their analytically predicted relationship. Private 
firms with more transacting shareholders provide disclosures with a higher level of quan-
tity, quality, and timeliness (Breuer et al. 2019a). Table 9 sums up the main properties as 
well as the major findings of the identified studies. 
Next to the studies directly analyzing the disclosure timing behavior of private firms, 
there is relevant research exploiting the setting of the introduction of EHUG. Firms that 
do not comply with disclosure rules prior to EHUG systematically exhibit greater finan-
cial constraints (Bernard 2016). The results indicate that firms avoid disclosure in order 
to mitigate predation risk. Using the same setting and proprietary data from Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Laschewski and Nasev (2018) support the notion that firms make use of 
disclosure avoidance in order to reduce related costs. Consistently, Bernard et al. (2018) 
find that private firms exploit costly size management in order to reduce the level of man-
dated disclosure and audit requirements. Likewise, their findings indicate that firms do so 
in order to mitigate proprietary costs.  
3.3 Determinants and empirical operationalizations  
Performance — Performance is one of the most discussed determinants of the disclosure 
timing decision. Under the heading of “good news early, bad news late”, prior analytical 
and empirical literature (in particular on public firms) provides broad evidence supporting 
this association (e.g., Givoly and Palmon 1982, Chambers and Penman 1984, Begely and 
Fischer 1998, Sengupta 2004). From a theoretical point of view, firms tend to disclose 
unfavorable information in a less timely manner. This allows managers, e.g., to close 
deals on more favorable terms, and provides more time to prepare responses or ways to 
reverse (Begley and Fischer 1998). However, litigation concerns (e.g., potential share-
holder lawsuits) encourage managers to also disclose bad news in a timely manner (Skin-
ner 1994, Graham 2005, Donelson et al. 2012). In the absence of a highly litigious envi-
ronment – as is the case for private firms – this association should be even stronger. Un-
favorable information such as a loss or declining profitability increase uncertainty regard-
ing future earnings and solvency and might impede contracting with customers, suppliers 
and capital lenders (raising agency costs). This could negatively affect firms’ reputation 
or result in worse conditions and a higher risk-premium, which would be consistent with 
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the “bad news late” hypothesis. In order to signal financial steadiness, growth prospects, 
and a well-performing business model, managers might even have incentives to accelerate 
disclosure if they beat certain benchmarks as prior year earnings. Survey evidence from 
Eierle et al. (2019) empirically supports this notion. Nonetheless, there are also incentives 
to delay favorable information. Firms might try to hide surpassing performance from po-
tential competitors, suppliers and customers, as they fear imitation of rivals and a deteri-
oration of their own position in price negotiations. Suppliers and customers might want 
to participate in high margins, too, which raises proprietary costs. In sum, literature pro-
vides inconclusive evidence on the association between disclosure and performance. Con-
sistent with mixed evidence, Muiño and Núñez-Nickel (2016) document a reverse u-
shaped association between transparency and profitability, which suggests incentives to 
delay filing on both extrema. In the same manner, Dedman and Lennox (2009) find com-
panies with high gross profits to withhold information. Figure 4 (adopted by Muiño and 
Núñez-Nickel (2016)) illustrates competing effects of decreasing agency costs and in-
creasing proprietary costs by profitability. It also shows a minimum of total costs for firms 
with moderate profits. 
Figure 4: 
Disclosure costs as a function of performance 
 
Notes: Figure depicts increasing proprietary costs, decreasing agency costs and total costs by performance 
from Muiño and Núñez-Nickel (2016). 
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Referring to timeliness, we expect a longer reporting lag for firms with a loss and shorter 
lags if firms perform better than in the year before. However, we also expect firms with 
higher abnormal profitability to delay filing. To operationalize performance, we rely on 
different measures. We employ binary variables indicating a loss if the operating income 
is less than zero (Loss). Additionally, we have a binary variable equal to one if firms beat 
their prior year’s earnings benchmark (Improve). Finally, performance is continuously 
measured by return on assets (RoA). 
Ownership structure and agency conflicts — When analyzing disclosure incentives, the 
ownership structure is an important factor, particularly in a setting where controlling own-
ers play a significant role (Vural 2018). In general, reporting incentives are strongly 
driven by agency conflicts. Thus, their extent is positively associated with the benefits of 
transparency and the benefits of timely public availability of financial statements. Own-
ership-induced agency conflicts arise from the separation of management and control, 
and depend not only on the number of shareholders but also on the distance between 
management and ownership. We therefore assume that both influence the reporting in-
centives and the disclosure timing decision. Sengupta (2004) argues that blockowners 
(owner holding significant shares) do not rely on public information. They are able to 
obtain information directly from the management and do not urge timely disclosures. In 
a private firm setting, this association must be even stronger because owners are usually 
much closer to firms’ sphere and daily business. Even non-managing owners are informed 
by the general meeting or other channels, and do not need to rely on the Federal Gazette. 
Hence, typical family firms, directly held by the founder or the descendants, are not urged 
to file financial statements in a timely manner. Prior literature already shows that founder 
and heir firms report more opaque than diffused shareholder firms (Anderson et al. 2009, 
Vural 2018). They face less ownership-induced agency problems and do not benefit from 
high transparency. Beyond that, owners are even confronted with a loss of privacy as 
financial statements allow for inferences on the personal wealth and income situation 
(privacy costs). Thus, privacy concerns might explain the disclosure behavior to some 
extent as well, which is also implied by Muhn and Gassen (2019).  
The literature provides various concepts to empirically separate family firms and other 
firms. We follow Cassar et al. (2015) and rely on a binary measure indicating whether a 
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firm is owned by a natural person who holds more than 50 % of shares (controlling share-
holder).29 
Agency conflicts also arise from information asymmetries between transacting outside 
stakeholders. Publicly available information mitigates such problems and helps to ease 
contracting, e.g., with suppliers (Arruñada 2011, Ceustermans et al. 2017). Hence, the 
number of transacting stakeholders shapes financial reporting decisions including timeli-
ness (Breuer et al. 2019a). The broader the set of business relationships, the higher the 
costs of individual communication via private channels. Thus, the mandated disclosure 
of a certain set of standardized information reduces duplicate effort and generates cost 
savings. As a consequence, larger firms, which are more likely to exhibit more severe 
conflicts as the number and the heterogeneity of stakeholder increases (Eierle and Haller 
2009), benefit much more from the public availability of their accounts (Arruñada 2011). 
We therefore expect larger firms, measured by total assets (Size), to file timelier. 
Competition — The proprietary costs theory suggests (potential) non-transacting stake-
holders such as competitors to be major beneficiaries of public information. Mandatory 
disclosures provide information about financial constraints, margins, weaknesses, trends, 
and strategies. Competitors can systematically obtain and analyze this information to the 
detriment of the disclosing firm. Survey evidence has already revealed that firms study 
the filings of major competitors and assume rivals to access their publicly available filings 
as well (Graham et al. 2005, Grottke et al. 2016, Minnis and Shroff 2017).30 In line, Muhn 
and Gassen (2019) find competition to be the most important reason why small private 
firms are reluctant to publish financial statements. There is also some evidence suggesting 
that firms systematically withhold sensitive information (Dedman and Lennox 2009, Ellis 
et al. 2012). For example, Dedman and Lennox (2009) find that managers of private firms 
hide information about sales and the cost of sales when they perceive themselves to be 
acting in highly competitive markets. We therefore assume competitiveness to influence 
the disclosure timing decision as well. In contrast to many other studies31, we proxy com-
petition on a firm-level basis and use a metric which relies on firms’ narratives. This 
                                                 
29  This approach is common in the finance and accounting literature and also applied in recent research, 
e.g., by Murro and Peruzzi (2019).  
30  Industry-specific evidence presented by Tomy (2019) suggests that 94 % of surveyed banks use the 
financial statements of their competitors to analyze current and expected market competition. 
31  Many empirical accounting studies rely on industry concentration as a measure of competition (the most 
common is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)). However, there are some empirical and theoretical 
problems: (i) the measure is ambiguous and difficult to interpret; (ii) from a theoretical viewpoint, the 
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measure, developed by Li et al. (2013), has already been applied in recent accounting 
research (e.g., Bushman et al. 2016, Bozanic et al. 2019, Li and Zhan 2019, Shi et al. 
2018). It is based on the intensity of competition-related terms in a firm’s filing and comes 
with several advantages. Among the important aspects are: (i) it captures managers’ per-
ception of firms’ individual competitive environment, which allows for industry and year 
variation; (ii) it refrains from a fixed and crude industry classification scheme; and (iii) it 
is a holistic approach which does not solely focus on certain aspects of competition, such 
as more traditional approaches (e.g., market concentration, entry costs or profit margins) 
(Li et al. 2013, Shi et al. 2018). Appendix B describes the technical details. 
Other firm characteristics 
Auditor — With respect to the auditor, we expect firms hiring a large auditing company 
to exhibit shorter reporting lags. Big4 auditors (i) are more experienced and have well 
qualified personnel, (ii) have more standardized processes and access to international net-
works, and (iii) are less dependent on individual clients due to higher market shares. 
Hence, they are able to enforce higher standards regarding earnings and audit quality 
compared to non-Big4 auditors (Francis and Wang 2008, Loy 2013). We conjecture that 
large auditors also monitor overall compliance and reporting more strictly, including the 
timely submission of financial statements. However, an alternative explanation refers to 
self-selection. Firms that engage an auditor, which is associated with higher audit quality 
(Big4), could be more receptive to transparency. 
Type of financial statement — Depending on the prevalence of subsidiaries, firms are 
obliged to prepare and publish a consolidated financial statement. In contrast to the single 
statement account, the only purpose of a consolidated financial statement is to provide 
information. Thus, the consolidated account is less biased by contracting incentives and 
therefore more informative for third parties. As a consequence, the information is of 
higher value and its release causes higher indirect costs (Laschewski and Nasev 2018). 
Relationship lending — Private firms heavily rely on external financing by bank loans. 
Often, the business relationship between the financing bank and the firm is very close and 
long-term (Berger and Udell 1998). In general, firms that use external debt financing are 
expected to provide information of a higher quality to satisfy banks’ information needs 
                                                 
relation between concentration and competition is unclear; (iii) by definition, the HHI can only be cal-
culated at industry-level. Dedman and Lennox (2009) discuss the problems in more detail. 
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in order to lower debt-induced agency conflicts. However, firms that are engaged in rela-
tionship lending do not need to provide comprehensive public information and can choose 
to remain more opaque (Bigus and Hillebrand 2017). Based on a close relationship, the 
financing bank obtains all relevant information via private channels. In this way, the bank 
has access to information beyond accounting figures and even soft and proprietary infor-
mation on a confidential basis. Therefore, high accounting quality and timely disclosure 
are less relevant. Banks can even benefit from the higher opacity of their clients, as ana-
lytically modelled by Bigus and Hakenes (2017). To proxy for relationship banking, we 
rely on the number of house banks. In line with Bigus and Hillebrand (2017), we expect 
a positive association between the reporting lag and the presence of relationship banking.  
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4 Data and research design 
4.1 Sample selection 
Our analysis is based on a sample of German private firms, which are subject to manda-
tory disclosure rules. Hence, we use the Amadeus database maintained by Bureau van 
Dijk to obtain all firms with limited liability. We exclude companies with publicly traded 
debt or equity instruments and restrict our sample to large limited liability companies 
because they are more likely to be independent of external factors such as tax advisers 
and must meet the full set of disclosure requirements.32 In order to be qualified as large, 
firms must meet at least two of three size criteria with reference to Article 267 of the 
German commercial code (GCC) in 2015: total assets of at least 19.25 m. €, revenues of 
at least 38 m. €, and at least 250 employees. Furthermore, we drop firms from the public 
administration as well as the real estate, defense, and compulsory social security sectors.33 
We end in a comprehensive sample of 8,715 firms from which we randomly select 1,000 
firms (about 11.5 %).  
In a next step, we seek firms’ annual filings from the Electronic Federal Gazette and 
obtain necessary data, which are not provided by Amadeus. We hand-collect the date of 
report completion (preparation), issuance of the audit opinion, shareholders’ approval, 
and final publication for a six-year period (2011–2016). If a firm prepares and files a 
single as well as a consolidated financial report, we follow Burgstahler et al. (2006) and 
consider only the latter as a firm’s primary set of financial statements from an informa-
tional perspective.34 We exclude the years prior to 2011 for the following reasons: First, 
until 2009 the Electronic Federal Gazette allowed firms to file data in hard copy form, 
which led to increased administrative burdens and substantial delays due to processing 
filed statements. Second, another potential bias stems from the Accounting Law Modern-
ization Act (BilMoG), which is considered to be the most fundamental reform of German 
accounting regulations since the Accounting Directive Act (BiRiLiG) (Fülbier and Klein 
2015). For the first time, the BilMoG became effective for fiscal years starting in 2010 
(year of transition). Next, we match the hand-collected data with financial data from 
Amadeus, resulting in a unique data set of 6,000 firm-year observations. 
                                                 
32  Small and medium-sized companies benefit from reduced disclosure requirements. Moreover, their fi-
nancial statements are often prepared and filed by tax consultancy firms. 
33  NACE Revision 2, Main Section L and O. 
34  If a firm is the parent company and therefore provides a single and a consolidated report, we use the 
latter. In all other cases, we obtain and use the unconsolidated (i.e., legal entity-based) report. 
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We eliminate 90 observations of firms that voluntarily apply IFRS and drop 647 obser-
vations with incomplete data. We delete IFRS-firms because they are expected to volun-
tarily opt to report in a more transparent fashion and systematically differ with respect to 
firm characteristics (Bassemir 2018, Eierle et al. 2018). For our main analysis, the final 
sample consists of 5,262 observations from 912 firms (see Table 10). 
4.2 Empirical model 
One major objective is to analyze the determinants of the variance in private firms’ dis-
closure timing decision. We therefore introduce the term (reporting) lag or delay as the 
difference in time between the closing date of the firm’s fiscal year and the date of pub-
lication of the financial account at the Electronic Federal Gazette.35 If a filing is amended 
or complemented, we rely on its first version (the date when the information becomes 
available for the first time).36 The dependent variable (Lag_Rep) is defined as number of 
days between the financial year-end and the date of filing. We examine the reporting lag 
by using multivariate regressions. Our main model is specified as follows: 
                                                 
35  The Electronic Federal Gazette can be found at www.bundesanzeiger.de. In fact, the date of publication 
does not correspond to the date of submission. The Federal Gazette needs an insignificant amount of 
time to prove and process submitted documents. Henselmann and Kaya (2008) assume a processing 
time of two to three days. Due to technical achievements and the ban of hard-copy submissions, we 
expect this processing time to be even shorter and therefore negligible. 
36  About 4 % of filings in our sample are complemented (“Ergänzung”) and about 2 % are revised (“Ber-
ichtigung”) after initial submission. 
Table 10: 
Sample selection 
  Firms  Firm years 
Large private corporations with limited liability  
(legal forms: “Limited liability company” (GmbH), „Limited liability com-
pany & partnerships” (GmbH & Co. KG), ”Limited liability company & 
partnership by shares” (GmbH & Co. KGaA), “Limited partnership by 
shares” (KGaA), “Public limited partnership” (AG)) 
 8,715  52,290 
Random sample  1,000  6,000 
./. Accounts in accordance with IFRS  15  90 
./. Missing disclosure timing data  /  54 
Total sample of descriptive results of disclosure timing  985  5,772 
./. Missing data of independent variables for main analysis  63  510 
Total sample of multivariate analysis  912  5,262 
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 (1) 
where i and t denote the firm and year, and βn and ε denote the slope coefficients and error 
term, respectively. To control for specific yearly and possible industry37 and regional38 
differences, we employ fixed effects. Variables are as defined as in Appendix C. 
We run the main model in several variants, which are tabulated in Table 15. We primarily 
focus on the delay between the fiscal year-end and publication in the Federal Gazette 
(Lag_Rep). However, in our descriptive results and for additional analyses, we separate 
the reporting lag in four components. We use Lag_Prep for the time in days between the 
fiscal year-end and the financial statement preparation. To identify, we rely on execu-
tives’ signature date on the financial statement.39 Moreover, we calculate Lag_Audit 
(Lag_Approv) as the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the signature date 
on the audit opinion (the date of approval by the general meeting).40 Finally, we use sub-
lags, for example, the lag between the approval of a financial statement and its publication 
(△Approv_Rep). All lags are specified in the following figure: 
 
                                                 
37  Industry-fixed effects are based on the Fama/French 48-industry classification. 
38  Similar to Bernard (2016), Breuer et al. (2019a) or Breuer et al. (2018), we control for regional differ-
ences. Region-fixed effects are based on one-digit zip codes. 
39  To extract dates from firms’ filings, we use regular expressions. In case our Python script does not 
recognize any (reasonable) date, we manually obtain missing data.  
40  In case of consolidated reports, which are not adopted by the general meeting (“Feststellung”), we use 
the date of approval (“Billigung”). However, we use the term “approval” in both cases. 
Figure 5: 
Time lags during the financial reporting process 
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5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive results 
Panel A of Table 11 presents summary statistics for the reporting lag variable (Lag_Rep) 
over the sample period in detail. The average reporting lag amounts to 373 days with a 
median delay of 393 days. The standard deviation is about 87 days (three months), indi-
cating that the reporting date is quite volatile. The year-by-year distribution reveals a peak 
of reporting lag in 2013,41 followed by relatively steady means in 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
On examining Panel B, the frequency distribution shows the highest shares of submission 
in Month 14 and 15 after the fiscal year-end, which is beyond the legal requirements (see 
Figure 1).42 Only 38 % of financial accounts are filed within the statutory deadline of 12 
months. Another 26 % are disclosed within the grace period of six weeks (415 days43), 
indicating that these firms accept small administrative charges in order to modestly delay 
publication. The remaining financial statements (about 36 %) are filed substantially late. 
Failing compliance confronts firms with repeating monetary sanctions until they fulfill 
                                                 
41  We cannot provide a causal explanation for the peak in 2013. However, the number of sanctioning 
proceedings correspondently peaks in 2015, indicating firms’ responsibility. 
42  For parsimony, years 2011 and 2016 are not depicted. 
43  The legal deadline amounts to 365 days plus the extension period of 6 weeks (42 days) = 407. We add 
another week to consider potential administrative delays (415 days) by the Federal Gazette. 
Figure 6: 
Cumulative percentage of the reporting lag over time 
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their disclosure obligation. Even descriptive results provide some indication of firms’ 
general reluctance towards timely disclosure. The components of the reporting lag, tabu-
lated in Table 13 (Panel A) reinforce this notion. The disaggregation shows that the prep-
aration of financial statements takes 141 days on average. Another 16 days elapse until 
the audit is completed. Next, the general meeting, where shareholders approve the finan-
cial statements is held, on average, about 200 days (median 180 days) after the fiscal year-
Table 11: 
Summary statistics of the reporting lag 
Panel A: Reporting lag by year 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
2011 984 359.09 88.74 312 373 415 
2012 985 385.42 102.43 312 408 452 
2013 984 403.39 76.63 385 422 447 
2014 977 364.54 85.69 303 386 428 
2015 950 361.00 75.22 327 376 413 
2016 892 361.63 78.79 325 375 416 
Total 5,772 372.76 86.80 322 392.5 430 
Panel B: Frequency by month of filing 
 n percentage cumulative  
≤ 4th month 20 0.35 0.35  
5th month 47 0.81 1.16  
6th month 127 2.20 3.36  
7th month 148 2.56 5.93  
8th month 272 4.71 10.64  
9th month 264 4.57 15.21  
10th month 360 6.24 21.45  
11th month 412 7.14 28.59  
12th month 540 9.36 37.94  
13th month 788 13.65 51.59  
14th month 1,156 20.03 71.62  
15th month 1,001 17.34 88.96  
16th  month 301 5.21 94.18  
17th month 184 3.19 97.37  
18th month 59 1.02 98.39  
19th  month 35 0.61 99.00  
20th  month 20 0.35 99.34  
≥ 21st  month 38 0.67 100.00  
Total 5,772    
 
PART B: TIMELINESS 
62 
end. Finally, Figure 7 graphically reveals a time span of nearly six month between a po-
tential disclosure (after approval) and its actual publication on the Electronic Federal Ga-
zette. Put differently, we observe a major discrepancy between a “firm is able to disclose” 
and a “firm is willing to disclose”; release-ready financial accounts are withheld for about 
half a year on average. This strongly differs from prior findings on public firms, where 
the complexity of operations and the time spent for preparation and auditing consumes 
major parts of the reporting lag (Givoly and Palmon 1982, Sengupta 2004). Figure 8 de-
picts the development from preparation to audit, approval (sub-lags) and actual disclosure 
cumulatively. The highlighted area presents △Approv_Rep and graphically indicates the 
sum of the discretionary delay of our sample firms. Overall, the descriptive results docu-
ment the lack of willingness among some firms to disclose in a timely manner. There are 
no major differences with respect to the industry (Table 12).44 We also find only slight 
                                                 
44  The average reporting lag of “Utilities” is relatively short (337 days). This is consistent with the results 
of Bernard (2016), where “Utilities” show the lowest rate of disclosure avoidance. However, the low 
Figure 7: 
Decomposition of reporting lag over time 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts mean of Lag_Rep and time span for preparation, audit and approval as defined in 
Figure 5 by years (n=5,772). The vertical line represents the statutory deadline (365 days). The last bar 
shows average lags for all years. 
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variation regarding firms’ local origin. Potential variation due to historical differences 
between East and West Germany, industry concentration, economic strength or regional 
competition are not evident and difficult to grasp on a rough classification based on fed-
eral states.45 
Panels B and C of Table 13 present summary statistics of the independent variables of 
our main model and additional analysis, along with 5,262 observations with full data 
availability for the main regression model. The median firm exhibits total assets of 58 m. 
€ (Size) and a profitability of 6.9 % (RoA). About 15 % of financial statements report a 
loss and 54 % beat prior-year earnings. Moreover, one third of our sample firms is char-
acterized by family ownership and almost half of the accounts are audited by one of the 
Big4 auditors (41 %). Six percent of sample firms are registered as a stock corporation 
(AG). Most firms are incorporated as private limited companies (GmbH: 73 %, GmbH & 
Co. KG: 20 %). Overall, descriptive statistics are consistent with other studies analyzing 
private firms in similar settings.  
                                                 
number of observations for some industries should be noted. We therefore refrain from further interpre-
tations.  
45  See Appendix D for details. 
Figure 8: 
Cumulative percentage of sub lags 
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Table 14 displays the correlation matrix of the reporting lag and explanatory variables. 
Except for Banks, all correlations with the dependent variable exhibit expected signs. Un-
surprisingly, variables capturing performance (Loss, Improve, RoA) are relatively highly 
correlated. The highest correlation (Loss and RoA) amounts to -0.53. Employing a Big4 
auditor (0.30) and the presence of a consolidated report (0.29) are associated with com-
pany size. Otherwise, all correlations in our main model are modest and well below 0.4, 
indicating that each predictor captures different information. We also conclude that mul-
ticollinearity should not be a serious issue.46 
                                                 
46  We calculate variance inflation factors for each regression; scores are well-below conventional thresh-
olds. 
Table 12: 
Reporting lag by industry 
NAICS Industry label Mean n 
21 Mining 330.67 42 
22 Utilities 336.92 84 
23 Construction 367.56 202 
31 Food and textile manufacturing 366.10 262 
32 Wood product, chemical, and nonmetallic mineral manufacturing 374.08 717 
33 Metal, machinery, electronics, and (…) furniture manufacturing 368.02 1,345 
42 Wholesale trade 374.83 1,027 
44-45 Retail trade 384.53 225 
48-49 Transportation and warehousing 365.94 175 
51 Information 373.06 36 
52 Finance and insurance 384.32 41 
53 Real estate, rental and leasing 383.25 48 
54 Professional, scientiﬁc and technical services 371.08 310 
55 Management of companies and enterprises 343.70 30 
56 Administrative and support and (…) remediation services 381.14 949 
61 Educational services 387.39 18 
62 Health care and social assistance 380.01 181 
71 Arts, entertainment and recreation 421.42 24 
81 Other services (except public administration) 357.21 56 
 Total 372.76 5,772 
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Table 13: 
Summary statistics 
Panel A: Components of the reporting lag 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Lag_Rep 5,262 371.78 87.26 320 391 430 
Lag_Approv 3,127 197.52 80.98 135 180 247 
Lag_Audit 5,231 156.86 86.01 93 141 192 
Lag_Prep 5,244 141.13 82.46 86 121 174 
△Approv_Rep 3,127 172.96 93.27 95 168 248 
△Audit_Rep 5,231 214.30 98.10 136 219 289 
△Prep_Rep 5,244 230.39 97.68 152 238 307 
Panel B: Variables for the main model 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Loss 5,262 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 
Improve 5,262 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 
Family 5,262 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
Competition 5,262 0.48 0.35 0.22 0.44 0.78 
Size 5,262 11.12 0.99 10.38 10.97 11.67 
Age 5,262 40.56 36.00 16 26 55 
StockCorp 5,262 0.06 0.25 0 0 0 
Big4 5,262 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 
Banks 5,262 2.60 1.51 1 2 4 
Group 5,262 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
Leverage 5,262 0.42 0.59 0.22 0.39 0.57 
YearEnd 5,262 0.14 0.34 0 0 0 
Panel C: Variables for additional analyses 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
△Lag_Rep 4,355 0.01 85.03 -42 -3 44 
Lag_RepCS 1,050 380.88 86.38 328 393 434 
Lag_RepUCS 1,050 364.12 80.04 318 377 421 
△Lag_RepCS_UCS 1,050 16.99 50.76 -2 6 35 
RoA 5,262 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.13 
NonCompliant365 5,262 0.61 0.49 0 1 1 
NonCompliant415 5,262 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
Amount 5,262 10.66 0.40 10.36 10.63 10.92 
|dAcc| 5,084 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.12 
Notes: Table depicts summary statistics of employed variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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5.2 Determinants of disclosure timing 
Table 15 presents the OLS regression results of the main Model (1a) and several specifi-
cations (1b–e). In general, the results follow our predictions. The coefficients of Loss and 
Improve indicate that performance strongly influences the disclosure timing decision. 
Firms with bad news (Loss) file their accounts significantly later. In the case where firms 
beat prior year’s earnings benchmark (earnings improvement), they tend to file more 
timely. Nevertheless, the effect of Loss is stronger in magnitude and suggests a longer 
reporting lag of about a month (30 days) for loss-reporting firms. 
Ownership structure and timeliness also seem to be linked. Firms held by a natural person 
with controlling influence (family firms) exhibit a less timely disclosure behavior. First, 
this is attributable to a less dispersed ownership of family firms, which induces lower 
ownership/manager-related agency costs. Second, controlling shareholders are more 
likely to exploit private channels rather than obtain information from public sources and 
therefore do not demand timely disclosure. Third, this might also be attributable to pri-
vacy cost concerns, when considering that the earnings and financial condition of the 
disclosing company are directly linked to the private sphere, and the private income and 
wealth of often (locally) well-known entrepreneurs and families. The significant negative 
relationship between StockCorp and the reporting lag supports agency-conflicts to be a 
major influencing factor. Firms registered as a stock corporation, a legal form that is de-
signed to facilitate the transfer of ownership and to create more distance between owner 
and management, file timelier. Even Size is consistent with the notion of more severe 
information asymmetries, when assuming a higher number of stakeholders and business 
partners. Informing various stakeholder via standardized public channels seems to be 
more efficient and therefore more useful for larger firms (transaction cost savings). How-
ever, a shorter reporting lag might also be attributable to a higher level of professionalism 
in the financial reporting process. Larger firms are more likely to possess sophisticated 
accounting systems and well-trained personnel for the preparation of financial statements. 
We also find a significantly positive relation between Competition and the timeliness of 
financial statement publications, even when controlling for industry.47 Firms with a 
higher perception regarding individual competitiveness exhibit longer reporting lags. This 
is consistent with the proprietary costs theory and the aspiration of firms’ management 
                                                 
47  Without industry-fixed effects, the positive association between Lag_Rep and Competition is highly 
significant.  
PART B: TIMELINESS 
68 
 
Table 15: 
Firm-level determinants of disclosure timing decision 
 (1a) Lag_Rep 
(1b) 
Lag_Rep 
(1c) 
△Approv_Rep 
(1d) 
Lag_Rep 
(1e) 
Lag_Rep 
Lag_Prep  0.324***    
  (24.26)    
Lag_Rept-1     0.485*** 
     (37.59) 
Loss 30.311*** 20.404*** 19.305*** 32.293*** 19.432*** 
 (9.22) (6.49) (3.86) (9.71) (6.31) 
Improve -10.957*** -9.521*** -4.469 -10.853*** -15.424*** 
 (-4.77) (-4.37) (-1.36) (-5.69) (-7.08) 
Family 10.717*** 9.220*** 12.338***  5.239** 
 (4.04) (3.66) (3.30)  (2.07) 
Competition 7.472** 5.300* 9.329*  4.407 
 (2.27) (1.70) (1.93)  (1.40) 
Size -3.989*** -2.313* 3.354*  -2.292* 
 (-2.96) (-1.81) (1.75)  (-1.79) 
Big4 -27.311*** -23.869*** -8.974**  -12.777*** 
 (-10.05) (-9.25) (-2.16)  (-4.92) 
StockCorp -17.513*** -8.932* 21.369***  -8.348* 
 (-3.61) (-1.94) (3.38)  (-1.81) 
Startup 7.986** 8.353** 15.110***  0.016 
 (2.33) (2.57) (3.00)  (0.00) 
Banks 4.180*** 4.375*** 7.822***  2.091*** 
 (4.98) (5.50) (6.62)  (2.62) 
Group 15.998*** 5.751* -17.871***  6.186* 
 (4.72) (1.78) (-3.48)  (1.92) 
Leverage -3.746** -4.220** -10.695**  -0.940 
 (-1.98) (-2.36) (-2.34)  (-0.56) 
YearEnd -18.175*** -15.882*** -13.607***  -11.381*** 
 (-5.46) (-5.04) (-2.84)  (-3.60) 
Constant 396.805*** 342.962*** 110.575*** 423.248*** 239.221*** 
 (23.33) (21.08) (4.60) (16.88) (14.19) 
      
Fixed effects Y, I, R Y, I, R Y, I, R Y, F Y, I, R 
      
n 5,262 5,244 3,127 5,262 4,355 
R² 0.167 0.254 0.133 0.594 0.377 
Adj. R² 0.156 0.244 0.114 0.508 0.367 
      
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of main Model (1a) and several specifications (1b–e) with 
Lag_Rep as dependent variable (1a–b, 1d–e). Dependent variable in Model (1c) is △Approv_Rep. We em-
ploy fixed effects for the year (Y), the industry based on Fama/French 48 classification (I), the region (R), 
and the firm (F) as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed 
test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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to withhold information from (potential) competitors by delaying its public availability. 
A firm might do so in order to protect its competitive advantages. Considering the weak 
information environment and the relative importance of financial statements in a private 
firm setting, this seems reasonable. Younger firms (e.g., startups) also publish less timely 
as the coefficient of variable the Startup indicates. Compared to older companies, their 
operational activities and performance are less known and less predictable. To maintain 
a reduced information environment, they might be more strongly engaged in delaying. 
Laschewksi and Nasev (2018) expect the proprietary costs of publishing consolidated ac-
counts to be higher because group accounts are supposed to be more informative and 
transparent as they serve as a major information source. In line with this notion, we find 
a significantly positive association between the reporting lag and the release of a consol-
idated account. They are published 16 days later.48 
Moreover, we discover a highly significant relationship between the type of auditor and 
the publication timing. Firms with a Big4 auditor exhibit considerably shorter reporting 
lags. We provide two possible explanations: first, large auditors are able to exert a stricter 
influence over clients’ behavior in prompting them to comply with legal rules; second, 
the election of the auditor is a company’s (or shareholder’s) decision, suggesting self-
selection issues. Firms hiring auditors associated with stricter audit quality (Francis et al. 
2014) are generally more transparent and less reluctant to disclose timely.  
Finally, we expected the number of banks to be negatively related to the reporting lag. 
This would be in line with the findings of Bigus and Hillebrand (2017) who argue that 
relationship banking is negatively associated with financial reporting quality (i.a., meas-
ured by timeliness). However, the reporting lag increases with the number of Banks.49 
We attribute this to our sample selection and speculate that large firms do not rely as 
much on relationship banking as their small and medium-sized counterparts.  
Overall, the results of our Model (1) are mainly consistent with the prior literature and 
our expectations. To control for internal effects and preparation delay, we additionally 
present several specifications of the Model (1b–e) in Table 15. Model (1b) includes the 
time for the preparation of financial statements (Lag_Prep) as an influencing factor. Of 
course, the lag for preparation explains some variation in the publication delay as they 
                                                 
48  We add to this aspect in the course of further analysis (Section 6.1). 
49  Breuer et al. (2019a) also document a positive association between the number of banks and financial 
reporting timeliness. 
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are logically linked. Notwithstanding, all of our previous results hold. Next, we replace 
the dependent variable Lag_Rep with the lag in time between approval and publication 
(△Approv_Rep) to exclude all kinds of possible internally driven delays (1c). The results 
hold, which reinforce the notion that the time for preparation, audit and approval explains 
only a minor part of the reporting lag of private firms (see also the descriptive results in 
Section 5.1 and Figure 7). Moreover, this shows that delaying is an intentional managerial 
decision.  
Since we use panel data, and to control for omitted firm related issues (Amir et al. 2016), 
we drop all determinants with no or low firm-level variance and employ firm-fixed effects 
in Model (1d). Unsurprisingly, R² rises indicating firm-specific patterns regarding the dis-
closure timing decision (e.g., ritualistic behavior or prevalence of a certain filing policy). 
In a similar vein, Model (1e) controls for the reporting lag in the prior year (Lag_Rept-1). 
Adding lagged variables controls for non-observable firm properties. Nevertheless, all 
results also hold under stricter model specifications. 
5.3 Profitability and firm-level differences in the reporting lag 
In a next step, we take a closer look at the firm-level year-over-year changes of the re-
porting lag. Therefore, we define △Lag_Rep as the difference in disclosure timing be-
tween two consecutive periods. As an example, assume that a firm files the financial 
statement for fiscal year t1 after 345 days, the financial statement of t2 within 400 days 
Figure 9: 
Histogram of firm-level differences in the reporting lag 
 
 
 
 
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
20%
-300 -240 -180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180 240 300
Firm-level differences in the reporting lag in days
PART B: TIMELINESS 
71 
and the financial statement of t3 after 380 days. In this example, △Lag_Rep t1/2 and 
△Lag_Rep t2/3 are +55 and -20 days, respectively. Hence, the sign provides information 
whether a firm accelerates (negative sign) or slows down (positive sign) financial state-
ment publication compared to the prior year. The descriptive statistics presented in Table 
13 (Panel C) and the histogram (Figure 9) graphically reveal the (nearly normal) distri-
bution of △Lag_Rep. The mean of the annual change amounts to nearly zero; however, 
the standard deviation is about 85 days, suggesting that firms alter their timing behavior 
to some extent. Whereas an essential part of financial statements is filed within +/- 30 
days compared to the prior year (indicating constant disclosure timing), the remaining 
observations (68 %) exhibit greater heterogeneity.  
The timing decision does not appear to be sticky. In the absence of capital market pressure 
and scheduled reporting dates – compared to public firms – this seems less surprising. 
We next examine whether these annual changes are related to changes in firms’ perfor-
mance. We therefore take a closer look at psychologically important thresholds, namely, 
when firms’ earnings turn from a profit into a loss (P_L) and vice versa (L_P) (DeGeorge 
et. al 1999. Based on earnings before taxes, we identify 326 observations fulfilling the 
first mentioned pattern (P_L) and 323 observations concurring with the latter (L_P). Ta-
ble 16 presents the mean of △Lag_Rep for all four combinations (2×2 matrix).  
 
Table 16: 
Performance and firm-level difference in reporting lag (2×2 matrix) 
Profit and loss based on earnings before taxes  Profit and loss based on earnings after taxes 
 t-1    t-1 
 
t Profit Loss Diff.  t Profit Loss Diff. 
Profit 2.07 (3,336) 
-49.69 
(323) 
51.76*** 
(11.03) 
 
Profit 1.66 (3,212) 
-47.39 
(351) 
49.05*** 
(10.83) 
Loss 36.72 (326) 
-6,81 
(365) 
-43.53*** 
(-5.89) 
 
Loss 40.02 (352) 
-5.95 
(420) 
-45.97*** 
(-6.73) 
Total 5.16 (3,662) 
-26.94  
(688)   
Total 5.45 (3,564) 
-24.82 
(771)  
         
Notes: Table depicts firm-level differences in the reporting lag (△Lag_Rep) for firms with a loss (RoA < 
0) in the prior year (t-1) turning to a profit (RoA ≥ 0) in the current year (t) and vice versa, denoted in bold. 
Number of observations is in parentheses. Colum Diff. depicts t-test results of △Lag_Rep between firms 
turning from a loss in t-1 to a profit in t vs. firms exhibit profits in both years and vice versa. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Left (right) two-by-two matrix indicates RoA based on earnings before taxes (after taxes). 
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The mean of the annual changes of firms, which report a loss after a prior positive per-
formance (third quadrant), is about +37 days, suggesting that firms with this performance 
pattern seem to have incentives to (further) delay the public availability of their filings. 
In contrast, firms that report profits after negative performance (first quadrant) reveal an 
acceleration in filing by more than 1.5 months (-50 days).50 In spite of an overall reluc-
tance of private firms to be transparent, we find a negative sign. It seems that returning to 
profitability encourages companies to file more timely. All differences in annual changes 
are significant. T-tests reveal highly significant results based on earnings before taxes 
(left matrix) as well as on earnings after taxes (right matrix). This is consistent with the 
notion that underperformance increases agency costs, whereas information about be-
ing/becoming profitable reduces them. Hence, the results suggest that performance influ-
ences firms’ (un)willingness to disclose timely; particularly in the case of critical changes 
in earnings. Nevertheless, we rather expected a quadratic than a linear relationship be-
tween disclosure timing and firm performance. This is because there are two competing 
effects. Whereas underperformance increases agency costs, outperformance might attract 
new competitors, which raises proprietary costs (Section 3.3). On a purely descriptive 
basis, the graph in Figure 10 reveals a minimum in the reporting lag for firms with mod-
erate or average performance. Return on assets is grouped by sextiles. Both extremes 
exhibit longer reporting lags, suggesting a non-monotonic relationship, which is in line 
with the results of Muiño and Núñez-Nickel (2016).  
We depict this association for all of our sample firms as well as for family firms only. As 
can be seen, family firms generally exhibit a higher reporting lag and it appears that the 
u-shaped association seems even more pronounced for family firms. To multivariately 
test for a u-shaped relationship, we employ the following regression model: 
  (3) 
Compared to Model (1) we replace the binaries Loss and Improve with a continuous per-
formance measure (RoA). Methodologically adapting, e.g., Bernard (2016), or Muiño and 
Núñez-Nickel (2016), we further add return on assets squared (RoA²). 
                                                 
50  The results are unlikely to be driven by financial statement preparation. For both groups, the preparation 
lag (Lag_Prep) is quite similar. Lag_Prep of firms with positive earnings after a loss (L_P = 1) is 156 
days; for all other firms it equals 157 days. 
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Table 17 presents the results of Equation (2) and several specifications. First, it is notable, 
that profitability is highly negatively associated with the reporting lag (Model 2a) even 
when measured continuously. Second, the results support our expectations about the 
properties of the relationship (u-shaped). The negative linear and the positive quadratic 
coefficients of RoA of Model (2b) are highly significant, indicating that poor and outper-
forming firms are stronger engaged in delaying publication. The unwillingness of the for-
mer is attributable to raising agency costs, while the unwillingness of the latter is due to 
growing proprietary costs concerns (Muiño and Núñez-Nickel 2016). To illustrate the 
relation, Figure 11 plots the estimated margins and the corresponding 95 % confidence 
interval of RoA based on Model (2b) from Table 17.  
Moving from -2 standard deviations to mean of return on assets results in a decrease in 
Lag_Rep of about 10 %. Moving further from +1 to +4 standard deviations results in an 
increase of 9 %. As already implied by the descriptive results and the shape of the curve 
in Figure 10, the quadratic relationship is more prominent for family firms (-13 %, 
+21 %).  
Figure 10: 
Reporting lag by performance 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the reporting lag by return on assets (sextiles = bins of 16.6 percentiles). Solid (dot-
ted) line represents all firms (family firms only). 
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Table 17: 
Performance and reporting lag 
 (2a) Lag_Rep 
(2b) 
Lag_Rep 
(2c) 
Lag_Rep 
(2d) 
Lag_Rep 
RoA -74.155*** -183.816***   
 (-6.43) (-9.80)   
RoA²  433.727***   
  (7.40)   
RoAadj   -75.348*** -109.391*** 
   (-6.40) (-8.73) 
RoAadj2    474.374*** 
    (7.67) 
Family 10.464*** 10.965*** 11.358*** 11.871*** 
 (3.91) (4.11) (4.37) (4.59) 
Competition 8.055** 7.541** 11.175*** 10.415*** 
 (2.42) (2.28) (3.40) (3.19) 
Size -4.410*** -3.616*** -5.193*** -4.192*** 
 (-3.23) (-2.66) (-3.94) (-3.18) 
Big4 -25.796*** -27.647*** -25.951*** -27.898*** 
 (-9.42) (-10.10) (-9.57) (-10.30) 
StockCorp -18.683*** -17.892*** -23.346*** -22.480*** 
 (-3.82) (-3.68) (-4.82) (-4.67) 
Startup 9.610*** 7.649** 9.874*** 7.791** 
 (2.78) (2.22) (2.86) (2.27) 
Banks 3.715*** 3.931*** 3.301*** 3.514*** 
 (4.38) (4.66) (4.07) (4.35) 
Group 15.252*** 16.132*** 16.764*** 17.769*** 
 (4.46) (4.74) (5.91) (6.29) 
Leverage -3.132 -3.376* -3.621* -3.749** 
 (-1.64) (-1.78) (-1.89) (-1.97) 
YearEnd -18.467*** -18.864*** -16.681*** -17.461*** 
 (-5.50) (-5.65) (-5.01) (-5.27) 
Constant 405.696*** 401.095*** 404.443*** 388.861*** 
 (23.50) (23.33) (26.52) (25.41) 
     
Fixed effects Y, I, R Y, I, R Y, R Y, R 
     
n 5,262 5,262 5,262 5,262 
R² 0.152 0.161 0.123 0.132 
Adj. R² 0.141 0.150 0.118 0.128 
     
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (2a) and several specifications (2b–d) with Lag_Rep 
as dependent variable. We employ fixed effects for the year (Y), the industry based on Fama/French 48 
classification (I), and the region (R) as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
PART B: TIMELINESS 
75 
For robustness reasons, we industry-adjust the return on assets variable to specify firms’ 
performance relative to their industry-level peers. In order to do so, we subtract the in-
dustry-year mean (RoAadj).51 All results hold (Model 2d). Overall, the findings indicate 
the presence of systematic and statistical significant timing patterns, which might be use-
ful for outside stakeholders, especially when considering the low information environ-
ment of private firms. As such, the findings indicate that the disclosure delay can carry 
information about a firm’s performance. 
   
                                                 
51  Bernard (2016) computes industry-adjusted performance and leverage in the same way.  
Figure 11: 
Estimated margins of reporting lag for return on assets 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the estimated margins and corresponding 95 % confidence intervals of reporting lag 
(Lag_Rep) from -4 standard deviations to +4 standard deviations of return on assets (RoA). Estimated mar-
gins are computed based on Model (2b) from Table 17. 
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6 Additional analyses 
6.1 Reporting lag of consolidated financial statements  
The results for firm-level determinants (Section 5.2) reveal a positive association between 
the type of account and timing, suggesting that consolidated reports are submitted with 
greater delay compared to unconsolidated accounts (single statement accounts). This is 
in accordance with Laschewski and Nasev (2018) and the conjecture that consolidated 
accounts are of higher informational value and reveal additional information about a com-
pany. To reinforce this, we analyze the timing decision of the consolidated and the un-
consolidated accounts of the same firm. We additionally obtain timing data on unconsol-
idated accounts from all parent companies of our sample. Hence, there are two filing dates 
for each firm-year observation. One filing date refers to the unconsolidated statement 
(UCS) and a second filing date refers to the consolidated statement (CS). Overall, we find 
1,053 pairs52 from 205 firms with complete data. To reduce administrative effort and 
direct compliance costs, one could expect firms to file both financial statements concur-
rently. Indeed, this is only the case for 128 pairs (12 %). Another 273 pairs (25 %) are 
filed at least within +/-10 days. For the remaining observations, timing is clearly different. 
While the majority submit the CS posterior to the UCS, some firms do so the other way 
around. Table 13 (Panel C) displays descriptive statistics for both timing decisions and a 
variable capturing the difference between the two dates (△Lag_RepCS_UCS).  
While a parent company files the unconsolidated accounts on average 364 days after fis-
cal year-end, it publishes the (by assumption more informative) consolidated accounts 17 
days later. Figure 12 plots each pair. The points that lie on an imaginary diagonal (x=y) 
are filed concurrently (n=128). Furthermore, Figure 12 graphically reveals that more data 
points lie above the diagonal, which is consistent with the negative sign of 
△Lag_RepCS_UCS. Delays in financial statement preparation and auditing are less likely to 
be responsible, as the results in Figure 7 indicate. Untabulated multivariate results suggest 
that this association (longer delay of the more informative consolidated report) is more 
pronounced for family firms and for firms with higher perceived competition.  
                                                 
52  Actually, we find 1,075 pairs; however, we drop 22 pairs with a conspicuously great Lag_RepUCS (> 600 
days) indicating that firms might have been unaware of their filing obligation. 
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6.2 Disclosure timing and other financial reporting decisions  
Other dimensions of corporate transparency could also influence the timing decision. We 
therefore examine how timing interacts with the amount of disclosure (Bigus and Hille-
brand 2017, Breuer et al. 2019a) and the extent of discretionary accruals (e.g., Bigus and 
Hillebrand 2017, Zicke and Kiy 2017, Laschewski and Nasev 2018). Both are often as-
sociated with reporting quality and employed in recent research on private firms. Moreo-
ver, both are as much under managerial control as the timing decision and contribute to 
firms’ information environment. However, it is questionable as to whether disclosure tim-
ing acts as a complement or substitute when seeking to achieve the desired level of trans-
parency. In terms of the disclosure amount, the former would be the case, if firms pursue 
Figure 12: 
Reporting lag of consolidated vs. unconsolidated financial statements 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts scatter plot of the reporting lag of the consolidated accounts (y-axis) and the reporting 
lag of the unconsolidated account (x-axis) of each parent company (n=1,053). The dotted lines represent 
the statutory deadline of 365 days. 
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a minimal disclosure strategy and additionally delay their filings. The latter follows the 
idea that firms enhance their reporting lag because they produce more comprehensive and 
informative reports. Following this notion, we also analyze the extent of discretionary 
accruals – a commonly used proxy for accounting quality – as a second financial reporting 
decision. We test whether firms are engaged in both (complement) or if there is a substi-
tutional association, and firms delay publication when they provide earnings of a higher 
quality. We therefore use the following regression model where ReportingQuality repre-
sents either the amount of disclosure or the discretionary accruals: 
  (3) 
To measure the amount of disclosure, we rely on the total number of characters in a firm’s 
filing, which is retrievable from the German Federal Gazette (Amount). To calculate the 
extent of potential earnings management, we employ the commonly used modified Jones 
(1991) model (Dechow et al. 1995) which separates accruals into a normal and a discre-
tionary portion. Following DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), we apply a cross-sectional 
model and calculate discretionary accruals (dAcc) as the difference between total and 
“expected” accruals based on the following regression: 
 
 
(4) 
where △Rev is the change in revenues of firm i from year t-1 to t, △Rec is the change in 
trade receivables, and PPE is the gross property, plant and equipment book value. All 
variables are scaled by one-year lagged total assets (TAt-1). Total accruals (tAcc) are cal-
culated in accordance with Dechow et al. (1995): 
 
 (5) 
 where △CA = change in current assets, △Cash = change in cash and cash equivalents, 
△CL = change in current liabilities, △STD = change in short-term debt, △TP = change 
in taxes payable, and △Dep = depreciation and amortization.  
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Table 18: 
Timing decision and other dimensions of reporting quality 
 (3a) Lag_Rep 
(3b) 
Lag_Rep 
Amount -22.258***  
 (-5.47)  
|dAcc|  16.841* 
  (1.67) 
RoA -79.200*** -74.525*** 
 (-6.86) (-6.38) 
Family 9.407*** 10.584*** 
 (3.51) (3.88) 
Competition 9.523*** 7.803** 
 (2.86) (2.30) 
Size -1.203 -5.090*** 
 (-0.81) (-3.66) 
Big4 -23.408*** -25.464*** 
 (-8.46) (-9.20) 
StockCorp -14.686*** -17.970*** 
 (-2.98) (-3.66) 
Startup 10.728*** 10.215*** 
 (3.11) (2.89) 
Banks 4.368*** 3.396*** 
 (5.12) (3.94) 
Group 21.985*** 16.387*** 
 (6.06) (4.71) 
Leverage -2.453 -2.987 
 (-1.29) (-1.57) 
YearEnd -18.212*** -18.746*** 
 (-5.44) (-5.52) 
Constant 599.115*** 409.072*** 
 (15.22) (23.10) 
   
Fixed effects Y, I, R Y, I, R 
   
n 5,262 5,084 
R² 0.157 0.152 
Adj. R² 0.146 0.141 
   
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (3) with Lag_Rep as dependent variable. We employ 
fixed effects for the year (Y), the industry based on Fama/French 48 classification (I), and the region (R) 
as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-
statistics are in parentheses. 
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We estimate Equation (4) in cross-section by industry and by year and therefore need a 
minimum of 15 observations for each combination. Industries are based on the 48-indus-
try classification scheme by Fama and French (1997). The residuals of the regression 
form the discretionary accruals (dAccit). We take absolute values, so that earnings de- and 
increasing effects do not compensate each other (|dAccit|).  
The results of the regression Model (3) are tabulated in Table 18. The first column depicts 
the disclosure amount, which is negatively associated to a significant extent with the tim-
ing decision. In this case, a negative (positive) coefficient of Amount is interpretable as a 
slight indication of a complementary (substitutional) relation between timing and amount 
of disclosure (3a). Firms that produce longer financial statements file significantly 
prompter. In other words, firms with shorter reports that are already less transparent by 
assumption, publish them with greater delay. This strategy seems reasonable when pur-
suing greatest opaqueness (“little and late”). The second regression (3b) reveals a posi-
tive association between reporting lag and the extent of discretionary accruals.53 This 
slightly suggests a complementary relationship too. Firms that provide more biased earn-
ings figures file late (“biased and late”). Both represents an approach to decrease the 
information environment and is also in line with the findings of Luypaert et al. (2016), 
who find extremely late-filed accounts to be associated with lower financial statement 
quality. However, the results have to be interpreted with caution. First, the correlation 
between Size and Amount is about 0.57, suggesting possible reliability issues.54 Second, 
the results are subject to general limitations and problems regarding the measurement as 
well as the interpretation of discretionary accruals (e.g., Jackson 2017, Chen et al. 2018). 
6.3 Compliance with legal deadlines 
To further analyze the willingness of firms to accept (substantial) monetary sanctions in 
order to withhold filings for a longer period, we introduce several variables, which bi-
narily measure compliance at different thresholds in time (NonCompliant). The longer a 
firm delays publication, the higher the monetary sanctions imposed by the FOJ. This fact 
allows us to derive an approximation of firms’ individual pricing for withholding infor-
mation. We employ the following logit regression:  
                                                 
53  N is slightly lower compared to other models because there are not enough industry-year combinations 
to calculate |dAcc| for all observations. 
54  The average variance inflation factor of Regression (3a) is 1.96 with a minimum of 1.03 and a maximum 
of 2.22 for the main variables. In untabulated tests, we drop Size from the controls and scale the number 
of characters by Size, with no effect on the results.  
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(6) 
The results are presented below (Table 19) and indicate that compliant firms and firms, 
which do not comply with legal timing requirements, differ with respect to some corpo-
rate attributes.  
The first logit regression (6a) examines firm-level characteristics, which drive the deci-
sion to file in or beyond the legal deadline. Non-complaint firms are more likely (i) to 
exhibit a loss, (ii) to show a higher score of our perceived competition measure, (iii) to 
not be audited by a Big4 audit company, and (iv) to be characterized as a family firm 
based on our definition. In order to obtain an assessment of the economic significance, 
we also estimate the predicted probabilities of exceeding the deadline. The marginal ef-
fects as depicted in Table 20 show the relative impact of a change of an explanatory var-
iable on being non-compliant. For continuous (binary) variables, the marginal effect is 
defined as a one-standard deviation increase (change from zero to one) while holding all 
other variables constant at sample means. The predicted probability of being non-compli-
ant (Lag_Rep > 365 days) rises from 59 % to 71 % (+12 points) when firms report nega-
tive earnings (Loss). Increasing Competition by one standard deviation rises probability 
of non-compliance by 6 %. On the contrary, firms hiring a Big4 auditor are about 18 % 
less likely to overrun the 365 days.  
If firms submit their accounts after 12 months, but within the period of grace (six weeks), 
they are subject to relatively low administrative sanctions. If a firm continues to ignore 
the filing obligation, it will be confronted with higher fines. Model (6c) analyzes the de-
terminants of firms complying within the extended period vs. those ignoring it. The de-
pendent variable equals one if Lag_Rep is higher than 415 days.55 Unsurprisingly, Loss 
and Family are still positively related, showing a higher probability for loss-reporting and 
family firms to exceed even the extended period. Competition is insignificant, indicating 
that competitive concerns are an issue when delaying beyond 365 days but not accepting 
higher financial penalties. The predicted probability to file after 415 days amounts to 
                                                 
55  The legal deadline amounts to 365 days plus the extension period of six weeks (42 days) = 407. We add 
another week in order to consider potential administrative delays (415 days) by the Federal Gazette. 
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Table 19: 
Firm-level determinants of non-compliance 
 (6a) Lag_Rep > 365 
(6b) 
Lag_Rep > 375 
(6c) 
Lag_Rep > 415 
(6d) 
Lag_Rep > 445 
Loss 0.556*** 0.564*** 0.722*** 0.995*** 
 (6.09) (6.29) (8.04) (9.55) 
Improve -0.159*** -0.156** -0.301*** -0.248*** 
 (-2.59) (-2.55) (-4.66) (-2.93) 
Family 0.307*** 0.374*** 0.360*** 0.536*** 
 (4.45) (5.52) (5.15) (5.99) 
Competition 0.268*** 0.233*** 0.098 0.105 
 (3.09) (2.72) (1.09) (0.89) 
Size -0.106*** -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.104** 
 (-3.10) (-2.70) (-2.68) (-2.15) 
Big4 -0.752*** -0.660*** -0.407*** -0.197** 
 (-10.78) (-9.49) (-5.41) (-2.00) 
StockCorp -0.412*** -0.464*** -0.446*** -0.704*** 
 (-3.34) (-3.75) (-3.22) (-3.61) 
Startup 0.165* 0.221** 0.161* 0.309*** 
 (1.80) (2.43) (1.71) (2.68) 
Banks 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.080*** 0.097*** 
 (3.13) (3.31) (3.61) (3.39) 
Group 0.178** 0.239*** 0.123 0.595*** 
 (2.38) (3.23) (1.60) (6.21) 
Leverage -0.130* -0.137* -0.178** -0.098* 
 (-1.84) (-1.93) (-2.24) (-1.73) 
YearEnd -0.230*** -0.531*** -1.119*** -0.730*** 
 (-2.67) (-6.16) (-10.43) (-5.21) 
Constant 1.290*** 0.871** -0.065 -1.724*** 
 (3.44) (2.33) (-0.16) (-3.22) 
     
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
     
n 5,262 5,262 5,262 5,262 
Pseudo R² 0.078 0.089 0.124 0.152 
     
Notes: Table depicts logit regression results of Model (6) with NonCompliance as binary dependent varia-
ble. In regression (6a) the dependent variable equals one if Lag_Rep > 365; in regression (6b) the dependent 
variable equals one if Lag_Rep > 375; in regression (6c) the dependent variable equals one if Lag_Rep > 
415; in regression (6d) the dependent variable equals one if Lag_Rep > 445. We employ year-fixed effects 
(Y). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
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33 % and increasing to 48 % when firms report a loss. The marginal effect is stronger 
than in Model (6a). In the last specification (6d), we add another month and increase the 
threshold of the dependent variable to 445 days (extreme delay). The predicted likelihood 
for such disclosure timing is 14 %, and doubling to 28 % if a firm reports a loss. The 
magnitude is high for Family, where the probability for filing beyond 445 days rises from 
14 % to 20 %.56 
Overall, performance is highly associated with the managerial decision to accept financial 
penalties in order to file late. Furthermore, there is some indication that ownership seems 
to influence the decision, too. Companies that we designate as family firms are more 
likely to clearly go beyond the legal deadlines.  
                                                 
56  Marginal effects are based on the coefficient estimates of Model (6b–d), which are not tabulated. 
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Table 20: 
Marginal effects of compliance with statutory deadlines 
 Model (6a) coefficients 
Marginal effect 
dy/dx 
Effect relative to  
Pr(NonCompliance) 
Loss 0.556*** 0.122*** 0.200 
 (6.09) (6.58)  
Improve -0.159*** -0.037*** -0.061 
 (-2.59) (-2.59)  
Family 0.307*** 0.071*** 0.116 
 (4.45) (4.52)  
Competition 0.268*** 0.063*** 0.102 
 (3.09) (3.09)  
Size -0.106*** -0.025*** -0.040 
 (-3.10) (-3.10)  
Big4 -0.752*** -0.175*** -0.289 
 (-10.78) (-10.85)  
StockCorp -0.412*** -0.100*** -0.163 
 (-3.34) (-3.26)  
Startup 0.165* 0.038* 0.062 
 (1.80) (1.83)  
Banks 0.067*** 0.016*** 0.026 
 (3.13) (3.13)  
Group 0.178** 0.041** 0.067 
 (2.38) (2.40)  
Leverage -0.130* -0.030* -0.050 
 (-1.84) (-1.84)  
YearEnd -0.230*** -0.055*** -0.089 
 (-2.67) (-2.63)  
Constant 1.290***   
 (3.44)   
    
Fixed effects Y   
    
n 5,262   
Pseudo R² 0.079   
Pr(NonCompliance) 0.613   
    
Notes: Table depicts marginal effects after the logit Model (6a) with NonCompliance (equals one if 
Lag_Rep > 365) as binary dependent variable. First column reports coefficients for Model (6a) as in Table 
19. For continuous variables, marginal effects are defined as an increase by one standard deviation while 
holding all other variables constant at sample means. For binary variables, effects are based on a change 
from zero to one. Unconditional probability of non-compliance (Pr(NonCompliance)) is number of non-
compliant accounts divided by total number of observations. We employ year-fixed effects (Y). *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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6.4  Robustness and limitations 
6.4.1 Analyzing disclosure timing using hazard duration approach 
To validate our main results, we additionally apply a survival analysis, which is a statis-
tical method that is explicitly designed to examine the duration of time until the occur-
rence of a certain event. This technique was originally developed and applied in medical 
research where the event is often a disease or the death of a study participant. However, 
over the years, this approach has been applied to predict the length of time in various 
disciplines. In this context, the event is the publication of the financial statement at the 
Federal Gazette. Although, we have no censored data, this approach is advantageous, as 
non-parametric models do not assume any underlying distribution and are more appro-
priate to study durations. Hence, we use the semi-parametric Cox (1972) proportional 
hazard model, which is mostly applied (Royston and Lambert 2011). We run the follow-
ing model, where the dependent variable is the hazard rate:  
 
 
(7) 
The baseline hazard function is denoted as h0(T) and T is the elapsed time since firms’ 
fiscal year-end in days. 
Table 21 provides the results of the Cox proportional hazard model estimation (7). A 
hazard rate above one implies a positive marginal impact on the occurrence of the event 
(the hazard) and thus a reduction in expected time until disclosure (vice versa). All of our 
influencing factors are statistically significant and exhibit the expected signs. The results 
are consistent with the multivariate regressions from Section 5.2. For example, a hazard 
rate < 1 of Family (0.826) can be interpreted as follows: given a family firm has not 
already disclosed prior to t, it is less likely that it discloses on the next day compared to a 
non-family firm. The same holds for firms with negative earnings, firms with higher per-
ceived competition and younger firms. Larger firms as well as firms beating prior years’ 
earnings report more timely. 
6.4.2 Alternatively operationalizing family firms 
It is a crucial challenge to define and operationalize family businesses. The literature has 
established various definitions and concepts to separate family firms from non-family 
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firms (Prencipe et al. 2014, Klein 2015). In order to validate our results regarding owner-
ship, we alter the empirical operationalization, which is so far grounded on quantitative 
data. Alternatively, we employ a stricter definition, which is based on a surname match-
ing. It is common for a typical family firm to carry the name of the founder. We therefore 
declare a firm to be a family firm, if the name of a person in the management is equal to 
the firm’s name. For example, the “Weber Tiefbau GmbH & Co. KG”, which is managed 
Table 21: 
Cox proportional hazard rate model of determinants on disclosure timing 
 (7a) h(T) 
(7b) 
h(T) 
Loss 0.634*** 0.564*** 
 (-10.82) (-9.13) 
Improve 1.091*** 1.213*** 
 (3.00) (5.53) 
Family 0.826***  
 (-5.85)  
Competition 0.910**  
 (-2.30)  
Size 1.057***  
 (3.26)  
Big4 0.911**  
 (-2.16)  
StockCorp 1.247***  
 (3.63)  
Startup 1.172***  
 (4.71)  
Banks 0.954***  
 (-4.37)  
Group 0.846***  
 (-4.02)  
Leverage 1.024  
 (1.13)  
YearEnd 1.362***  
 (7.32)  
   
Fixed effects Y, I, R Y, F 
   
n 5,262 5,262 
   
Notes: Table depicts results of the Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the hazard 
rate. We employ fixed effects for the year (Y), the industry based on Fama/French 48 classification (I), the 
region (R), and the firm (F) as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level 
(two-tailed test). The z-statistics are in parentheses. 
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by “Mr. Konrad Weber” is considered to be a family firm, because parts of the firm’s 
name are identical with the surname of the manager. This approach captures the manage-
rial influence of the family and the identification with the firm more properly. Of course, 
there are some problems. First, we will not capture all family firms using this approach. 
When a family firm does not carry the surname of the founder, there will be some false 
negatives (Error Type II). Names of younger firms are especially less likely to contain 
surnames. Moreover, we are not able to identify abbreviations of names, for example, if 
“Mr. Konrad Weber” would have named his firm “KoWe Tiefbau GmbH & Co. KG”. 
For this reason, we underestimate the number of family firms, which, however, would 
contradict any findings. We do not expect notable false positives (Error Type I), which 
would only occur in rare cases with extremely common surnames. In about 25 % of the 
sample firms, the surname of a person on the board of directors corresponds with the firm 
name (FamilyCEO). 
In a further specification, we identify all firms with at least two individuals with the same 
surname on the management board (regardless of the firm name). It is most likely, that 
executive members with the same surname are spouses, siblings or children of the founder 
(family members). Thus, this approach allows us to alternatively capture family control 
and decision-making as an important characteristic of family firms.57 About 12 % of all 
firms employ at least two managers with the same surname (RelatedCEOs).  
We rerun the main Model (1) with the previous family measure (1a) as well FamilyCEO 
(1f) and RelatedCEOs (1g). The regression results are depicted in Table 22. The coeffi-
cients of the variables of interest are positive and highly significant. Hence, all of our 
results are stable and robust in relation to an alternative measurement of family firms.  
6.4.3 Further limitations 
Our study is subject to major caveats and suffers from limitations. First, our sample is 
limited to large German private firms. We choose large private firms because they are 
confronted with the full set of mandatory disclosure requirements. Due to the special reg-
ulatory setting of the recent introduction of an effective enforcement system as well as a 
digitalized data retrieval platform (Electronic Federal Gazette), we choose German firms. 
However, inferences that only rely on the behavior of a group are vulnerable and need to 
be interpreted with caution. Small and medium-sized private firms could reveal a 
                                                 
57  For example, if “KoWe Tiefbau GmbH & Co. KG” employs “Mr. Konrad Weber”, “Mrs. Andrea We-
ber” and “Mr. Georg Müller” as managers, the firm is classified as a family firm. 
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Table 22: 
Regression results with alternative family firm measures 
 (1a) Lag_Rep 
(1f) 
Lag_Rep 
(1g) 
Lag_Rep 
Family 10.717***   
 (4.04)   
FamilyCEO  9.286***  
  (3.25)  
RelatedCEOs   13.328*** 
   (3.73) 
RoA 30.311*** 30.508*** 29.762*** 
 (9.22) (9.25) (9.06) 
Family -10.957*** -11.130*** -11.319*** 
 (-4.77) (-4.84) (-4.93) 
Competition 7.472** 7.568** 7.060** 
 (2.27) (2.29) (2.14) 
Size -3.989*** -4.152*** -4.310*** 
 (-2.96) (-3.08) (-3.21) 
Big4 -27.311*** -28.611*** -28.187*** 
 (-10.05) (-10.71) (-10.52) 
StockCorp -17.513*** -20.340*** -18.684*** 
 (-3.61) (-4.21) (-3.87) 
Startup 7.986** 7.979** 7.792** 
 (2.33) (2.32) (2.27) 
Banks 4.180*** 4.281*** 4.550*** 
 (4.98) (5.10) (5.46) 
Group 15.998*** 17.181*** 16.668*** 
 (4.72) (5.09) (4.93) 
Leverage -3.746** -3.669* -3.582* 
 (-1.98) (-1.94) (-1.89) 
YearEnd -18.175*** -17.209*** -18.001*** 
 (-5.46) (-5.15) (-5.41) 
Constant 396.805*** 402.435*** 404.149*** 
 (23.33) (23.82) (23.98) 
    
Fixed effects Y, I, R Y, I, R Y, I, R 
    
n 5,262 5,262 5,262 
R² 0.167 0.166 0.167 
Adj. R² 0.156 0.155 0.156 
    
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (1) with Lag_Rep as dependent variable. Model (1f) 
and (1g) contain alternative family firm measures. We employ fixed effects for the year (Y), the industry 
based on Fama/French 48 classification (I), and the region (R) as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate signifi-
cance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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different disclosure behavior grounded on differential cost-benefit considerations. Sec-
ond, we only rely on a randomly chosen sample. We are not aware of any indication, that 
our sample is unrepresentative for the population of companies included in the Amadeus 
database.58 Nonetheless, it is possible that firms that severely suffer from proprietary 
costs are not included. Such firms could have found ways to completely circumvent or 
significantly reduce disclosure requirements (e.g., change in legal form or size manage-
ment as indicated by Bernard et al. (2018)). Third, the financial filing procedure could be 
outsourced to external parties (e.g., tax advisers), which could influence the disclosure 
timing decision. Since we only consider large firms, this, however, should be not a major 
issue.  
7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this study, we examine the timing decision regarding the mandatory disclosure of pri-
vate firms. We argue that firms use discretion in legal requirements in order to deal with 
indirect costs of disclosure. Timeliness is a parameter that determines the value of infor-
mation to third parties. The literature already highlights the reluctance of private firms 
towards the public availability of financial statements and high transparency (e.g., Grottke 
2011, Grottke et al. 2012, Eierle et al. 2019). Prior to a regulatory change (EHUG), simply 
ignoring the disclosure obligation was prevalent. However, since 2007, automated sanc-
tioning has forced private firms to file annual reports within twelve months after fiscal 
year-end. We use this setting, to analyze how private firms respond to enforced mandated 
filing. 
In line with prior literature, we reveal high disclosure rates but add evidence on delaying 
disclosure to be a strategy to reduce indirect costs. We observe a high number of viola-
tions concerning statutory deadlines. Only 38 % of financial statements are filed in time. 
The mean reporting lag as the difference in days between the fiscal year-end and submis-
sion is 373 days (i.e., on average, private firms totally exhaust legal discretion of 365 
days).  
Whereas Gregory and Van Horn (1960, p. 352) generally define “the chief element of 
delay [as] the time required to process data” and also note that only small amounts of time 
                                                 
58  To ensure representativeness, we compared our sample and the Amadeus population with respect to 
size, profitability and distribution over industries without any peculiarities. 
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are required to distribute financial reports, this does not seem to be valid for private firms. 
Only a minor part of the reporting lag is consumed by financial statements’ preparation 
and auditing processes. Between the date when a firm is able to publish its annual report 
(following approval) and actual submission, there is an average time span of about six 
months. This significant gap between “a firm is able to disclose” and “a firm is willing 
to disclose” highlights firms’ unwillingness and indicates a tendency to create a less trans-
parent information environment. Notwithstanding, timing behavior is not homogenous. 
The reporting lag exhibits high variance. Some firms comply in a timely fashion, while 
others even accept monetary sanctions to overrun statutory deadlines. We therefore take 
a closer look at the determinants of the disclosure timing decision. 
Our results suggest corporate performance as an important influencing factor. In line with 
the “good news early, bad news late” hypothesis, we find that loss-reporting firms exhibit 
significantly longer reporting lags. This is also the case, if firms are not able to beat prior 
year earnings. Against the background of rising agency conflicts, it seems reasonable, to 
withhold cost-raising news as long as possible. In particular, extreme changes in earnings, 
namely moving from a profit situation to a loss situation and vice versa, shape disclosure 
timing. Firms that report a loss after a profit in the previous year significantly slow down 
the public availability of financial statements. In the opposite case, disclosure timing is 
accelerated. Consistent with the findings of Muiño and Núñez-Nickel (2016), we also 
observe a u-shaped relationship between disclosure timing and firm performance. This 
indicates that highly profitable firms cherish incentives to file less timely as well. Firms 
might try to hide outperformance and high margins from (potential) competitors and other 
stakeholders. Hence, a longer withholding of information allows them to deal with in-
creasing proprietary costs.  
In line with the proprietary costs theory, we find that firms exposed to higher (perceived) 
competition exhibit longer reporting lags. Additionally, we show the ownership structure 
to be related with timeliness. Family firms, which are more strongly confronted with pri-
vacy costs, delay disclosure to a higher degree. Thus, we also add to this aspect of the 
literature, which already documents a higher opacity of family firms (e.g., Anderson et 
al. 2009, Ma et al. 2017).  
Overall, we provide evidence to show that private firms exploit discretion in timeliness 
in order to handle indirect costs of mandatory disclosure. From a financial statement 
user’s perspective, we present insights into the potential informativeness of the reporting 
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lag. We also document slight indication that timeliness is related to other aspects of fi-
nancial reporting quality. Our results suggest that firms which delay financial reporting 
provide shorter reports (less information) and exhibit a higher extent of discretionary ac-
cruals.  
The study extends the literature on private firms, particularly on the costs of mandatory 
disclosure. It also contributes to a better understanding of the financial reporting practice 
of private firms and emphasizes the importance of proprietary costs. Moreover, findings 
are of practical relevance to standard setters and regulators, when defining the require-
ments of mandatory disclosure and designing its enforcement mechanism. 
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To proxy for a firm’s competitive environment, we employ a textual-based measure developed 
by Li et al. (2013). The idea is to capture management’s perception of the intensity of competition 
by referring to the number of occurrences of competition-related terms in firms’ management 
report. We therefore translate, adjust and complement the key terms provided by Li et al. (2013). 
To control for length, we scale the measure by total number of words. We extract the management 
report from the document filed at Federal Gazette by each firm and year, and count the competi-
tion-related words.59 
 
 
(8) 
In a next step, we form decile ranks of PctComp each year, subtract one of the decile rank and 
divide it by nine (Li et al. 2013). We denote the decile ranked variable, which is now scaled in 
[0,1], Competition.  
 
  
                                                 
59  Li et al. (2013) employ competition, competitor, competitive, compete, competing including those words 
with an “s” appended as competition-related words. We use the following appropriate German expres-
sions: *wettbew*, *konkurr*, *rival*, *erlösdruck*, *preisdruck*, *margendruck*, *ertragsdruck*, 
*kostendruck*, *kompetitiv*. 
Appendix B: 
Competition measure 
 
 
PART B: TIMELINESS 
98  
Appendix C: 
Variable definitions and data sources 
Timing variables 
 Definition Source 
Lag_Prep is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year-end and the 
date of completion of the financial statement (preparation).  
Federal 
Gazette 
Lag_Audit is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year-end and the 
date of audit completion (signature date). 
Federal 
Gazette 
Lag_Approv is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year-end and the 
date of financial statement approval through the general meet-
ing. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Lag_Rep is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year-end and the 
date of the public filing at the Federal Gazette.  
Federal 
Gazette 
△Prep_Rep is the difference in days between the date of completion of the 
financial statement and the date of public filing at the Federal 
Gazette. 
Federal 
Gazette 
△Audit_Rep is the difference in days between the date of audit completion 
and the date of public filing at the Federal Gazette. 
Federal 
Gazette 
△Approv_Rep is the difference in days between the date of financial statement 
approval through the general meeting and the date of public fil-
ing at the Federal Gazette. 
Federal 
Gazette 
△Lag_Rep is the difference between Lag_Rep in year t and Lag_Rep in 
year t-1. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Variables of the main model 
 Definition Source 
Loss is a binary variable equal to one if the operating income is nega-
tive. Amadeus 
Improve is a binary variable equal to one if the operating income in year 
t is higher compared to the previous year (t-1). Amadeus 
Family is a binary variable equal to one if a natural person holds more 
than 50 % of shares (controlling shareholder). Amadeus 
Competition is a measure for perceived competition following Li et al. 
(2013). See Appendix B for details. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Amadeus 
Startup Is a binary variable equal to one if the age of the company is 
less than ten years. Amadeus 
StockCorp is a binary variable equal to one if firm is incorporated as a 
stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft, AG). Amadeus 
Big4 is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is audited by one of 
the Big4 auditor firms. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Banks is the number of bank contacts. Amadeus 
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Appendix C: 
continued 
 Definition Source 
Group is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s primary financial 
report from an informational perspective is a consolidated re-
port. 
Amadeus 
Leverage is the firm-level ratio of non-current liabilities to the sum of 
non-current liabilities plus the book value of equity. Amadeus 
YearEnd is a binary variable equal to one if firms' fiscal year-end does 
not correspond with the calendar year. Amadeus 
Variables for additional analyses 
 Definition Source 
RoA is the ratio of operating income to average total assets. Amadeus 
RoAadj is the ratio of operate income to average total assets, minus the 
mean of this ratio for all other firms of the same industry based 
on Fama/French 48-classification. 
Amadeus 
Lag_RepCS is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year-end and the 
date of public filing of the consolidated account at the Federal 
Gazette. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Lag_RepUCS is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year-end and the 
date of public filing of the unconsolidated account at the Fed-
eral Gazette of firms that provide also a consolidated account. 
Federal 
Gazette 
△Lag_RepCS_UCS is the difference in days between public filing of the consoli-
dated account minus the difference in days between public fil-
ing of the unconsolidated account. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Amount is the natural logarithm of the number of characters of the pub-
licly filed documents. 
Federal 
Gazette 
|dAcc| is the absolute firm-level value of discretionary accruals based 
on the cross sectional modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 
1995) calculated using data on the population of large private 
firms in Amadeus. 
Amadeus 
NonCompliant365 is a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s reporting lag is 
greater than 365 days. 
Federal 
Gazette 
NonCompliant375 is a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s reporting lag is 
greater than 375 days. 
Federal 
Gazette 
NonCompliant415 is a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s reporting lag is 
greater than 415 days. 
Federal 
Gazette 
NonCompliant445 is a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s reporting lag is 
greater than 445 days. 
Federal 
Gazette 
FamilyCEO is a binary variable equal to one if the surname of a person of 
the board of directors is equal to firms' name. 
Federal 
Gazette 
RelatedCEOs is a binary variable equal to one if there are at least two persons 
on the board of directors that have the same surname. 
Federal 
Gazette 
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Appendix D: 
Regional differences 
Federal state Mean n 
Baden-Württemberg 371.92 945 
Bavaria 378.35 1,001 
Berlin 369.97 145 
Brandenburg 340.76 76 
Bremen 353.49 78 
Hamburg 368.29 230 
Hesse 356.61 388 
Lower Saxony 377.70 501 
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 376.77 65 
North Rhine-Westphalia 379.10 1,480 
Rhineland Palatinate 378.18 237 
Saarland 355.14 66 
Saxony 380.75 158 
Saxony-Anhalt 356.89 124 
Schleswig Holstein 354.48 192 
Thuringia 358.93 86 
Total 372.76 5,772 
 
 
 
Notes: Appendix depicts the reporting lag (Lag_Rep) by federal states. The darker, the longer the average 
reporting lag of the firms in the federal state (n=5,772). The federal state with the lowest (highest) number 
of observation is “Mecklenburg Western Pomerania” (“North Rhine-Westphalia”) with 65 (1,480) firm 
years. 
 
  
Part C: 
Narratives 
When you say nothing (new) – 
Do firms strategically distort the informativeness of their narrative reports? 
 
 
A b s t r a c t  
We analyze whether private firms use discretion to decrease the informative-
ness of mandatory narrative disclosures. As such, we identify narrative 
opaqueness by measuring the intensity of report stickiness (“copy-paste”). 
First, we show that firms with strong incentives to be more opaque systemat-
ically modify and update their narrative disclosures to a lower extent. In con-
trast, firms facing greater demand for financial reporting, update them to a 
significantly higher degree. Second, we provide evidence of a potential mech-
anism for decreased usefulness of reports with a greater copy-paste intensity 
(high similarity), whose content exhibits less predictive power. Put differ-
ently, the content of more modified management reports (low similarity) is 
more consistent with current performance and a better predictor of future 
earnings. We conclude that some firms successfully create management re-
ports that are less informative by generously using copy-paste. 
 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Marcus Bravidor and Thomas Loy. A paper version is available 
as Wittmann et al. (2019). 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank Jap Efendi (Discussant), Rolf Uwe Fülbier, Joachim Gassen, Hendrik Ru-
pertus, participants at the 14th Workshop of European Financial Reporting in Stockholm, Sweden, the 42th 
European Accounting Association Annual Congress in Paphos, Cyprus as well as the doctoral seminars at 
the University of Bochum and the University of Bayreuth for their valuable comments. 
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1 Introduction 
In contrast to privately held firms in the United States, European firms are obliged to 
prepare financial statements and make them publicly available. Apart from quantitative 
accounting data in balance sheets, income statements and accompanying notes, firms 
must also prepare narrative sections with detailed qualitative information about risks and 
opportunities, their strategies and forecasts in the management report (Lagebericht). Ide-
ally and in line with the management approach, the report contains information from an 
insider’s perspective, complements accounting numbers and provides additional and fu-
ture-related information. Thus, the report is considered as a superior information source, 
which enhances a firm’s transparency (e.g., Feldman et al. 2010). Notwithstanding, this 
only applies if the management report is written with the intention of conveying relevant, 
concise and non-biased information in a structured way. However, as the management 
report is a narrative report with numerous qualitative and subjective assertions, it inher-
ently entails a high degree of managerial discretion. Although, the management report is 
regulated with respect to its basic content, the actual breadth and depth of discussion and 
the transmission of managerial “sentiment” are largely under the author’s control.  
A growing body of accounting and finance research employs tools and practices from 
computational linguistics to examine the textual properties of financial reports (for a re-
view of the earlier small-sample and contemporaneous large-sample literature, see, e.g., 
Jones and Shoemaker 1994 or Loughran and McDonald 2016). We build on the extant 
literature – which has so far solely focused on listed companies and capital market con-
sequences – and present initial evidence related to the properties of private firms’ narra-
tive disclosures. 
Managers of private firms trade off the potential benefits of transparency (e.g., more read-
ily available trade credit and better borrowing conditions) against the downsides attribut-
able to regulatory and proprietary costs (Minnis and Shroff 2017). In consequence, some 
firms seek to be more opaque and choose to create a less transparent information envi-
ronment. There are different “channels” how firms can achieve a lower level of transpar-
ency60 – even in a mandatory disclosure setting. First, firms could refuse to publicly file 
                                                 
60  We apply the terms “lower transparency” and “higher opaqueness” synonymously. 
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financial reports (Bernard 2016),61 manage the size of their operations to fall below dis-
closure thresholds (Bernard et al. 2018) or withhold specific information (Dedman and 
Lennox 2009). Second, firms can systematically disclose lower-quality accounting fig-
ures (Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Burgstahler et al. 2006, Hope et al. 2013). Third, they 
could delay the public availability of their filings (Bigus and Hillebrand 2017, Clatworthy 
and Peel 2016, Luypaert et al. 2016). We argue that a potential fourth channel relates to 
the textual and linguistic properties of corporate narratives. To the best of our knowledge, 
this channel has not been studied in the context of private firms. 
This lack of research is rather surprising given the importance of non-financial disclosures 
for European as well as German regulators in recent years. As such, Article 19 of Di-
rective (EC) 2013/34/EU stipulates that firms’ management reports should contain infor-
mation on current and expected performance, research and development activities, and 
risks and opportunities. German regulations are even more extensive than required by the 
European rules. For example, German firms need to provide detailed forecasts of changes 
in key performance indicators.  
The comparatively scant attention paid to private firm narratives may be the result of 
problematic data availability due to the absence of a comprehensive and automatically 
retrievable database that includes these textual disclosures. Hence, our sample consists of 
manually collected data from 1,000 large, privately held German corporations over six 
years.  
Our results contribute to the literature in multiple ways. To the best of our knowledge, we 
present the first large-sample evidence on private firms’ textual properties. We provide 
insights into a potential approach to create less informative filings, which is largely at 
managerial discretion. Namely, we use textual year-over-year modifications as a proxy 
for firms’ intention to provide informative narratives. We follow the notion that textual 
passages copied from prior years (i.e., synonymous with leaving annual narratives un-
changed) provide the readers of financial statements with no new information and are 
more likely to just resemble standard phrases or boilerplate language. We find that firms 
with strong incentives to create a more opaque information environment systematically 
file narrative reports with a higher degree of copy-paste intensity. As such, we provide 
evidence that firms which have previously chosen the most efficient way to be opaque 
                                                 
61  This channel is no longer available to German firms, which we will explain in more detail in Section 2. 
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(i.e., avoiding disclosure completely) are now stronger engaged in copy-paste activities. 
Likewise, financially constrained firms exhibit similar patterns as they update their man-
agement reports less thoroughly. Moreover, firms in less concentrated industries and 
those firms that exceed average industry profitability leave yearly narratives unchanged 
to a higher degree. We attribute this to proprietary cost concerns. In comparison, firms 
facing greater demand for financial reporting revise their management reports more 
properly. We conclude that firms systematically shape the informativeness of narrative 
requirements according to their needs and preferences (for privacy). Lastly, we show that 
firms succeed in publishing less informative reports by relying on copy-paste activities. 
Compared to more updated reports, the content of those with a high degree of copy-paste 
exhibits significantly less consistency with current accounting numbers and significantly 
less predictive power in terms of future earnings.  
Overall, the results suggest that firms adapt informativeness to their reporting needs by 
exploiting copy-paste activities in order to reduce the incremental information of manda-
tory narrative disclosures.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the German regulatory environ-
ment. Section 3 provides a review of the relevant literature on private firm disclosure 
attributes and presents channels to achieve higher opaqueness even in mandatory disclo-
sure settings. In Section 4, we develop our hypotheses. The research design, data and 
results are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 contains robustness checks and the 
final section concludes. 
2 Institutional background 
Regulation of management reporting 
In addition to annual quantitative financial accounts, public and private limited liability 
firms must prepare a mandatory (group) management report, which requires various types 
of information, including non-financial and especially future-oriented information. Firms 
are required to report on risks, opportunities and their business prospects from the man-
agement’s point of view. To complement retrospective accounting figures, the manage-
ment report must include a wide range of information, which should convey a compre-
hensive picture of firms’ present and future economic situation. Based on European reg-
ulation, German law mandates the evaluation and explanation of expected developments 
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and accompanying risks and opportunities (Article 289 of the German Commercial Code 
(GCC) for individual accounts and Article 315 GCC for consolidated accounts). As GCC 
does not provide clear guidance on the content and presentation of the required infor-
mation, German Accounting Standard 20 (GAS 20) has, since 2013, specified the require-
ments of the consolidated reports in greater detail. Following the management approach, 
it requires an outlook and estimates for the most important financial and non-financial 
key performance indicators, comments on current research and development activities, 
and a report about material events occurring after the balance sheet date. The regulation 
requires the management to explicitly provide unbiased descriptions of firms’ opportuni-
ties (GAS 20.B40) and further mandates a detailed description of the risk management 
system, as well as the methods employed for consolidating and assessing entity-level risks 
(GAS 20.B38). GAS 20 is not mandatory but strongly recommended on a legal entity-
level (i.e., for individual financial statements). As such, the management report should 
consist of different narrative sections, for instance, a discussion and analysis of the eco-
nomic position, and individual risks and opportunities (including the macroeconomic and 
sector-specific environment). In summary, the main objective of the management report 
is to enable an informed user to obtain a suitable understanding of expected future devel-
opment, crucial risks and opportunities.  
Mandatory disclosure regulation 
In addition to the preparation of annual accounts and management reports, German regu-
lation also mandates public disclosure for all companies with limited liability. The scope 
of disclosure depends on the size of the company, with some relaxations for smaller firms 
(Bernard et al. 2018, Deno et al. 2019). Annual financial statements, the accompanying 
management report and other documents must be published within a period of twelve 
months after fiscal year-end. The Electronic Trade Register and Company Register Act 
(EHUG) of 2007 significantly amended the German mandatory disclosure regime. First, 
disclosure enforcement was improved. Now, firms that do not fulfill their filing obliga-
tions are automatically subject to fines. The introduction of this highly effective sanction-
ing mechanism notably raised compliance rates (e.g., Bernard 2016, Grottke et al. 2016). 
Second, an online platform replaced the old-fashioned hard-copies of local trade registers. 
The Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) allows for online submission and significantly fa-
cilitates data retrieval. Interested parties can obtain reliable financial data for almost every 
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German company. Despite European harmonization efforts, there are still notable differ-
ences among member states (Kaya and Seebeck 2019). The relevant EU directive, 
2013/34/EU (Article 30), gives them some discretion in terms of designing the data filing 
and retrieval processes. For example, in France, access to filings is subject to fees and 
requires registration. Moreover, French private firms are allowed to exclude the manage-
ment report from publicly available filings (Article L. 232-21 f. French Commercial Code 
(FCC)).62 The German legislator decided to make online access completely free of 
charge, without any user-registration requirements and implemented a useful criteria-
based and multilingual full-text-search.63 According to a business register survey, only 
five of 27 member states do not charge for financial statement information.64 From a 
user’s perspective, the German Electronic Federal Gazette thus provides a comfortable 
and helpful tool to research firms. Most private firms, therefore, consider the EHUG a 
“transparency shock” (Deno et al. 2019, Bernard 2016, Breuer et al. 2018, Breuer et al. 
2019c, Laschewski and Nasev 2018).  
Cumulatively, the German setting with its requirement to prepare and publish manage-
ment reports, provides an ideal opportunity to test our research question of whether firms 
with increased incentives to be more opaque are engaged in activities to render their man-
agement report less informative. 
3 Prior literature 
3.1 Incentives to create a more opaque information environment 
Incentives to be (more) opaque stem from different sources, which have been extensively 
discussed in prior literature. A major reason is based on competition (e.g., Breuer et al. 
2019c, Muhn and Gassen 2019). Firms seek to protect competitive advantages and high 
margins and aim to hide relevant information from actual and potential rivals. This rela-
tion is based on the conjecture that disclosure reveals sensitive information to competi-
tors, which may reduce future cash flows. 65 Thus, disclosure is costly and potentially 
harmful to the disclosing firm (Verrecchia 1983). Recent survey evidence by Minnis and 
                                                 
62  There is an exception to the obligation to file management reports; however, these reports have to be 
made available upon request (Article L. 232-23 I 2 FCC). The exception is not applicable to group 
management reports. 
63  Only, filings of micro entities are only available upon request and require payment of a service charge. 
64  For details, see: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_in_member_states-106-en.do. 
65  Using IP addresses and access data on EDGAR, Bernard et al. (2019) empirically show information 
flows between rival firms. 
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Shroff (2017) supports this notion. Private firms subject to mandatory disclosure are most 
concerned that competitors will learn about their financial position and performance. Fur-
thermore, even suppliers, customers and debtholders can use such information to review 
their contractual relationships, with possible negative monetary implications (Loy 2016). 
These aspects intensify when considering that (potential) competitors from the US or 
other countries do not need to disclose any financial statements. Product market predation 
is another source, which is supported by analytical and empirical research. It is argued 
that financially constrained firms are potential targets for predation. As such, they have 
incentives to conceal their financial situation in order to impede being identified as vul-
nerable prey (Bernard 2016). Beyond the abovementioned factors, there are many other 
rational and irrational reasons that depend on the personal preferences of the owner and/or 
manager, and the idiosyncrasies of the disclosing firm. Concluding, a number of (un)ob-
servable factors determine the optimal level of transparency/opaqueness. 
3.2 Channels to create a more opaque information environment 
Extant literature has already taken a closer look at some of the channels which influence 
firms’ information environment. Most previous studies have concentrated on the numbers 
in financial statements. For instance, Burgstahler et al. (2006) show that European private 
firms tend to manage their earnings comparatively more than public firms. Numeric 
(mostly accrual-based) evidence documents that private firms tend to be less transparent 
than their public counterparts (Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Hope et al. 2013). Moreover, 
it seems that firms strategically distort the informativeness of their earnings figures to 
conceal actual numbers (e.g., Ellul et al. 2016, Imhof et al. 2018, Shi et al. 2018). Re-
search on other channels how to provide less transparent financial accounting information 
is scarce. As an exception, e.g., Dedman and Lennox (2009) find that firms strategically 
withhold specific information (details about sales and the cost of sales). Results indicate 
that firms tend to mitigate the informativeness of their reports by leaving them out. Like-
wise, Bigus and Hillebrand (2017) examine disclosure timing and reporting quantity of 
private firms. Their results indicate that firms with fewer bank relationships systemati-
cally choose to remain more opaque by providing shorter reports and publishing them 
significantly later. Bernard (2016) shows that (many) private firms not only attempt to 
withhold specific information but actually completely avoid disclosure. His results sug-
gest that financially constrained firms are more likely to ignore their disclosure obliga-
tions in order to mitigate predation risks. This was possible as the Germany enforcement 
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regime in Germany was lax and did not effectively sanction non-compliance. It was the 
most effective way to achieve opaqueness (i.e. ‘staying dark’). However, since the new 
regulation (Section 2) de facto forces all private corporations to disclose their financial 
statements, we argue that firms exploit other channels to make their filings less informa-
tive. In addition to (i) disclosure avoidance and the withholding of specific information, 
(ii) earnings management, and (iii) disclosure timeliness, we assume that managing the 
properties of textual disclosure requirements (narratives) could be a another “channel”.  
3.3 Narratives as a potential channel for achieving higher opaqueness 
Textual analysis is a growing field in finance and accounting research (Lewis and Young 
2019). Within the last decade, many studies have employed language-processing tech-
niques to assess textual attributes, and examine their economic correlates and implica-
tions. Some of these build on the notion that firms manage textual properties in order to 
alter their information environment. For instance, one of the first studies interprets the 
use of complex language as an intentional managerial choice and documents a positive 
relation between annual report readability and firm performance (Li 2008). The results 
suggest that firms selectively manage the lexical features of narratives to hide adverse 
information, consistent with managerial obfuscation (see also Li and Zhan 2019). Lo et 
al. (2017) pick up this point and find that managers chose higher linguistic complexity in 
conjunction with earnings management. The authors conclude that decreased readability 
serves as a tool to conceal actual earnings management procedures. Next to readability, 
managers seem to exploit the specificity of language in order to influence reports’ in-
formativeness. As such, Hope et al. (2016) assert that firms which face higher proprietary 
costs are less likely to provide specific and precise information. In other words, firms 
systematically choose to use unspecific wording (i.e., cheap talk) to reduce the informa-
tiveness of their reports. Likewise, the results of Cazier and Pfeiffer (2017) reveal that 
firms strategically employ repetitive disclosures to inflate narratives and report infor-
mation in a more opaque fashion.66 Lastly, recent literature indicates that narratives are 
potentially uninformative to stakeholders if they are not updated decisively following sig-
nificant economic changes (Brown and Tucker 2011, Bozanic et al. 2017, Amel-Zadeh 
and Fraase 2016, Cohen et al. 2018).  
                                                 
66  Although Cazier and Pfeiffer (2017) mainly refer to obfuscation, they also note litigation concerns to 
be a potential influencing factor. In our private firm setting, however, litigation risks are not significant. 
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In summary, previous research provides some indication that discretion in preparing nar-
ratives is used to manage the informativeness of disclosures. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, textual analysis studies have exclusively focused on public firms and capital 
market implications. The narratives of private firms seem to provide an exciting research 
opportunity for (at least) three reasons. First, from the perspective of third parties, private 
firms exhibit an overall weaker information environment than comparable public firms. 
There are fewer competing sources of information, which increases the relative im-
portance of accounting information for third parties (Chen et al. 2011). Apart from a low 
level of media coverage for most of private firms, there are no ad hoc disclosures, interim 
reports, analyst reports, earnings press releases or conference calls. In many cases, firms’ 
yearly filings are the main – or possibly only – source of substantial and reliable infor-
mation about a non-listed firm (Hope et al. 2017, Hope and Yvas 2017). Second, the 
(narrative) disclosures of private firms offer a more genuine management perspective. In 
the absence of broad and costly marketing and legal divisions as well as specialized in-
vestor relations, filings are less likely to be rehearsed or optimized. Third, private Euro-
pean firms generally face lower litigation risks in terms of financial disclosure (Chaney 
et al. 2004, Hope and Langli 2010). Hence, substantial litigation issues should not bias 
managerial behavior or the properties of private firms’ narratives. 
4 Development of hypotheses 
4.1 Firm-level determinants of reports’ informativeness 
Given that the regulation of narratives is vague and difficult to enforce (e.g., compared to 
accounting numbers), the author of a report can significantly influence its informative-
ness. Based on this high level of discretion, we would therefore expect firms to adapt the 
informativeness of textual disclosures to their needs. Following this idea, we formulate 
two sets of opposing hypotheses. First, H1 presumes that firms facing greater financial 
reporting demand prepare more informative management reports as follows: 
H1: Firms facing greater reporting demand file more informative narratives. 
H1a:  Firms with more dispersed ownership publish more informative narratives. 
H1b: Firms that rely on transactional banking publish more informative narratives. 
H1c: Firms with labor participation publish more informative narratives. 
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In contrast, we would expect that firms incentivized to seek greater opaqueness prepare 
management reports that have less informative value. Based on proprietary costs theory, 
our second set of hypotheses, therefore, reads as follows: 
H2:  Firms facing proprietary-cost concerns file less informative narratives. 
H2a: Habitual disclosure avoiders publish less informative narratives. 
H2b:  Financially constrained firms publish less informative narratives. 
H2c:  Firms in less concentrated industries publish less informative narratives. 
H2d:  Firms with above-industry margins publish less informative narratives. 
4.2 The relation between copy-paste intensity and reports’ informativeness 
Our approach to determine the informativeness of firms’ narratives is based on the idea 
that useful disclosures provide updated information to financial statement readers. Infor-
mation that is already publicly known does not enhance a firm’s information environ-
ment. Hence, the informativeness depends on the willingness of the author to adjust nar-
ratives to the firm’s economic situation year by year. Moreover, copied passages are more 
likely to be standard phrases or boilerplate and do not contain relevant information. Thus, 
we rely on the following basic association: The larger the proportion of information al-
ready published in previous year(s) (through copy-paste), the lower the usefulness of the 
report.  
To obtain a better understanding of our notion, we refer to Exhibit 1 at the end of this 
section, which shows the management report of one of our sample firms for the year 2016. 
Passages copied word for word from the 2011 report (five years old) are marked in dark 
grey; passages copied from the preceding year’s report are marked in light grey. Only 
updated or newly introduced sections (which potentially provide new information) are 
not greyed out. The author of this exemplary report chose to reduce updated passages to 
a bare minimum, and scarcely revealed any new information. This contributes to an over-
all opaque information environment. In a similar vein, Exhibit 2 shows the forecast sec-
tion – a financial reporting element with sensitive forward-looking information – for a 
sample firm from 2011 through 2016. The firm published an equally worded forecast 
section without any adjustment over a period of at least six years. Of course, both exam-
ples are extremes, but they demonstrate that some firms engage heavily in copy-paste 
activities. We thus rely on the extent of yearly revisions as a proxy for a report’s informa-
tiveness.  
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Nevertheless, there are alternative explanations (aside from managerial discretion) for 
keeping narratives unchanged. First, copy-pasting is a common practice in the process of 
preparing financial statements. To a certain extent, it is reasonable to use the preceding 
year’s filing as a template for the current year and repeat language from one year to the 
next. Recent survey evidence supports the practical relevance of this procedure. When 
asked about financial statement preparation, respondents document a strong reliance on 
prior year’s MD&A as a template (Amel-Zadeh et al. 2019).67 Copied fractions are, there-
fore, not an indicator for an uninformative report per se. In particular, legislative and legal 
literature has developed theories to explain the existence of terms that are only copy-paste 
(boilerplate). Accompanying benefits – discussed under the heading of “economics of 
boilerplate” (Kahan and Klausner 1997) – are partly transferable to the preparation of 
management reports (McMullin 2016). Reliance on a default language and a default struc-
ture minimizes the transaction costs associated with drafting, internal coordination and 
negotiating (Ahdieh 2006). In addition, readers, auditors and regulators are accustomed 
to standard terms, which create a kind of familiarity and promote information digestion.  
Second, organizational and behavioral theory offers further explanations by referring to 
the tendency of established structures and routines to perpetuate existing disclosure pro-
cedures (Hannan and Freeman 1984, Gibbins et al. 1990). The content and style of finan-
cial reporting is affected by ritualistic and bureaucratic behavior (Aerts 2010). Hence, 
report stickiness is partly a result of routine, automatic processes and a general reluctance 
to deviate from the status quo (status quo bias).68 Undoubtedly, there is a reasonable 
amount of copy-paste in management reports, which explain some degree of year-over-
year similarity. 
Nonetheless, extensive stickiness impairs the usefulness of management reports. Several 
empirical studies have already provided evidence of this relation. Brown and Tucker 
(2011) were the first to analyze the textual modification of MD&As. Given the significant 
association between the extent of yearly revisions and magnitude of stock price responses, 
the authors conclude that modified narratives are informative. They even find some evi-
dence that firms facing more competition are less likely to revise their MD&A in order 
                                                 
67  Public US firms respond to the question “When creating the draft for the current year’s MD&A, to what 
degree does the primary author rely on the prior year’s MD&A as a template?” with a mean (median) 
of 0.6 (0.7), where 0 is no reliance and 1 is very strong reliance (n=189) (Amel-Zadeh et al. 2019). 
68  Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) introduced the term “status quo bias” in economics. It describes 
individuals’ preference for the current state and the maintenance of prior decisions based on psycholog-
ical and behavioral theories (Kahneman et al. 1991). 
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to disclose less informative reports. Likewise, Amel-Zadeh and Fraase (2016) empirically 
show that year-over-year changes are informative to investors. In a similar vein, Bozanic 
et al. (2017) assert that high year-over-year textual similarity is a tool to hide information 
from specific stakeholders and to make mandatory disclosures less informative. By ex-
amining the implementation of new disclosure requirements, they find that firms engage 
more intense copy-paste activities when proprietary costs are high. Following the idea 
that (only) changes in narratives are informative and valuable, Cohen et al. (2018) indi-
cate that changes are predictive of the future. The extent of modification allows for pre-
dicting profitability, future news announcements, and even future firm-level bankrupt-
cies. Likewise, Rawte et al. (2018) integrate modifications of risk factors disclosures 
(Form 10-K, Item 1A) into a model to predict bank failures more accurately.  
Aforementioned studies build on the notion that only revised narratives are informative. 
Thus, reports with a higher share of copy-paste have less predictive power. We follow 
this assumption and argue that private firms can exploit this channel even more exten-
sively as they face far less severe litigation concerns and are not exposed to capital market 
pressure. Therefore, we assume that firms which choose to be more opaque are more 
strongly engaged in creating a less transparent information environment by refraining 
from updating their narrative reports, as formulated in H1.  
To empirically support our argumentation about the creation of a more opaque infor-
mation environment through exploiting copy-paste, we evaluate the usefulness of man-
agement report content with respect to copy-paste intensity. Thus, we state our last set of 
hypothesis as follows: 
H3: The content of reports with greater copy-paste intensity is less useful. 
H3a:  The content of reports with greater copy-paste intensity exhibits less consistency 
with current accounting numbers. 
H3b:  The content of reports with greater copy-paste intensity exhibits less predictive 
power. 
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Exhibit 1: 
Exemplary management report (sticky passages highlighted) 
Lagebericht für das Geschäftsjahr 2016 
Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft 
Die Gesamtwirtschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat sich in 2016 weiter stabilisiert und im Vergleich zu 2015 eine positive Entwicklung genommen. Die Produk-
tion in Deutschland konnte damit stabilisiert werden, der Absatz stand jedoch durch verschiedene Krisenstaaten in Europa weiter unter Druck. Investitionen werden im 
Wesentlichen als Ersatzinvestitionen aber auch als Erweiterungsinvestitionen vorgenommen. 
Entwicklung der Märkte 
Im Jahr 2016 war weiterhin eine Stabilisierung der Märkte zu verzeichnen. Daher konnte insbesondere im Bereich der Standardprodukte eine Auslastung auf gestiege-
nem Niveau erreicht werden was insbesondere im Inland zu einer entsprechenden Erhöhung der Umsatzerlöse führte. 
Geschäftsentwicklung 
Ertragslage 
Die Umsatzsteigerung des Jahres 2016 resultiert im Wesentlichen aus einer Steigerung der Inlandsumsätze sowie gestiegenen Materiallieferungen. 
Während sich der Exportanteil für die xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx auf 29,3 % (Vorj.: 30,2 %) vermindert hat, ist der Inlandsumsatz mit Kunden im Vergleich zum Vorjahr 
auf rd. 70,7 % (Vorj.: 69,8 %) gestiegen. 
Der gestiegenen Gesamtleistung standen entsprechend höhere Materialkosten gegenüber, so dass sich ein Rohertrag in Höhe von xxxxx T€ (Vorj.: xxxxx T€) ergibt, 
der damit im Vergleich zum Vorjahr um 2.521 T€ gestiegen ist. 
Kapitalstruktur 
Die Kapitalstruktur der xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx stellt sich weiterhin als solide dar. Die Bilanzsumme hat sich gegenüber dem Vorjahr um rund 4,9 % auf xxxxx T€ 
erhöht. 
Insgesamt werden x.xx0 T€ (Vorjahr X.xx0 T€) der gesamten Verbindlichkeiten an Banken geschuldet. Die Gesellschaft konnte dabei ihren Zahlungsverpflichtungen im 
Geschäftsjahr 2016 jederzeit nachkommen. 
Das Eigenkapital erhöhte sich unter Berücksichtigung einer Ausschüttung von X.000 T€ um xxxx T€, die Eigenkapitalquote beträgt X0,1 % (Vorj.: xx,x %) der Bilanz-
summe. 
Dies zeugt weiterhin von einer sehr soliden Kapital- und Finanzstruktur. 
Finanzlage 
Der Cashflow beträgt xxxx T€ in 2016 nach xxxxx T€ im Jahr 2015. 
Unsere Mitarbeiter 
Erstklassig qualifizierte, motivierte und engagierte Mitarbeiter sind weiterhin ein entscheidender Faktor für den Erfolg unseres Unternehmens. Obwohl auch im Bereich 
der Stammbelegschaft Anpassungen erforderlich waren, ist die weitere Zukunft der Unternehmung von gut ausgebildeten Mitarbeitern in allen Unternehmensbereichen 
abhängig. 
Unser Dank gilt allen Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern, die sich mit ganzer Kraft für das Unternehmen eingesetzt haben. ihr Engagement, ihre Leistung und Loyalität 
waren die Voraussetzung dafür, dass die Herausforderungen des Geschäftsjahres 2016 bewältigt werden konnten. 
Organisationsstruktur 
Die Organisationsstruktur der xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ist effizient und schlank. Kennzeichnend sind flache Hierarchien. Sie erlauben schnell und effektiv sich verän-
dernden Kundenanforderungen und Marktschwankungen anzupassen. 
Risikobericht 
Unternehmerisches Handeln bietet nicht nur Chancen, sondern unterliegt naturgemäß auch Risiken. Durch das möglichst vollständige und frühzeitige Erkennen und 
Bewerten dieser Risiken tragen wir zur langfristigen Sicherung unseres Geschäftserfolges bei. Die Gesamtverantwortung des Risikomanagements liegt bei der Ge-
schäftsführung. Die wesentlichen Risiken für unseren Geschäftserfolg stellen sich wie folgt dar: 
Wirtschaftliche und rechtliche Risiken 
Viele unserer Geschäftsbereiche unterliegen signifikanten, nicht durch eigenes Verhalten zu beeinflussenden externen Risiken. Zu diesen zählen insbesondere die ge-
samtwirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, den Staaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft sowie die Entwicklung in Osteuropa. 
Wir begegnen diesen Risiken unter anderem durch eine engere Kundenbindung sowie einer stetigen Verbesserung unserer — von unseren Kunden geschätzten — ho-
hen Qualität bei den von uns hergestellten sowie der Entwicklung neuer und innovativer Produkte sowie durch die Bereitschaft, auf individuelle Kundenwünsche und 
Sonderanfertigungen einzugehen. 
Für allgemeine Risiken und Schadensfälle haben wir Versicherungen abgeschlossen, um die möglichen Folgen von im Unternehmen verbleibenden Risiken in Grenzen zu 
halten beziehungsweise sie ganz auszuschließen. 
Finanzierungsrisiken 
Die stabile Ertragslage der Gesellschaft bildet die Grundlage für eine solide Finanzierung des Geschäftsbetriebes. Aufgrund der in der Vergangenheit aufgebauten Kapi-
talstruktur und der zugesagten Finanzierungslinien sind Finanzierungsrisiken derzeit grundsätzlich nicht erkennbar. 
Risikocontrolling 
Das operative Tagesgeschäft wird durch eine moderne Informationstechnologie effizient und transparent abgewickelt. Der Bereich der Ertrags-, Liquiditäts- und Finanz-
planung wird permanent überwacht und fortgeschrieben. 
Basierend auf den dargestellten Einzelrisiken kommt der Überprüfung von Funktionalität und Vollständigkeit des bestehenden Risikomanagementsystems sowie dessen 
Überwachung und Erweiterung eine zentrale Rolle zu. 
Zusammenfassende Beurteilung 
Außer den allgemeinen Risiken, insbesondere der weiteren konjunkturellen Entwicklung, denen durch eine zeitnahe Anpassung Rechnung getragen wird, sind uns keine 
sonstigen wirtschaftlichen oder rechtlichen Gefährdungspotentiale bekannt, die besonderen Einfluss auf die Vermögens- und Ertragslage haben könnten, oder den 
Bestand des Unternehmens gefährden würden. 
Prognosebericht 
Angesichts der Entwicklung der Umsatzerlöse zu Beginn des Jahres sowie dem derzeitigen Auftragsbestand rechnen wir für das Geschäftsjahr 2017 mit einer steigen-
den Nachfrage. 
 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx7 
xxxxxxxxxxxxdo not uncover xxxxxx 
 
Notes: Exhibit depicts the management report of the year 2016 of a sample firm, which each is obtained 
from the German Federal Gazette. Passages that already appeared verbatim in the management report of 
2011 are marked in dark grey. Passages that already appeared verbatim in the management report of 2015 
are marked in light grey. New passages are not highlighted. Firm’s name and location are blacked out. 
Similarity of this reports amounts to 0.971 (SimilarityMR). 
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Exhibit 2: 
Exemplary forecast section over a six years period 
Panel A: Forecast section in 2011 
Prognosebericht  
Auf der Grundlage neuer Marktdeterminanten haben sich die Agrarmärkte besonders in den letzten Jahren substantiell verändert mit gestie-
genen Volatilitäten. Zusätzlich ist das Marktumfeld unserer Produkte geprägt von politischen und klimabedingten Risiken. Zur Kontrollen der 
in der Konsequenz gestiegenen Marktrisiken haben wir die notwendigen Instrumente entwickelt. Wir gehen davon aus, dass es sich bei den 
Veränderungen nicht um einen temporären Effekt handelt. Durch unsere langfristigen Investitionen in unsere Vernetzung in den wesentli-
chen Ursprungsländern und in unsere Kundenprofilierung sehen wir uns im Wettbewerb gut aufgestellt zur optimalen Nutzung der Chancen, 
die sich aus dem veränderte Marktumfeld ergeben. 
Für das Geschäftsjahr 2011/2012 erwarten wir ein positives Ergebnis. 
Panel B: Forecast section in 2012 
Prognosebericht  
Auf der Grundlage neuer Marktdeterminanten haben sich die Agrarmärkte besonders in den letzten Jahren substantiell verändert mit gestie-
genen Volatilitäten. Zusätzlich ist das Marktumfeld unserer Produkte geprägt von politischen und klimabedingten Risiken. Wir gehen davon 
aus, dass es sich bei den Veränderungen nicht um einen temporären Effekt handelt. Zur Kontrollen der in der Konsequenz gestiegenen 
Marktrisiken haben wir die notwendigen Instrumente entwickelt. Durch unsere langfristigen Investitionen in unsere Vernetzung in den we-
sentlichen Ursprungsländern und in unsere Kundenprofilierung sehen wir uns im Wettbewerb gut aufgestellt zur optimalen Nutzung der 
Chancen, die sich aus dem veränderte Marktumfeld ergeben. Für das Geschäftsjahr 2012/2013 erwartet wir im Rahmen der allgemein gülti-
gen Marktfaktoren wieder ein positives Ergebnis.  
Panel C: Forecast section in 2015 
Prognosebericht  
Auf der Grundlage neuer Marktdeterminanten haben sich die Agrarmärkte besonders in den letzten Jahren substantiell verändert mit gestie-
genen Volatilitäten. Zusätzlich ist das Marktumfeld unserer Produkte geprägt von politischen und klimabedingten Risiken. Wir gehen davon 
aus, dass es sich bei den Veränderungen nicht um einen temporären Effekt handelt. Zur Kontrollen der in der Konsequenz gestiegenen 
Marktrisiken haben wir die notwendigen Instrumente entwickelt. Durch unsere langfristigen Investitionen in unsere Vernetzung in den we-
sentlichen Ursprungsländern und in unsere Kundenprofilierung sehen wir uns im Wettbewerb gut aufgestellt zur optimalen Nutzung der 
Chancen, die sich aus dem veränderte Marktumfeld ergeben. Für das Geschäftsjahr 2015/2016 erwartet wir im Rahmen der allgemein gülti-
gen Marktfaktoren wieder ein positives Ergebnis. 
Panel D: Forecast section in 2016 
Prognosebericht  
Auf der Grundlage neuer Marktdeterminanten haben sich die Agrarmärkte besonders in den letzten Jahren substantiell verändert mit gestie-
genen Volatilitäten. Zusätzlich ist das Marktumfeld unserer Produkte geprägt von politischen und klimabedingten Risiken. Wir gehen davon 
aus, dass es sich bei den Veränderungen nicht um einen temporären Effekt handelt. Zur Kontrollen der in der Konsequenz gestiegenen 
Marktrisiken haben wir die notwendigen Instrumente entwickelt. Durch unsere langfristigen Investitionen in unsere Vernetzung in den we-
sentlichen Ursprungsländern und in unsere Kundenprofilierung sehen wir uns im Wettbewerb gut aufgestellt zur optimalen Nutzung der 
Chancen, die sich aus dem veränderte Marktumfeld ergeben. Für das Geschäftsjahr 2016/2017 erwartet wir im Rahmen der allgemein gülti-
gen Marktfaktoren wieder ein positives Ergebnis. 
Notes: Exhibit depicts the forecast section of the management report of the year 2011, 2012, 2015 and 
2016 of a sample firm, which each is obtained from the German Federal Gazette. For parsimony, years 
2013 and 2014 are omitted. The similarity of this section amounts to 0.961 (2012), 1 (2013), 1 (2014), 1 
(2015), 1 (2016) (SimilarityFC). 
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5 Research design  
5.1 Sample and data 
We employ a sample of 1,000 randomly selected German private firms. To ensure suffi-
cient disclosure, we abstain from considering small and medium-sized entities and restrict 
our sample to large corporations.69 To circumvent potential distortions associated with 
the German Accounting Law Modernization Act (Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, 
BilMoG), which came into effect in 2010, this study covers the period 2011 to 2016. 
Following Burgstahler et al. (2006), our analysis is based on firms’ primary financial 
statements from an informational perspective.70 We manually collect all yearly filings, 
including management reports (Lagebericht) from the Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). 
Afterwards, the collected narrative data is matched with financial data from Bureau van 
Dijk’s Amadeus database.  
The German Federal Gazette is not comparable to SEC’s EDGAR system. Filings can 
neither be downloaded in large chunks nor are they XBRL-tagged or machine readable; 
they also cannot be parsed automatically. Hence, we manually extract the management 
report and the forecast section from firms’ filings. After separation, we removed all tables, 
headlines and lists to exclusively obtain raw text.71  
5.2 Measuring management report similarity 
As outlined above, we use copy-paste intensity as our measure for the informativeness of 
management reports. To quantify the proportion that is copy-paste from the previous year, 
we calculate the cosine similarity between these two documents (Brown and Tucker 
2011). The metric is based on a vector space model, which represents a document as a 
vector in an n-dimensional Euclidean space, where n is the number of unique words in a 
document. The similarity between any two documents is measured by the angle between 
the two vectors, with a smaller angle indicating greater similarity between documents. 
Technically, the cosine similarity is defined as follows: 
                                                 
69  More specifically, we chose firms that meet at least two of three size requirements derived from Article 
267 GCC: (i) total assets equal to or more than 19.25 m. €; (ii) revenues equal to or more than 38.25 m. 
€; or (iii) 250 or more employees. Firms below these size thresholds benefit from relaxed disclosure 
requirements.  
70  If a firm is a parent company, we use the consolidated report. In all other cases, we obtain and use the 
unconsolidated (i.e., legal entity-based) report. 
71  A detailed description of data gathering and pre-processing can be found in Appendix A. 
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(1) 
where 𝜃𝜃 is the angle between v1 and v2. As such, we compare firms’ management report 
for a given year (t) with the management report for the preceding year (t-1) to quantify the 
copy-paste intensity. Scores are limited to values ranging between 0 and 1, with higher 
values indicating greater similarity. We drop stop-words and employ the term frequency–
inverse document frequency (tf-idf) approach, which assigns lower weights to very com-
mon words (SimilarityMR).  
To acknowledge the reasonable (i.e., normal) degree of copy-paste (see Section 4.2) in a 
firm’s management report, we analogously compute the similarity of the forecast section 
for two reasons. First, we assume that when the management intends to report in an in-
formative manner, the need for yearly updates is greatest in the forecast section (as com-
pared to, for example, the risk reporting section or the description of a firm’s structure 
and business model). Second, stakeholders are particularly interested in future-oriented 
information. Hence, the forecast section is of utmost importance and a crucial element of 
the management report. According to an interview study of Knauer and Wömperer 
(2011), all surveyed managers (of private and public firms) declared that they were reluc-
tant to reveal too much information in the forecast section. Therefore, analyzing the in-
formativeness of the forecast section provides an interesting opportunity to reinforce our 
results. Thus, we compute the similarity of the forecast section (SimilarityFC) in the same 
way as described in Appendix B.72 
5.3 Operationalization of treatments 
5.3.1 Measures of incentives to increase a report’s informativeness (H1) 
To operationalize firms’ need to report to outside stakeholders, we rely on four measures 
capturing demand-driven factors for high-quality financial reporting. Breuer et al. (2019a) 
have shown that the number of employees, number of banks and number of shareholders 
are positively related with the amount of online views of firms’ yearly filings (disclosure 
demand). Accordingly, we use number of banks (NbBanks) as an indicator for a situation 
where the information demand is higher. Bigus and Hillebrand (2017) find comparable 
                                                 
72  The forecast section is a major element of the management report. The average extent – measured by 
the number of characters – amounts to 10.7 % of the management report (9.4 % at median). 
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results in the case of firms not engaged in relationship lending, and that firms with more 
bank relationships (i.e., transactional banking) exhibit higher financial reporting quality. 
Banks engaged in arm’s length-lending need informative financial statements in order to 
make funding decisions and monitor them regularly. Likewise, we use the number of 
shareholders (NbShareholder) as an indicator for increased demand for accounting infor-
mation. Further, we use a binary variable if there is no controlling shareholder (NoCtrl-
Shareholder). In both cases, we would expect greater demand for informative manage-
ment reporting as non-controlling shareholder have less access to the management and 
internal data and are more likely to rely on firms’ filings. Finally, we proxy for the pres-
ence of employee participation and labor unions, as research provides evidence for their 
interest in private firms’ financial statements (Loy 2013). Labor is a binary variable equal 
to one if labor participation, co-determination and unionization play a major role for the 
corporation (identified using a word-list approach).73 
5.3.2 Measures of incentives to decrease a report’s informativeness (H2) 
Our first proxy does not measure incentives for opaqueness in a direct fashion. Instead, 
we examine firms’ disclosure decisions when disclosure avoidance (the most effective 
way to achieve opaqueness) was still possible. This approach captures different ulterior 
and unobservable reasons for seeking opaqueness. To determine disclosure avoiders, we 
follow Bernard (2016) and employ an indicator variable equal to zero if a firm appears in 
the Amadeus database before the enforcement shock. If a firm already appears in the da-
tabase for the first time after the new enforcement mechanism was introduced, we classify 
it as a former disclosure avoider (Avoider). 
Second, we measure financial constraints and rely on three distinct specifications. We 
again follow Bernard (2016) and use firms’ book leverage net of cash holdings (total debt 
net of cash (tDnoC)). In addition, financial distress is proxied through the commonly used 
Altman’s z-Score. The original model is designed for public firms and incorporates cap-
ital market data (Altman 1968). Hence, we employ the revised z-Score model from Alt-
man (2000), which is applicable to private firms: 
                                                 
73  Labor is equal to one if a firm’s annual financial statement contains at least two key terms that are 
associated with labor participation and unionization (*betriebsrat*, *gewerkschaft*, *arbeitnehmerver-
tretung*, *montanmitbestimmung*, *drittelbeteiligung*, *personalrat*, *betriebsverfassung* and all 
respective legal sources including abbreviations). 
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(2) 
where lower ZScore values imply a greater risk of bankruptcy. To align the direction with 
other measures, ZScore are multiplied by minus one. The third proxy for financial con-
straints is Leverage, which is defined as the firm-level ratio of non-current liabilities to 
the sum of non-current liabilities and the book value of equity. 
Third, we capture incentives to be more opaque based on industry concentration. To op-
erationalize, we rely on the widely-used Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI): 
 
 
(3) 
where TAij refers to the total assets of company i operating in industry j. Further, n is the 
number of companies operating in industry j. Three-digit SIC codes are used to specify 
industries. We calculate HHI based on total assets instead of sales figures in order to 
capture all German private and public firms (i.e., the population of German firms included 
in Amadeus).74 A lower (higher) score indicates a less (more) concentrated industry, re-
spectively. Attributable to more intense competition, we expect higher proprietary costs 
for firms in less concentrated industries. To align the direction with other measures, we 
multiply HHI by minus one, such that higher values indicate less concentration. 
The fourth and final measure is based on a firm’s abnormal profitability and the relative 
strength of its competitive position within its industry. The variable ZMargin captures the 
ability to earn higher rents than industry peers, for instance, due to a lack of substitute 
products or successful marketing strategies (Isidro and Marques 2019). 
 
 
(4) 
                                                 
74  Small and medium-sized private firms are not required to disclose revenues.  
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Margin is firm’s revenue, scaled by the revenue minus the operating income after depre-
ciation (EBIT). We than calculate ZMargin as a firm’s Margin in year t minus the average 
margin of a firm’s industry, divided by the industry’s (j) standard deviation. Again, in-
dustries are based on three-digit SIC codes. 
5.4 Empirical models 
Our first set of hypotheses (H1) is built on the notion that firms with incentives to increase 
their information environment prepare more informative narratives. Hence, this associa-
tion is tested as follows: 
 
 
(5) 
The dependent variable captures the degree of copy-paste intensity in a firm’s manage-
ment report. Lower values indicate greater year-over-year modification. We separately 
test four treatments (5a–d) that are associated with the demand for more informative fi-
nancial reports (Increase). 
Analogously, we test the second set of hypotheses (firms with incentives to decrease their 
information environment reduce the informativeness of their narrative reports). We em-
ploy six distinct measures of proprietary cost concerns (6a-f): 
 
 
(6) 
Both models consider typical controls in private firm accounting research (see Table 25). 
Furthermore, we add controls that could potentially explain major modifications in man-
agement reporting. Namely, we control for changes in the board of management 
(MgmtChange) and a change of auditor (AudChange). In the private firm setting, the au-
ditor exerts high influence on the style and textual design of management reporting (Mau-
ritz et al. 2019). Moreover, we would expect larger economic and organizational changes 
in a given year to correspond with a greater need for explanation and, thus, modification 
in the narratives (Brown and Tucker 2011). We, therefore, control for absolute change in 
total assets (OrgChange), which indicates major events such as investments and divest-
ments, acquisitions or impairments.  
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We run each regression with year- and/or industry-fixed effects as denoted in the table 
notes. The research design for testing H3 is outlined in Section 6.2.  
5.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 23 presents descriptive statistics relating to our above-mentioned variables and con-
trols. The variable SimilarityMR (bounded from zero to one), has a mean of 0.769, indi-
cating that a large proportion of narrative is copied from the previous year. Considering 
the financial statement preparation procedure in practice, and other reasons, mentioned in 
Section 4.2, this finding is not very surprising. To validate the similarity measure, Figure 
13 presents median SimilarityMR over the sample period. On average, management re-
ports are modified to the highest degree in 2013.  
Figure 13: 
Similarity by year and type of account 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts yearly median of SimilarityMR separated by firms’ primary financial account type. 
SimilarityMR from consolidated financial accounts is plotted in darker grey (n=4,348). 
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When the regulatory change in management reporting (GAS 20) came into effect, firms 
were required to add new aspects and restructure content, resulting in lower similarity 
scores in 2013. Hence, we reasonably expect that firms have revised their reports the most 
Table 23: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Variables for main analyses  
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
SimilarityMR 4,348 0.769 0.154 0.689 0.811 0.886 
SimilarityFS 3,259 0.527 0.266 0.316 0.522 0.744 
Avoider 3,419 0.244 0.429 0 0 0 
tDnoC 4,348 0.510 0.281 0.326 0.539 0.724 
ZScore 4,304 -2.917 1.328 -3.52 -2.762 -2.092 
Leverage 4,348 0.417 0.251 0.216 0.387 0.569 
HHI 4,348 -0.028 -0.044 -0.005 -0.014 -0.032 
ZMargin 4,297 0.023 0.518 -0.248 -0.065 0.179 
NbBanks 4,025 2.636 1.463 1 2 4 
NbShareholder 4,094 2.754 2.710 1 2 3 
NCrtlShareholder 4,348 0.492 0.500 0 0 1 
Labor 4,348 0.080 0.271 0 0 0 
Size 4,348 11.13 0.964 10.401 10.982 11.685 
RoA 4,348 0.082 0.100 0.027 0.068 0.124 
Loss 4,348 0.158 0.365 0 0 0 
OrgChange 4,348 0.106 0.118 0.033 0.071 0.135 
Intangibles 4,348 0.022 0.050 0.001 0.005 0.017 
Age 4,348 41.072 36.066 16 27 55 
AuditorChange 4,348 0.055 0.228 0 0 0 
MgmtChange 4,348 0.035 0.184 0 0 0 
Big4 4,348 0.411 0.492 0 0 1 
Group 4,348 0.279 0.449 0 0 1 
East 4,348 0.112 0.315 0 0 0 
Tone 4,346 1.342 0.697 0.875 1.199 1.622 
Panel B: Variables for additional analyses 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
SimilarityMRt-2 3,436 0.687 0.171 0.578 0.722 0.822 
SimilarityMRlen 4,348 0.001 0.148 -0.075 0.03 0.107 
GAS20 4,348 0.770 0.421 1 1 1 
Notes: Table depicts descriptive statistic of measures of management report similarity, disclosure incen-
tives and controls. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are 
defined as described in Appendix C. 
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thoroughly going from 2012 to 2013. As such, this pattern indicates that our measure 
actually captures intended document similarity. Higher values of Similarity in 2014, 2015  
and 2016 suggest that subsequent reports are updated comparatively less exhaustively. 
Major changes, thus, seem to be a one-time and regulatory-driven effect.  
Figure 14 plots the kernel density of SimilarityMR and SimilarityFC and graphically re-
veals the distinct distributions. The average copy-paste intensity of the forecast section 
(0.507) is significantly lower, however, SimilarityFC exhibits a higher bandwidth (i.e., 
the standard deviation is almost twice as high). The 1st quartile exhibits a similarity of 
0.305, indicating substantial revision of some sections. In contrast, we also identify 110 
forecast sections with a similarity score of 1, which means that the content in t is fully 
copied from t-1 without any adjustments. For the forecast section, the number of observa-
tions (n=3,259) is smaller for the following reasons: (i) in 86 cases, we could not identify 
any section designated as “forecast” or “outlook”. Moreover, (ii) German management 
report regulations allow for inclusion of a combined “risk, opportunities and outlook” 
section.75 In 829 cases, firms made use of this option. Since it is not possible to separate 
the forecast section from other elements in a precise manner, we drop those observations. 
Lastly, (iii) the lack of a stand-alone report in t-1 (as the reference to measure the similar-
ity) also reduced the number of observations.  
Approximately 25 % of firms in our sample ignored disclosure obligations and did not 
file any financial statements before the regulatory shock (EHUG).76 The share of avoiders 
is lower when compared to the findings of Bernard (2016). We attribute this to the fact 
that we concentrate on large firms. Small and medium-sized entities are more likely to to 
have withheld financial statements in the past.77 On average, the firms in our sample ex-
hibit a ratio of total debt net of cash to total assets of 0.51 (tDnoC), an aligned ZScore of 
-2.91 and Leverage of 0.42. Furthermore, our descriptive statistics reveal that 28 % of 
sample firms provide a consolidated financial statement (Group) and that approximately 
41 % hire one of the Big4 audit firms (Big4). The median return on asset rate is 8 %, 
                                                 
75  “(…) the two reports or the combined report on risks and opportunities can be integrated into the report 
on expected developments or presented separately from that report. The issue of whether these reports 
are presented separately or are combined is governed by the form of presentation that group manage-
ment believes more clearly conveys the expected developments and the associated opportunities and 
risks to a knowledgeable user in each specific instance” (GAS 20.117). 
76  Due to changes in company structures and companies that became incorporated after 2005, we are only 
able to track 3,375 (79 %) of our observations and classify these as former discloser avoiders or non-
avoiders.  
77  In line with this notion, the results of Bernard (2016) show a significant negative correlation between 
size and disclosure avoidance. 
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while 16 % report a loss. On average, firms have 2.6 bank relationships and 2.8 share-
holders. Overall, the descriptive statistics are consistent with comparable private firm ac-
counting studies (Table 23).  
Table 24 depicts Pearson correlations. Most variables show the expected association with 
copy-paste intensity. Unsurprisingly, Leverage and tDnoC (0.71) as well ZMargin and 
RoA (0.70) are highly correlated. However, those pairs are not employed concurrently in 
one regression. All other correlations are well below established thresholds and models’ 
variance inflation factors do not indicate any multicollinearity issues. 
Figure 14: 
Density plot of similarity (management report vs. forecast section) 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the kernel density distribution of the similarity of the management report (dotted) 
compared to the forecast section (solid). 
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6 Results 
6.1 Firm-level determinants of copy-paste intensity (H1 and H2) 
Incentives to increase management report informativeness (H1) 
We begin by analyzing firms’ incentives to increase their information environment. Table 
25 presents the results of Model (5). The number of banks and number of shareholders 
are both negatively associated with management report stickiness (SimilarityMR). This is 
in line with our expectations (H1a and H1b). Firms with more bank contacts are more likely 
to be engaged in arm’s length lending (i.e., transactional banking) and hence, are more 
likely to need to provide informative management reports. The same holds for firms with 
more diffused ownership. Their reports contain less copy-paste (see Model 5b). This find-
ing is supported by the binary measure NoCtrlShareholder, which is also negatively as-
sociated and highly significant. While a controlling shareholder is able to directly obtain 
information, non-controlling shareholders are more likely to rely on a firm’s filings. This 
leads to a greater demand for informative reports and, in turn, a higher need for updated 
narratives. On its own, the positive coefficient of Labor does not meet our expectations, 
when assuming that employees and labor unions are a major stakeholder of private firms 
(H1c). The positive sign would be more in line with the results of Scott (1994), who finds 
disclosure to be negatively associated with labor power as it raises proprietary costs and 
impairs firms’ negotiating position. 
Controls reveal that younger firms (Age) and firms with more intangible assets (often 
used as a proxy for higher proprietary cost) exhibit significantly more stickiness in their 
narrative disclosures. The negative and significant association with OrgChange provides 
plausible evidence regarding the validity of our similarity measure. Firms with larger 
year-over-year changes in assets (organizational changes) update their management re-
ports more extensively. Moreover, personnel changes in firms’ management boards cor-
relate with the extent of modification. This is also the case when firms switch their audi-
tors. This finding is in line with the results of Mauritz et al. (2019), who analyze the 
textual similarity of firms sharing the same auditor and thus produce evidence of auditors’ 
influence. Both negative coefficients (management and auditor change) suggest that our 
similarity metric performs well. For parsimony, controls are not presented in further re-
gression result tables.  
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Table 25: 
Demand factors: Firm-level determinants of management report similarity 
 (5a) (5b) (5c) (5d) 
NbBanks -0.006***    
 (-3.54)    
NbShareholders  -0.003***   
  (-3.04)   
NoCrtlShareholder   -0.026***  
   (-5.39)  
Labor    0.014** 
    (2.04) 
Size 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (7.57) (7.37) (7.36) (6.60) 
RoA 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.123*** 
 (4.18) (4.42) (4.35) (4.68) 
Loss -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.26) (-0.21) 
OrgChange -0.036* -0.040* -0.039** -0.033* 
 (-1.72) (-1.90) (-1.97) (-1.69) 
Intangibles 0.101** 0.125*** 0.090** 0.109** 
 (2.17) (2.79) (2.04) (2.49) 
Age -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-3.27) (-3.72) (-3.17) (-4.05) 
AudChange -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (-4.08) (-4.25) (-4.35) (-4.29) 
MgmtChange -0.032** -0.030** -0.028** -0.024* 
 (-2.35) (-2.30) (-2.23) (-1.96) 
Big4 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 
 (9.45) (10.50) (10.57) (11.36) 
Group 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.017** 
 (3.18) (2.92) (3.57) (2.57) 
East -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-1.06) (-0.90) (-0.37) (-0.42) 
Constant 0.529*** 0.518*** 0.506*** 0.524*** 
 (15.50) (15.45) (15.27) (15.35) 
     
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I 
     
n 4,025 4,094 4,348 4,348 
Adj. R² 0.139 0.136 0.145 0.140 
     
Notes: Table OLS depicts regression results of Model (5) with similarity of the management report (Simi-
larityMR) as dependent variable. Fixed effects for the year (Y) and industry based on two-digit NAICS 
codes (I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level 
(two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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Table 26 presents the results regarding the stickiness of the forecast section. The coeffi-
cients of number of banks, number of shareholders and NoCtrlShareholder are in line 
with our hypotheses and are highly significant. Furthermore, we provide linear prediction 
plots for each of our treatment variables to graphically complement our results. A com-
pilation of all treatment variables is depicted in Figure 15 at the end of this section. 
Incentives to decrease management report informativeness (H2) 
Table 27 presents the results of analyzing firms’ incentives to decrease the information 
environment (Model 6). The first treatment (Avoider) is significantly associated with Sim-
ilarityMR indicating that former disclosure avoiders make greater use of copy-paste, i.e., 
they are more reluctant to make narrative modifications. Consistently habitual avoiders 
also publish less modified forecast sections, as indicated by the results in Table 28. Such 
firms seem to exhibit incentives to report more opaquely, which is in line with H2a.  
Furthermore, financially constrained firms are more engaged in copy-paste activities. All 
three measures (tDnoC, ZScore and Leverage) are positively associated with management 
Table 26: 
Demand factors: Firm-level determinants of forecast section similarity 
 (5a) (5b) (5c) (5d) 
NbBanks -0.016***    
 (-4.68)    
NbShareholders  -0.004***   
  (-2.68)   
NoCrtlShareholder   -0.026**  
   (-2.50)  
Labor    -0.050*** 
    (-3.02) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I 
     
n 3,028 3,078 3,259 3,259 
Adj. R² 0.056 0.049 0.050 0.033 
     
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (5) with similarity of the forecast section (Similari-
tyFC) as dependent variable. Controls are considered as in Table 25. Fixed effects for the year (Y) and 
industry based on two-digit NAICS codes (I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defined 
as described in Appendix C. 
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report stickiness (H2b). In general, literature argues that financially constrained and dis-
tressed firms should report more transparently to acquire capital and satisfy the infor-
mation needs of actual and potential lenders. Based on these findings, this seems less 
likely to be the case for publicly available narratives. Hence, this indirectly emphasizes 
the relevance of private channel communication in private firm financing and a potential 
overweight of concerns regarding predation risks (Bernard 2016). 
The positive coefficient of HHI is consistent with the assumption that firms in less con-
centrated industries are exposed to higher competition and, therefore, report more 
opaquely.78 However, inferences about competition based on industry concentration have 
to be interpreted with caution and are controversial (e.g., Ali et al. 2014).  
                                                 
78  Note that HHI is multiplied by minus one. Thus, higher values indicate less industry concentration. 
Table 27: 
Firm-level determinants of management report similarity 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) (6f) 
Avoider 0.031***      
 (5.43)      
tDnoC  0.018**     
  (2.09)     
ZScore   0.006***    
   (2.85)    
Leverage    0.021**   
    (2.33)   
HHI     0.126**  
     (2.46)  
ZMargin      0.016*** 
      (3.78) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y Y, I 
       
n 3,419 4,348 4,304 4,348 4,348 4,305 
Adj. R² 0.152 0.140 0.143 0.140 0.117 0.138 
       
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (6) with similarity of the management report (Simi-
larityMR) as dependent variable. Controls are considered as in Table 25. Fixed effects for the year (Y) and 
industry based on two-digit NAICS codes (I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defined 
as described in Appendix C. 
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We also find a positive relation between copy-paste intensity and abnormal profitability 
(ZMargin). The positive coefficient indicates that firms are more reluctant to provide in-
formative management reports if they achieve abnormally high margins. This is in line 
with the theory of proprietary costs as outperforming firms try to hide specific information 
in order to keep their competitive advantages. 
Although similarity of the forecast section reveals a distinct distribution, the coefficients 
(except for financial constraints) support our findings (Table 28). Graphically, the linear 
prediction plots in Panel B of Figure 15 support H2 and the notion that proprietary cost 
concerns are correlated with the degree of copy-paste intensity.79 With the exception of 
Labor, all treatments reveal the expected association with SimilarityMR.   
                                                 
79  For prediction plots of the coefficients concerning the forecast section similarity, see Appendix D. 
Table 28: 
Firm-level determinants of forecast section similarity 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) (6f) 
Avoider 0.036***      
 (2.91)      
tDnoC  -0.001     
  (-0.06)     
ZScore   0.011**    
   (2.55)    
Leverage    0.010   
    (0.50)   
HHI     0.293***  
     (2.97)  
ZMargin      0.036*** 
      (3.75) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y Y, I 
       
n 2,567 3,259 3,224 3,259 3,259 3,222 
Adj. R² 0.054 0.048 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.044 
       
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (6) with similarity of the forecast section (Similari-
tyFC) as dependent variable. Controls are considered as in Table 25. Fixed effects for the year (Y) and 
industry based on two-digit NAICS codes (I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defined 
as described in Appendix C. 
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Figure 15: 
Linear prediction plots of management reports’ similarity 
Panel A: Incentives to publish more informative narratives (H1) 
 
Panel B: Incentives to publish less informative narratives (H2) 
 
Notes: Figure depicts linear prediction plots of the management report similarity and treatment variables 
for H1 (Panel A) and H2 (Panel B) including the 95 % confidence interval. The y-axis depicts SimilarityMR. 
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6.2 Consistency and predictive power of firm’s narratives (H3) 
In this section, we test H3 and empirically evaluate whether firms succeed in making the 
content of their narrative reports less useful when using copy-paste. Textual elements of 
financial statements are considered useful if they complement numerical accounting data 
(Chou et al. 2018) and enable substantial inferences to be made about firms’ future per-
formance and financial condition. In particular, certain sections of the management report 
explicitly aim to provide an outlook and describe a firm’s prospect. Consequently, if a 
report is written with the intention of conveying relevant (additional) information, its con-
tent should coincide with firms’ current and future performance indicators. Related liter-
ature has already shown that the information content of firms’ narratives (measured, e.g., 
through textual sentiment) is associated with (future) stock returns, profitability and other 
firm fundamentals (e.g., Li 2010, Henry and Leone 2016, Amel-Zadeh and Faasse 2016, 
Hering 2018). Following this notion, we examine the usefulness of private firms’ narra-
tives based on their consistency with current fundamentals (H3a) and their ability to pre-
dict future performance (H3b). 
To examine the content of firms’ management reports, we rely on the textual sentiment, 
which is an approach often used in finance and accounting research. The measure is based 
on the intensity of words associated with a particular sentiment. Hence, the quality of the 
measure strongly depends on the underlying word list (dictionary). Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) emphasize the importance of a domain-specific dictionary and estab-
lished the word-list most widely used in accounting research for the English language. 
Given that our management reports are in German, we employ the dictionary of Bannier 
et al. (2019). This is a domain-specific German word list for business communication, 
which is based on Loughran and McDonald (2011). We identify the positive and negative 
sentiments of our firms’ management reports using the word list of Bannier et al. (2019), 
adjust them by negation and define our measure as the ratio of positive to negative words 
(Tone). 
In a first step, we conduct a simple correlation analysis and divide the sample into reports 
with high and low levels of similarity based on a median split.80 Table 29 presents the 
correlation matrix for Tone, and the current and future performance indicators of man-
agement reports with low (Panel A) and high similarity (Panel B). The coefficients in 
                                                 
80  The sample is divided according to the yearly median of the length-adjusted similarity (SimilarityMRlen). 
For more details, see Section 7.2. 
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column (1) are most relevant. All correlations exhibit the expected sign, indicating that 
the narratives of private firms generally provide information that is consistent with current 
and future performance. However, descriptive results clearly show differences with re-
spect to the degree of copy-paste. While the correlation for Tone of less similar reports 
and RoA is 0.161, it is only 0.091 for reports with greater stickiness. The correlation be-
tween future return on assets (RoAt+1) of high-similar reports is only about half (0.067) 
compared with narratives of lower similarity (0.135). In sum, the correlation analysis 
suggests higher consistency with current accounting numbers, a greater association with 
firms’ future performance, and, therefore, a higher usefulness of management reports with 
lower year-over-year similarity.  
In a second step, we test the differences in usefulness in a multivariate manner and employ 
the following prediction model:  
  
Table 29: 
Correlation matrices (splitted samples) 
Panel A: Low similarity (“more updated reports”) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Tone 1.000       
(2) RoA 0.161 1.000      
(3) RoAt+1 0.135 0.712 1.000     
(4) RoAt+2 0.106 0.642 0.722 1.000    
(5) Loss -0.170 -0.551 -0.324 -0.303 1.000   
(6) Losst+1 -0.119 -0.328 -0.536 -0.364 0.419 1.000  
(7) Losst+2 -0.110 -0.301 -0.344 -0.543 0.374 0.463 1.000 
        
Panel B: High similarity (“less updated reports”) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Tone 1.000       
(2) RoA 0.091 1.000      
(3) RoAt+1 0.067 0.787 1.000     
(4) RoAt+2 0.053 0.683 0.781 1.000    
(5) Loss -0.143 -0.522 -0.373 -0.274 1.000   
(6) Losst+1 -0.090 -0.366 -0.530 -0.369 0.468 1.000  
(7) Losst+2 -0.012 -0.286 -0.359 -0.528 0.323 0.474 1.000 
        
Notes: Table depicts Pearson correlation coefficients of Tone and firms’ current and future performance 
indicators. The sample is splitted by the yearly median of SimilarityMRlen. Panel A (Panel B) shows the 
correlation for observations with similarity scores that are lower (higher) than the median. Significant cor-
relations (at 5 %) are depicted in bold. All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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(7) 
where Performance is one of six measures of current and future performance (RoA, 
RoAt+1, RoAt+2, Loss, Losst+1 and Losst+2). Again, we divide our sample according to the 
median of the management reports’ similarity (high vs. low similarity), and run the pre-
diction model for both groups separately. The dependent variable (Performance) is inter-
changed with the performance indicators. We then analyze whether the predictive power 
of reports differs with respect to the copy-paste intensity by comparing the coefficients 
of Tone from both regressions (low vs. high similarity).  
Alternatively, we test the association by adding an interaction term (Model 8) and pool 
data as follows: 
 
 
(8) 
where HighSim is a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s management report similarity 
score is above the median.  
Table 30 provides the results of Model (7). For parsimony, only the coefficients of Tone 
are shown. However, each coefficient is the result of a separate regression. The multivar-
iate results support the notion that the content of management reports with lower year-
over-year similarity is more useful. All coefficients are more strongly associated with 
current performance and exhibit a significantly higher predictive ability. The Tone coef-
ficients for the sub-sample of low-similarity reports are greater in magnitude than the 
coefficients of the reports with high similarity. In the case of predicting RoA, RoAt+1, 
Loss, Losst+1 and Losst+2, the differences are statistically significant. In other words, high 
similarity reports show more dissonance between narratives and numbers and, therefore, 
are of lower usefulness. 
Alternative tests, presented in Table 31, also support these findings. The coefficients of 
the interaction terms show the expected signs and reveal significant differences in con-
sistency (H3a) and predictive power (H3b) with respect to the copy-paste intensity in five 
of the six cases.  
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These findings are consistent with our expectations and the notion that a high copy-paste 
intensity impairs the usefulness of firms’ textual disclosures. Continually updated and 
adjusted content is more useful because it considers current macroeconomic and com-
pany-specific factors, short-term developments and other features more thoroughly. 
Hence, they better describe the economic reality of a firm’s business, allow for better 
predictions and, therefore, are of higher informative value. In sum, we find support for 
H3 and conclude that the degree of copy-paste is negatively associated with the informa-
tiveness of management reports.81 
                                                 
81  We do not separately test the predictive ability of the forecast sections because they usually do not 
contain enough sentiments to meaningfully determine Tone. 
Table 30: 
Consistency and predictive power of low vs. high-similar reports 
 
 
(1) 
Low-similar reports 
(“updated”) 
(2) 
High-similar reports 
(“copy-paste”) 
(3) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
RoA 0.0215*** 0.0095*** -0.012*** 
 (7.28) 
n=2,174 
(3.02) 
n=2,172 
(-2.78) 
RoAt+1 0.0168*** 0.0065* -0.010** 
 (4.97) 
n=1,710 
(1.82) 
n=1,711 
(-2.12) 
RoAt+2 0.0118*** 0.0041 -0.008 
 (3.04) 
n=1,256 
(1.00) 
n=1,259 
(-1.35) 
Loss -0.0965*** -0.0585*** 0.038*** 
 (-7.98) 
n=2,174 
(-5.73) 
n=2,172 
(2.40) 
Losst+1 -0.0617*** -0.0310*** 0.031* 
 (-4.63) 
n=1,710 
(-2.61) 
n=1,716 
(1.72) 
Losst+2 -0.0557*** 0.0066 0.063*** 
 
 
(-3.60) 
n=1,256 
(0.54) 
n=1,259 
(3.11) 
Notes: Column 1 (Column 2) presents coefficients on Tone (β1) of each regression of Model (7) with de-
pendent variable as denoted, for observations with low similarity (high similarity). Controls comprise Size, 
OrgChange, Intangibles, Age, Big4, Group and East. All models include industry- and year-fixed effects. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficient estimates (Column 1 - 
Column 2). The z-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 
1 % level. All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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7 Additional analyses and robustness checks 
7.1 Two-year lagged similarity 
In addition to year-by-year (SimilarityMR), we additionally calculate a two-year-lagged 
similarity and compute the degree of copy-paste in firms’ management reports that is at 
least two years old (SimilarityMRt-2). We assume that two-year old passages would be 
even less informative and even more likely to be boilerplate. Technically, we calculate 
the cosine similarity between firms’ management reports in year t and t-2. Since we do 
not have narrative data for 2010, we cannot compute the lagged similarity of management 
reports for the fiscal year 2012. Hence, the sample size is slightly lower. Nevertheless, 
we are able to compute SimilarityMRt-2 for 3,436 observations resulting in a mean (me-
dian) similarity of 0.687 (0.722) which is – as can be expected – lower than the year-by-
year similarity (SimilarityMR). We consider a high lagged similarity to be an indicator 
Table 31: 
Consistency and predictive power of narratives (interaction model) 
 (8a) RoA 
(8b) 
RoAt+1 
(8c) 
RoAt+2 
(8d) 
Loss 
(8e) 
Losst+1 
(8f) 
Losst+2 
Tone 0.0206*** 0.0163*** 0.0113*** -0.0932*** -0.0615*** -0.0543*** 
 (6.70) (4.60) (2.75) (-8.35) (-4.80) (-3.76) 
HighSim 0.0344*** 0.0326*** 0.0348*** -0.0948*** -0.0732*** -0.1326*** 
 (5.32) (4.48) (4.19) (-4.03) (-2.78) (-4.55) 
Tone × HighSim -0.0100** -0.0101** -0.0071 0.0310** 0.0298* 0.0612*** 
 (-2.36) (-2.09) (-1.28) (2.01) (1.70) (3.13) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I 
       
n 4,346 3,428 2,522 4,346 3,428 2,524 
Adj. R² 0.064 0.060 0.062 0.071 0.055 0.059 
       
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (8). Dependent variable is either RoA, RoAt+1, RoAt+2, 
Loss, Losst+1, Losst+2 (8a-f) as indicated in the heading. Controls comprise Size, OrgChange, Intangibles, 
Age, Big4, Group and East. Fixed effects for the year (Y) and industry based on two-digit NAICS codes 
(I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed 
test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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for even greater reluctance to update and properly revise reports. To test whether firms 
with incentives to report more opaquely exhibit a higher portion of lagged similarity, we 
re-run Model (6) with SimilarityMRt-2 as the dependent variable. Table 32 provides the 
regression results. All coefficients have the expected sign and reinforce previous results. 
In particular, former disclosure avoiders, firms in concentrated industries, firms with 
above-industry margins and financially constrained firms exhibit significantly more two-
year old textual fragments in their management reports. The results also hold true for the 
forecast section (untabulated). Overall, the results of lagged similarity regressions support 
H1 (untabulated) and H2 (Table 32).82  
                                                 
82  In further tests, we also dropped all controls referring to yearly changes (i.e., OrgChange, AudChange 
and MgmtChange) with no impact on the results of two-year lagged similarity regressions.  
Table 32: 
Firm-level determinants of lagged management report similarity 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) (6f) 
Avoider 0.033***      
 (4.56)      
tDnoC  0.014     
  (1.31)     
ZScore   0.005**    
   (2.06)    
Leverage    0.025**   
    (2.21)   
HHI     0.120**  
     (2.01)  
ZMargin      0.020*** 
      (3.68) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y Y, I 
       
n 2,704 3,436 3,399 3,436 3,436 3,400 
Adj. R² 0.153 0.145 0.148 0.146 0.121 0.141 
       
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (6) with the lagged similarity of the management 
report (SimilarityMRt-2) as dependent variable. Controls are considered as in Table 25. *, **, and *** indi-
cate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. All 
variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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7.2 Length-adjusted similarity  
Given that longer documents are more likely to contain any given word, Brown and 
Tucker (2011) show that cosine similarity can be affected by document length. To address 
this problem, the authors use a Taylor expansion at zero to estimate the functional form 
between the calculated cosine similarity and the document length. We follow this ap-
proach and regress cosine similarity (SimilarityMR) on the first five polynomials of doc-
ument length (measured by the number of words). To check for robustness, we employ 
the fitted scores (SimilarityMRlen) and re-run Model (6). The results are qualitatively un-
changed. Firms with incentives to be more opaque also exhibit a higher portion of length-
adjusted similarity in their reports (Table 33). Only, two of three financial constraint 
measures become insignificant. 
 
Table 33: 
Firm-level determinants of length-adjusted management report similarity 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) (6f) 
Avoider 0.033***      
 (5.74)      
tDnoC  0.009     
  (1.08)     
ZScore   0.007***    
   (3.51)    
Leverage    0.007   
    (0.78)   
HHI     0.142***  
     (2.91)  
ZMargin      0.025*** 
      (5.94) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y Y, I 
       
n 3,419 4,348 4,304 4,348 4,348 4,305 
Adj. R² 0.110 0.093 0.098 0.093 0.079 0.091 
       
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (6) with the length-adjusted similarity of the man-
agement report (SimilarityMRlen) as dependent variable. Controls are considered as in Table 25. Fixed ef-
fects for the year (Y) and industry based on two-digit NAICS codes (I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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7.3 Effect of the implementation of GAS 20 
As laid out in Section 2, the newly introduced GAS 20 specified and extended the re-
quirements for group management reporting. The new regulation has to be applied in 
reports referring to fiscal years beginning after December 31st, 2012. Where companies 
fiscal year coincides with the calendar year, reports for 2013 onwards will be affected. 
To control for this regulatory change and to assess its impact, we conduct several robust-
ness checks. In consequence of the extended requirements, firms have to adjust their man-
agement reporting, which leads to a lower SimilarityMR in the year of the initial applica-
tion. Figure 13 in Section 5.5 has already illustrated this. However, to ensure that this 
effect does not influence our results, we first employ a dummy variable indicating 
whether a management report is prepared before or after GAS 20 became effective 
(GAS20). Second, we drop all observations from the year of transition.83 The results from 
Model (6) with a reduced sample size are reported in Table 34. Nevertheless, controlling 
for GAS 20 does not change the results.84 Hence, the robustness checks support our main 
findings and provide additional support for H1 and H2. We conclude that GAS 20 nega-
tively affects management report similarity but does not drive our findings. 
7.4 Multinomial logit approach  
The last test acknowledges a normal extent of similarity and employs an alternative meth-
odological approach. We concentrate on firms exhibiting the lowest level of SimilarityMR 
(1st quartile) or the highest level of SimilarityMR (4th quartile). Firms in the two middle 
quartiles are assigned to be “normal”. We translate this logic into a variable with a value 
of “1” (low), “2” (normal) or “3” (high) and use a multinomial logistic regression to test 
for the likelihood of a firm being in the extreme quartiles as a function of reporting in-
                                                 
83  For 815 firms, we excluded the observations for 2013. For the remaining firms with a deviating fiscal 
year, we excluded the year 2014 (93 firms). 
84  We also evaluate the degree of modifications in firms’ management reports due to GAS 20 in the year 
of transition. Given that GAS 20 is a vague regulation and difficult to enforce, a manager is able to 
construct a meaning of compliance in a way that accommodates managerial interests (Edelman 1992, 
Holder-Webb and Cohen 2012). Hence, we expect firms with incentives to create a more opaque infor-
mation environment to revise their narratives as little as possible and to make generous use of copy-
paste despite new disclosure requirements. Untabulated tests show that the treatment firms (with incen-
tives to decrease their information environment) systematically exhibit a greater copy-paste intensity in 
the year of transition, compared to non-treatment firms (serious adopters). We interpret this as reluc-
tance to implement new requirements that may enhance a firm’s information environment, which sup-
ports H2. 
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centives and controls (Biddle et al. 2009). Panel A of Table 35 presents the results regard-
ing low similarity. All coefficients associated with reporting incentives show the expected 
signs. Firms with a higher number of shareholders (NbShareholders) and firms without a 
controlling shareholder (NoCtrlShareholder) are significantly more likely to be in the 
group of low similarity (H1). Consistent with H2, former disclosure avoiders, financially 
constrained firms, firms in less concentrated industries and those with abnormally high 
margins, are less likely to belong to the low similarity group. Consequently, these firms 
are more likely to be in the group with high similarity, which is depicted in Panel B of 
Table 35. Likewise, coefficients of Avoider, ZScore, HHI and ZMargin are positively 
associated with the likelihood that a firm is in the 4th quartile.  
Table 34: 
Firm-level determinants of management report similarity excluding year of GAS 20 transition 
 (6a) (6b) (6c) (6d) (6e) (6f) 
Avoider 0.030***      
 (4.84)      
tDnoC  0.017*     
  (1.76)     
ZScore   0.006**    
   (2.48)    
Leverage    0.022**   
    (2.13)   
HHI     0.185***  
     (3.14)  
ZMargin      0.014*** 
      (3.10) 
GAS20 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 
 (8.06) (8.97) (8.95) (9.00) (8.65) (8.94) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed effects Y, I Y, I Y, I Y, I Y Y, I 
       
n 2,707 3,440 3,398 3,440 3,440 3,399 
Adj. R² 0.157 0.139 0.143 0.140 0.116 0.140 
       
Notes: Table depicts OLS regression results of Model (3) with the similarity of the management report 
(SimilarityMR) as dependent variable. Models include a dummy variable indicating GAS 20 regulation. 
Observations from the year of transition are excluded. Controls are considered as in Table 25. Fixed effects 
for the year (Y) and industry based on two-digit NAICS codes (I) are employed as denoted. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
All variables are defined as described in Appendix C. 
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8 Concluding remarks 
This paper presents new evidence on the relation between private firms’ disclosure incen-
tives and narrative reporting properties in a mandatory disclosure setting. German private 
firms are required to prepare and disclose a management report covering firm-specific 
and in parts, highly sensitive information about (future) risks and opportunities as well as 
detailed business forecasts. By the nature of narrative reports, managers have a great deal 
of discretion in preparing them. We argue that firms adapt the informativeness of their 
narrative reports in a way that meets their preferences and needs. In order to empirically 
operationalize the informativeness of narrative disclosures, we focus on the textual year-
over-year similarity. This is based on the idea that passages that are copied from previous 
years do not contain new information. Thus, we assume that a high degree of copy-paste 
intensity impairs the usefulness of narrative disclosures. To test our hypotheses, we rely 
on a unique hand-collected sample of 1,000 private firms. Given a weak information en-
vironment, a more likely genuine management perspective in the narratives and a less 
likely influence of litigation concerns, we strongly believe that private firms provide a 
straightforward setting. 
The first set of analyses builds on the notion that firms seeking a more opaque information 
environment publish less informative narratives by neglecting yearly modification. In line 
with our expectation, we find that firms facing higher proprietary costs disclose narratives 
with a higher degree of copy-paste intensity. In contrast, we discover significantly less 
textual stickiness in the reports of firms facing greater financial reporting demand from 
stakeholders. These significant associations hold for firms’ management reports as well 
as for separately testing the textual stickiness of the forecast section. A battery of robust-
ness tests further ensures the stability of our results.  
The second set of analyses provides evidence on the relation between management re-
port’s copy-paste intensity and usefulness. As such, we empirically show that the content 
of reports with a high share of copy-paste is less coincided with current accounting num-
bers. Compared to reports with more extensive revision, we also find a significant lower 
degree of predictive power to proxy firms’ future performance. We conclude that firms 
succeed in making their narratives less informative through copy-pasting.  
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Appendix A: 
Data gathering and pre-processing 
1. Article 267 II of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) defines large corpo-
rations according to three size criteria based on total assets, sales and/or number of em-
ployees.1 We obtained an initial sample (n=8,715 firms) of large German private firms 
from the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk), based on the criteria for 2013. 
2. We randomly selected 1,000 firms (approximately 12 % of the population of large German 
private cooperations) and obtained their financial filings from the Electronic Federal Ga-
zette (Bundesanzeiger) for the six-year period from 2011 to 2016. Technical restrictions 
and data protection mechanisms do not allow automated downloads. Hence, all filings are 
obtained manually and saved in docx-format for further processing. 
3. We manually extracted the management report from the complete filing. Due to a lack of 
XBRL or any other standardized structure, automated document parsing (which is usually 
applied to structured data as, e.g., 10-K filings) is not applicable. We identify the beginning 
(and end) of a management report by its header (the signature of the executive).  
4. Next, we employed a Python script to convert all extracted reports into homogenous .txt-
files. More specifically, we extract the raw text through the following steps: 
a. Removal of all tables and visual elements (i.e., pictures, charts, diagrams, etc.); 
b. Removal of all HTML tags and footnotes; 
c. Removal of all headlines and paragraph headers (i.e., text that does not end with a 
punctuation mark). 
d. Removal of all numbers and special characters (e.g., “€”, “$”, “&”, “%”, etc.) 
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Appendix B: 
Cosine similarity 
To measure similarity, we follow Brown and Tucker (2011) and compute cosine similarity be-
tween a firm’s management report in year t and the report from the previous year (t-1). We convert 
the documents into an n-dimensional vector of the word counts, where n is the total number of 
unique words. Next, we take the dot product (⋅) of the vectors scaled by the product of their 
lengths: 
 
 
(1) 
We discard stop words and we employ the term frequency-inverse document frequency approach 
(tf-idf), which gives a lower weight to very common words. We use different German stop-word 
lists with no impact on the results. Technically, we compute the similarity metrics using Python 
and employing the scikit-learn package and the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK).  
Brown and Tucker (2011) note that cosine similarity can be affected by document length because 
longer documents are more likely to contain a given word. To address this problem, the authors 
use a Taylor expansion at zero to estimate the functional form between cosine similarity and 
document length. We follow this approach and regress cosine similarity on the first five polyno-
mials of document length (i.e., number of words). For robustness, we use the length-adjusted 
values (SimilarityMRlen), defined as SimilarityMR minus fitted values. 
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Appendix C: 
Variable definition 
Measures of textual similarity 
 Definition 
SimilarityMR is the cosine similarity between a firm’s management report in years t and 
t-1 considering term weighting which gives lower weight to common words 
(term frequency-inverse document frequency approach (tf-idf)). See Ap-
pendix B for details. 
SimilarityMRlen is the cosine similarity between a firms’ management report in years t and 
t-1 considering term weighting which gives lower weight to common words 
(tf-idf) and length adjustment. See Appendix B for details. 
SimilarityMRt-2 is the cosine similarity between a firms’ management report in years t and 
t-2 (two years lagged similarity) considering term weighting which gives 
lower weight to common words (term frequency-inverse document fre-
quency approach (tf-idf)). See Appendix B for details. 
SimilarityFC is the cosine similarity between a firm’s forecast section in years t and t-1 
considering term weighting which gives lower weight to common words 
(term frequency-inverse document frequency approach (tf-idf)). See Ap-
pendix B for details. 
Variables for main analyses and additional tests 
 Definition 
Avoider is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm appears in the database for the 
first time after the new enforcement mechanism (EHUG) was introduced. 
tDnoC is the firm's total debt net of cash scaled by total assets. 
ZScore  is Altman’s (2000) revised Z-Score for private firms equal to: 0.717 * 
(working capital/total assets) + 0.847 * (retained earnings/total assets) + 
3.107 * (earnings before interest and taxes/total assets) + 0.420 * (book 
value equity/total liabilities) + 0.998 * (sales/total assets). To align with 
other financial constraint measures, it is multiplied by minus one. 
Leverage is the firm-level ratio of non-current liabilities to the sum of non-current li-
abilities plus the book value of equity. 
HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index formed by three-digit SIC codes and 
constructed using total assets from the population of German firms in the 
Amadeus database. 
Zmargin is firms’ sales divided by sales minus earnings before interests and taxes. 
Next, the ratio is standardized within each industry-year combination, by 
subtracting its industry-year mean and dividing the difference by the indus-
try-year standard deviation. 
Banks is the number of a firm’s bank relationships. 
Shareholders is the number of a firm’s shareholders. 
CtrlShareholder is a dummy variable equal to one if one shareholder holds more than 50 % 
of a firm’s shares. 
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Appendix C: 
continued 
 Definition 
Labor is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s annual financial statement 
contains at least two key terms that are associated with labor participation 
and unionization (*betriebsrat*, *gewerkschaft*, *arbeitnehmerver-
tretung*, *montanmitbestimmung*, *drittelbeteiligung*, *personalrat*, 
*betriebsverfassung* and all respective legal sources including abbrevia-
tions). 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
RoA is the ratio of operating income to average total assets. 
Loss is a dummy variable equal to one if the result of the ordinary business is 
negative, and zero otherwise. 
Big4 is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is audited by one of the Big4 au-
dit firms, and zero otherwise. 
Intangibles is the firm’s intangible assets, scaled by total assets. 
Age is the number of years between the date of incorporation and the current 
year. 
AuditorChange is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm changed its auditor compared 
to the previous year. 
MgmtChange is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm entirely changes the (board of) 
management. Information is obtained from the notes. 
East is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is located in the former Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR), and zero otherwise. 
OrgChange is the absolute change in total assets between two fiscal years. 
Group is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s primary financial report is a 
consolidated report, and zero otherwise. 
Tone  is the ratio of positive words to negative words in a firm’s management re-
port. Positive and negative words are identified using the wordlist of Ban-
nier et al. (2019), while considering negation. 
HighSim is a binary variable equal to one if a firm’s length-adjusted similarity (Sim-
ilarityMRlen) is above the median. 
GAS20 is a dummy variable equal to one if a management report is prepared after 
GAS 20 became effective. 
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Appendix D: 
Linear prediction plots of forecast section similarity 
Panel A: Incentives to publish more informative narratives (H1) 
 
Panel B: Incentives to publish less informative narratives (H2) 
 
Notes: Figure depicts linear prediction plots of the forecast section similarity and treatment variables for 
H1 (Panel A) and H2 (Panel B) including the 95 % confidence interval. The y-axis depicts SimilarityFC. 
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Part D: 
Overall 
Spotting disclosure strategies – 
An exploratory data mining approach 
 
 
A b s t r a c t  
As financial reporting quality is at least a function of earnings properties, tex-
tual properties and timeliness, firms can vary it by exploiting managerial dis-
cretion from all these domains. While previous literature usually focuses on 
a single aspect, I use cluster analysis to concurrently consider measures from 
different domains of financial reporting. Based on a sample of German private 
companies, the algorithm groups firms that share financial reporting charac-
teristics and identifies distinct and more holistic financial reporting profiles. 
First, the explorative research design provides insights into complementary 
and substitutional associations among domains. Second, an analysis of firm-
level determinants provides slight evidence that firms’ fundamentals and eco-
nomic situations are associated with cluster affiliation. Third, tracking clus-
ters over time suggests that financial reporting practice is relatively invariant; 
however, I show that some firms switch cluster affiliation. Examining the de-
cision to switch between clusters in more detail could be a promising future 
research opportunity in order to gain a deeper understanding of incentives and 
associated costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure.  
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1 Introduction 
Publishing financial statements and other narrative reports produces indirect costs due to 
divulging proprietary information (Verrecchia 1983). Third parties are able to gather pub-
lic information, process it, and adjust their actions to the detriment of the disclosing firm. 
As a consequence, indirect costs can manifest, e.g., in a loss of the competitive position 
or privacy. Empirical research has already documented that firms that suffer from indirect 
costs of disclosure strive to reduce the informational significance of published documents 
(for a selection of exemplary studies, see Figure 16). 
To affect their information environment, firms can vary the quality of mandatory disclo-
sures. However, this is not a binary decision but rather the result of managerial discretion 
in different domains. Compared to their public counterparts, private firms are even more 
flexible in aligning financial reporting properties with their needs. They are not exposed 
to capital market pressure and do not have to fear high scrutiny and litigation (Hope and 
Langli 2010). Put differently, in particular, private firms can pursue miscellaneous and 
heterogeneous strategies to make their financial statements more or less informative. For 
example, firms can i) choose to file late and report information that is shorter in length 
and less detailed. Others might ii) exploit earnings management opportunities and use a 
complex and generic language to increase processing costs for third parties. Again others 
iii) report on a timely basis, but provide only vague and unspecific information. As these 
model strategies demonstrate, managers can choose and combine several ways to influ-
ence firms’ information environment. 
In this paper, I take a comprehensive view on these financial reporting choices by con-
currently considering multiple firm-level measures from different domains. Namely, I 
employ measures from three domains: disclosure timing, earnings properties, and textual 
characteristics of narrative disclosure requirements. I use cluster analysis to gather more 
holistic insights into financial reporting strategies, which I define as the sum of different 
managerial choices. Clustering firms that share financial reporting characteristics allows 
me to identify potential common disclosure strategies, as well as anomalies and poten-
tially interesting irregularities in financial reporting properties. As such, this study aims 
to discover patterns in financial reporting characteristics and is therefore explorative and 
mostly descriptive.  
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For the empirical analysis, I use data from 605 large German private firms which are 
required to publish an annual set of accounting information. The German regulatory set-
ting provides an ideal opportunity as firms’ disclosure obligation is effectively enforced 
and the data-retrieval platform allows easy access for third parties (Kaya and Seebeck 
2019). Hence, firms need to carefully decide when to provide what information. I cluster 
the sample firms based on their financial reporting properties and track their cluster affil-
iation over three years. The underlying algorithm extracts three groups of firms that sig-
nificantly differ with respect to five (seven) financial reporting properties from three do-
mains (timing, textual properties, and earnings properties). The shape of the identified 
clusters is relatively stable over time and each cluster reveals unique features and idio-
syncrasies. For example, the group of firms that updates their management reports the 
most thoroughly (textual property) exhibits the longest reporting lag (timeliness). Like-
wise, firms belonging to the cluster with the highest amount of abnormal tone are also 
engaged in delaying disclosure. Another group of firms exhibits the highest amount of 
discretionary accruals and the lowest readability scores. Prior literature on the interplay 
among financial reporting properties is scare.85 Hence, I provide evidence of the relation 
among reporting characteristics and derive further research suggestions. In particular, 
complementary and substitutional associations across domains are potentially interesting 
and worthy of examining in more detail.  
Moreover, tracking movements during the investigation period enables me to identify 
firms that switch their cluster affiliation over time. While the majority pursue an un-
changed (stable) disclosure strategy over three years, some firms switch between clusters. 
Thus, it could be a fruitful future research opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of 
firms’ decisions to switch cluster and to provide either more transparent or more opaque 
financial reports compared to the previous year. Finally, I contribute to the notion that 
firms’ economic environment and characteristics are a source of variation in reporting 
properties. The cluster affiliation significantly differs with respect to typical fundamen-
tals, such as ownership, financial structure, profitability and growth option or business 
complexity.  
                                                 
85  There are some studies suggesting a substitutional relationship between accrual-based earnings man-
agement and real-activities earnings management (Zang 2012, Achleitner et al. 2014). However, re-
search on inter-domain associations is rarer. Lo et al. (2017) find a complementary relation between 
earnings management and textual attributes (readability). Huang et al. (2014) suggest a substitutional 
relationship between the extent of abnormal tone and discretionary accruals.  
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In the next section, I discuss the related literature that focuses on different ways to achieve 
a more (less) transparent information environment. It is structured according to the dif-
ferent domains of managerial discretion. Then, I describe the data, the sample selection 
and the measures for the employed properties (Section 3). Section 4 provides the results 
of the cluster analysis. Finally, I discuss them and suggest potential opportunities for fu-
ture research in Section 5. 
2 Prior literature and research questions 
2.1 Evidence from public and private firms 
There is a wide body of research examining the effects of indirect costs of disclosure 
using different financial reporting choices. The results are mostly consistent with the no-
tion that firms which are exposed to higher proprietary costs decrease corporate transpar-
ency by reducing the quality of mandatory disclosure. The literature has already docu-
mented several ways to achieve this (Figure 16). 
First, the most obvious and effective option to reduce corporate transparency is disclosure 
avoidance (Bernard 2016), which is only possible in a (de facto) voluntary disclosure 
regime. Moreover, redacting certain information (Verrecchia and Weber 2006, Heinle 
2019) and withholding specific disclosure items (Dedman and Lennox 2009, Ellis et al. 
2012, Ceustermans and Breesch 2017) are further reasonable approaches to do so. Em-
pirical research predicts and finds that firms avoid disclosures and redact or withhold 
specific items (e.g., information about sales and the cost of sales or about large customers) 
as a consequence of proprietary-cost concerns. Firms also provide less disaggregated in-
formation and conduct less detailed segment reporting for competitive reasons (e.g., Har-
ris 1998, Berger and Hann 2007, Bens et al. 2011). They are even engaged in costly size 
management in order to avoid or to reduce statutory disclosure requirements, which is 
also attributable to proprietary costs (Bernard et al. 2018).  
Second, managers can manipulate accounting numbers to conceal a firm’s true financial 
and performance position. Numerous studies show that private and public firms are en-
gaged in earnings management. The authors often interpret this as a tool to reduce the 
informativeness of earnings and conceal actual numbers (e.g., Burgstahler et al. 2006, Shi 
et al. 2018). Likewise, earnings smoothing contributes to firms’ accounting opacity, as 
managers dampen any fluctuation in accounting and obfuscate changes in fundamental 
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performance (Ellul et al. 2016).86 In a similar vein, Imhof et al. (2018) find that firms 
respond to proprietary-cost-concerns by decreasing the comparability of their financial 
statements. Accrual-based and real earnings management seem also to be related with 
competition (Shi et al. 2018, Guo et al. 2019). 
A younger strand of literature has examined managerial discretion regarding the textual 
characteristics of narrative disclosure elements as a third domain of corporate transpar-
ency. It appears that firms strategically elaborate their narratives in order to provide low-
quality disclosures. Cazier and Pfeiffer (2017) document that firms inflate their reports 
by the discretionary repetition of information if they have incentives to report more 
opaquely. Likewise, firms confronted with higher proprietary costs provide less specific 
risk-factor disclosures (Hope et al. 2016), update their management discussion and anal-
ysis (MD&A) less appropriately (Brown and Tucker 2011) or pursue a minimal narrative 
disclosure strategy (Leung et al. 2015). There is also empirical evidence suggesting that 
firms strategically influence the readability of their reports in terms of obfuscation (Li 
2008, Lo et al. 2016, Li and Zhan 2019).  
                                                 
86  For a review on (other) motivations for earnings management, see, e.g., Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
Figure 16: 
Domains of financial reporting discretion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure presents four domains of financial reporting discretion underpinned by exemplary research. 
Studies that exclusively focus on public firms are depicted in italic.  
 
this study 
Discretion in financial reporting 
Avoidance/  
withholding 
Earnings  
properties 
Textual  
properties Timeliness 
e.g., Bernard et al. 
2018, Ceustermans and 
Breesch 2017, Bernard 
2016, Werner and 
Dachwitz 2013, Ded-
man and Lennox 2012,  
Ellis et al. 2012  
e.g., Imhof et al. 2018, 
Shi et. al. 2018, Ellul et 
al. 2016, Gassen and 
Fülbier 2015, Hope et 
al. 2013, Burgstahler et 
al. 2006, Ball and  
Shivakumar 2005 
e.g., Li and Zhan 2019, 
Bigus and Hillebrand 
2017, Cazier and 
Pfeiffer 2017, Lo et al. 
2017, Hope et al. 2016, 
Leung et al. 2015, 
Brown and Tucker 2012  
e.g., Bigus and  
Hillebrand 2017, 
Luypaert et al. 2016, 
Leventis and  
Weetmann 2012, 
Senguptha 2004  
PART D: OVERALL 
155 
Finally, strategic disclosure timing appears to be a fourth domain. Timeliness crucially 
determines the relevance of information and, in turn, the value for third parties. Thus, 
delaying disclosure is a reasonable way to deal with indirect cost (Senguptha 2004, Le-
ventis and Weetmann 2012). The longer a firm withholds information, the lower the as-
sociated adverse effects.  
While prior studies have already focused on several financial reporting choices, most of 
them concentrate on only one dimension.87 However, corporate transparency rather seems 
to be a function of at least earnings properties, the quality of narrative information as well 
as timeliness. Yet, I am unaware of literature considering a more comprehensive view on 
managerial discretion.  
2.2 Research questions 
In the European Union (EU), even most private firms are obliged to publish yearly finan-
cial statements. The EU requires their member states to implement mandatory disclosure 
and effective enforcement mechanisms for all firms with limited liability. It took a long 
time until German regulators committed themselves to introduce a de-facto mandatory 
disclosure regime for private firms. Only in 2007 did a major piece of legislation88 en-
hance disclosure compliance in an effective way. In consequence, disclosure avoidance 
is no longer possible and seeking opaqueness, thus, has shifted from a binary decision to 
a much more complex exercise. Instead of simply ignoring disclosure rules, firms need 
to reflect on different kinds of managerial discretion in order to achieve the desired level 
of transparency. This covers at least accounting figures, the content and style of reports, 
and the timing of publication. Therefore, my first research question reads as follows: 
RQ1: Which, if any, disclosure strategies do firms pursue? 
To this extent, the term “disclosure strategy” should comprehensively describe firms’ re-
porting practice as the sum of managerial discretion from multiple domains (earnings 
properties, textual properties and timeliness).  
                                                 
87  Only a few exceptions document at least a complementary or substitutional association between two 
dimensions (see also Fn. 85). Moreover, some studies, such as Bigus and Hillebrand (2017), employ 
financial reporting measures from different domains, but analyze them in isolation.  
88  In 2007, the Act on Electronic Commercial and Registers of Cooperatives and Business Registers 
(EHUG) significantly strengthened the German disclosure enforcement mechanism. For more details, 
see Part B (Section 2) of this thesis. 
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Based on such a holistic view on financial reporting properties and the results of cluster 
analysis, the second research question is directly linked: 
RQ2:  Do firm-level characteristics influence the choice of disclosure strategy?  
The extant literature has already revealed that a variety of firm-level characteristics shape 
firms’ financial reporting incentives. Financing needs and capital structure, ownership or 
the extent of agency conflicts are especially associated with financial reporting properties 
(e.g., Gassen and Fülbier 2015, Bigus and Hillebrand 2017, Breuer et al. 2019a). The last 
research question is twofold and focuses on the time (in)variance of reporting profiles 
over a longer period. First, it considers the potential stickiness of reporting profiles over 
the sample period. Second, it takes into account whether firms are constantly affiliated to 
the same cluster or if there are movements between clusters. I state the third research 
question as follows:  
RQ3:  Are reporting profiles sticky over time and do firms switch between them?  
These research questions being explorative by nature, are answered using methods from 
unsupervised machine learning (cluster analysis). Moreover, I focus on descriptions and 
associations. 
3 Methodology and data 
3.1 Research design 
To identify common financial reporting profiles (RQ1) from multidimensional data, I use 
cluster analysis. The method classifies objects into groups (i) with a high similarity in 
terms of their characteristics, while (ii) the groups in relation to each other are as hetero-
geneous as possible (Backhaus et al. 2016). Therefore, clustering optimizes the minimum 
variance within groups and forms homogenous clusters of firms that reveal similar finan-
cial reporting properties. I use a hierarchical agglomerative clustering approach and em-
ploy the Ward’s method,89 which is widely used (e.g., Ketchen and Shook 1996). At the 
beginning of the algorithm, each firm represents one cluster. At each stage, the two closest 
clusters are merged to form a new cluster. To measure the (dis)similarity between data 
                                                 
89  The Ward’s (1963) method calculates the (dis)similarity between clusters based upon the error sum of 
squares (SSE) and minimizes the increase in the total within-cluster SSE at each stage. 
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points, I rely on correlation instead of squared Euclidean distance. The former is recom-
mended for higher dimensional datasets90 using hierarchical clustering approaches (e.g., 
Shirkhorshidi et al. 2015). Moreover, I normalize all clustering variables (objects) to be 
bounded from 0 to 1 because uniform scaling facilitates the presentation and interpreta-
tion of results. The transformation preserves distribution and all other characteristics of 
data.91 A further critical issue in cluster analysis is the determination of the optimal num-
ber of clusters. Rules and guidance developed in prior literature have not enjoyed wide-
spread adoption. Instead, it is more common to rely on heuristics, which take the explor-
atory nature of cluster analysis into account. In the end, the decision is also a trade-off 
between simplicity and the homogeneity requirements of the cluster solution. In order to 
obtain an indication of a potentially appropriate number of clusters, I consider the stop-
ping rule proposed by Calinski and Harabasz (1974).92  
3.2 Data and measurement of constructs 
3.2.1 Sample selection 
To examine the outlined research questions and to study disclosure strategies, I focus on 
private firms. These tend to be more concerned with mandatory disclosure, as there are 
(proprietary) costs, but typically not enough firm-level benefits to outweigh them (Minnis 
and Shroff 2017). In addition, they are much more flexible regarding financial reporting 
choices. In the absence of capital markets, high litigation concerns, and scrutiny, manag-
ers can exert more discretion to meet a firm’s optimal level of transparency. Based on the 
special regulatory environment and the significance of private firms with numerous “hid-
den champions”, Germany offers an interesting setting. Until 2007, German firms were 
more likely to ignore disclosure obligation. However, a major regulatory change intro-
duced an effective enforcement mechanism as well as a transparent and user-friendly data 
retrieval-platform. Thus, private firms were confronted with a drastic increase in corpo-
rate transparency, requiring them to thoughtfully prepare and publish mandatory disclo-
sure. 
                                                 
90  Shirkhorshidi et al. (2015) categorize datasets with four or more dimensions as “higher dimensional”. 
91  I do not z-transform data because the standard deviation in normalized financial reporting measures is 
quite similar (about 0.20, see Panel B of Table 37).  
92  The rules are explained in more detail in Section 4.1.1. 
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I randomly choose 1,000 large private firms as they are subject to the maximum disclo-
sure requirements.93 I obtain financial data from the Amadeus database run by Bureau 
van Dijk and collect all further necessary data from the Federal Gazette for a three-year 
period from 2012 to 2014. I drop all firms that prepare financial statements in accordance 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since they voluntarily choose to 
report more transparently. As unconsolidated accounts systematically differ with respect 
to purpose and amount, I further drop all parent companies that prepare a consolidated 
account. Finally, I delete all firms with incomplete data for the three-year period. Thus, 
the final sample consists of 605 unlisted firms, which prepare and file an unconsolidated 
financial report. 
3.2.2 Measures of financial reporting properties 
I rely on the following seven measures (a–g) capturing financial reporting choices from 
three domains (I–III): 
I. Timeliness 
a) Reporting lag (Lag) — The delay in disclosure negatively influences firms’ transpar-
ency, as outdated information is less relevant and of lower value to third parties. I there-
fore collect yearly disclose timing data from the Federal Gazette and compute the report-
ing lag as the difference in days between the fiscal year end and the financial statements’ 
filing date.  
II. Textual attributes 
b) Amount of disclosure (Length) — A common measure for the disclosure amount is 
document length. Although, from a theoretical point of view, it is inconclusive as to 
whether shorter or longer documents are more informative, I follow the latter claim and 
assume that longer reports provide more information and thus enhance firms’ information 
environment. Compared to public companies, private firms prepare significantly more 
compact reports, which makes obfuscation by increasing document length less likely (Bi-
gus and Hillebrand 2017). Specifically, I measure the amount of disclosure by the natural 
logarithm of the number of words of the management report. I do not rely on the complete 
filing, because balance sheet, income statement and notes are regulated in more detail, 
whereas the management report allows for greater managerial discretion in terms of 
length. This allows me to capture a firm’s intentional choice regarding the amount of 
                                                 
93  Small and medium-sized private firms are allowed to exploit the relaxations in restrictions with respect 
to the amount and content of mandatory disclosure. 
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disclosure more appropriate. Moreover, I scale the number of words by company size 
(total assets). To align direction with other measures, scaled length is multiplied by minus 
one.  
c) Report stickiness (Similarity) — The next measure relies on firms’ willingness to 
properly update and revise the yearly narratives. I assume that only new information is 
potentially informative. Large passages copied from previous years’ reports tend to be 
less informative, as they are not individually tailored to a firm’s current situation. Further, 
they are more likely to involve standard phrases or boilerplate. Of course, there is a rea-
sonable amount of copying and pasting, as it is common practice to use the previous 
year’s report as a template. However, the literature implies negative consequences for 
firms’ information environment due to a high level of copy-paste intensity.94 I measure 
the extent of report stickiness by computing the cosine similarity between firms’ manage-
ment report in year t and t-1 (Brown and Tucker 2011). The value is bounded from 0 to 1. 
A higher score indicates higher similarity. Thus, a value of 1 denotes identical reports.  
d) Discretionary tone (dTone) — Narrative elements in financial reporting are considered 
to be useful if they are consistent with firms’ current fundamentals and/or allow for the 
prediction of firms’ future performance. However, narrative disclosure requirements are 
subjected to high discretion regarding focus, emphasis, and wording. For example, man-
agers can mask fundamental performance with upwardly biased narratives (exaggeration) 
or narrative understatement. Methodologically following Huang et al. (2014), I decom-
pose the tone into a normal and an abnormal component. Therefore, I compute the extent 
of the tone of a firm’s management report, which cannot be explained by its fundamentals. 
The residual of a model that controls for performance, risk, and complexity (Model 1) 
captures the extent of potential tone management. Specifically, I employ and adapt the 
expected tone model of Huang et al. (2014) by considering the context of private firms 
and available data:95 
 
 
(1) 
                                                 
94  For a more detailed discussion of the association between report stickiness and informational opacity, 
see Part C of this thesis (Section 4.2). 
95  The model differs from Huang et al. (2014) with respect to annual stock returns and analyst data, which 
are not applicable to private firms.  
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Tone [(number of positive words) – (number of negative words)] is scaled by firms’ total 
number of words in the management report. Positive and negative words are identified 
using the domain-specific word list of Bannier et al. (2019) while considering negation.96 
RoA refers to ordinary earnings scaled by lagged total assets; △RoA is the difference 
between RoA in year t and t-1; StDRoA is the standard deviation of RoA over the last three 
years; Loss is a binary variable indicating negative ordinary earnings; Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets, and Age is the age of the firm in years. I also control for year- 
and industry-fixed effects. The abnormal tone (dTone) is the residual (ε) of regression (1). 
e) Readability (Read) — The fourth measure captures the complexity of a firm’s man-
agement report. Prior literature argues and empirically finds that managers strategically 
enhance the complexity of narratives in order to make it harder for third parties to identify 
firms’ true fundamentals (e.g., Li et al. 2008, Lo et al. 2017, deHaan et al. 2019). I also 
follow the notion that a complex management report negatively affects firms’ information 
environment (managerial obfuscation). The most common metric to proxy financial re-
port complexity is the Fog index, which is restricted to the English language. I therefore 
use four common metrics (Table 36) which consider the idiosyncrasies of the German 
language. Following Guay et al. (2016), I construct the readability index (Read) as the 
first principal component of the four measures.97 
 
                                                 
96  I employ a Python script to count the number of sentiments in firms’ management reports. In the case 
of negation, a positive word is considered as negative (and vice versa). 
97  The first component has an eigenvalue of 3.67 and explains 91.9 % of variance.  
Table 36: 
Measures of readability 
WSTF “Vierte Wiener Sachtextformel” (Bamberger and Vanecek 1984): 
0.2744 * number of words with more than two syllables +  
0.2656 * average sentence length – 1.693 
SMOG Smog-Index (Bamberger and Vanecek 1984): 
sqrt(number of words with more than two syllables /  
number of sentences * 30) – 2 
FLESCH Flesch Reading Ease (Amstad 1978) 
180 – average sentence length – (58.5 * average syllables per word)  
LIX LIX for German language (Björnsson 1968) 
average sentence length +  
(number of words over six letters / number of words * 100) 
Notes: Table provides the definitions of the four employed metrics of readability for German language. 
Higher values of WSTF, SMOG, and LIX indicate less readability. Higher values of FLESCH indicate 
more readability. To align with other metrics, FLESCH is multiplied by minus one. 
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f) Hard information (hardInfo) — The last measure refers to the amount of hard infor-
mation in textual disclosures. There are concerns that narratives are vague or less concise 
compared to numbers. I therefore measure the extent to which narrative elements are sup-
ported by quantitative data, which is more verifiable and precise (Hope et al. 2016, Boza-
nic et al. 2017, Dyer et al. 2017). Data of a higher specificity positively contribute to 
firms’ transparency. I compute the ratio of informative numbers to the number of words 
in firms’ management reports.98 To align the direction with other measures, this is multi-
plied by minus one, so that higher values indicate less specificity. 
III. Earnings attributes 
g) Discretionary accruals (dAcc) — To represent the domain of accounting figures, I em-
ploy the widely-used modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995) which measures accrual 
quality by separating accruals into a normal and a discretionary portion:  
 
 
(2) 
where △Rev is the change in the revenue of a firm from year t-1 to t; △Rec is the change 
in trade receivables; and PPE is the book value of gross property, plant and equipment.99 
All variables are scaled by one-year lagged total assets (TAt-1). Equation (2) is estimated 
cross-sectionally by industry-year groups100 with at least 15 observations. The residuals 
form the discretionary accruals. Higher discretionary accruals are associated with lower 
earnings quality or higher earnings management.  
3.2.3 Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 37 presents summary statistics of employed financial reporting choice 
measures. Variables dacc and dTone are the residuals of a regression model, thus I pro-
vide signed and unsigned values. However, in cluster analysis and further sections, I rely 
on absolute values.  
The median reporting lag amounts to 412 days with a standard deviation of 89 days, sug-
gesting heterogeneous disclosure timing. Moreover, the scaled length of the management 
                                                 
98  All numbers with no information, such as dates, section numbers, enumerations, or legal and standard 
specifications, are excluded. The ratio is multiplied by 1,000.  
99  Total accruals (tAcc) are calculated in accordance with Dechow et al. (1995). See Part B (Section 6.2) 
of this thesis for more details. 
100  Based on the Fama/French 48-industry classification. 
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Table 37: 
Summary statistics 
Panel A: Financial reporting properties variables 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Lag 1,815 376.865 89.679 311 412 441 
Length 1,815 -5.127 0.548 -5.505 -5.121 -4.746 
Similarity 1,815 -0.011 0.155 -0.093 0.02 0.103 
dTone 1,815 0 0.007 -0.005 0 0.005 
|dTone| 1,815 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.008 
Read 1,815 -0.090 1.894 -1.360 -0.096 1.177 
hardInfo 1,815 -32.486 13.888 -40.416 -31.194 -22.705 
dAcc 1,815 -0.008 0.165 -0.073 -0.001 0.061 
|dAcc| 1,815 0.109 0.124 0.029 0.066 0.136 
Panel B: Normalized financial reporting properties variables [0,1] 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Lag 1,815 0.464 0.188 0.326 0.538 0.598 
Length 1,815 0.524 0.199 0.387 0.527 0.663 
Similarity 1,815 0.627 0.229 0.506 0.673 0.796 
|dTone| 1,815 0.315 0.242 0.123 0.265 0.443 
Read 1,815 0.496 0.206 0.358 0.495 0.633 
hardInfo 1,815 0.642 0.185 0.537 0.659 0.772 
|dAcc| 1,815 0.181 0.205 0.048 0.110 0.225 
Panel C: Variables for additional analysis 
 n Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
tDnoCadj 1,815 0.011 0.270 -0.156 0.040 0.212 
RoAadj 1,815 0.001 0.104 -0.060 -0.011 0.046 
Family 1,815 0.322 0.467 0 0 1 
Size 1,815 10.968 0.891 10.305 10.814 11.461 
Growth 1,815 0.046 0.179 -0.045 0.024 0.107 
Intangibles 1,815 0.017 0.048 0.001 0.003 0.011 
PublicRival 1,815 0.336 0.472 0 0 1 
HighLaborEnforce 1,815 0.068 0.251 0 0 0 
IncomePerCapita 1,815 21.295 2.791 19.503 21.04 22.971 
HHI 1,815 0.034 0.047 0.010 0.020 0.040 
YearIncorp 1,815 1971.674 37.453 1958 1986 1997 
Notes: Table depicts summary statistics of employed variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined as described in Appendix A. 
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reports amounts to 5.127. The longest (shortest) report contains 8,904 (485) words, which 
is about 25 (1.5) pages. The average report stickiness (Similarity) amounts to 0.748 (me-
dian: 0.786). Moreover, the quantity of numbers in a management report (hardInfo) 
ranges from five to 80 per 1,000 words. On average a management reports consists of 32 
numbers per 1,000 words. Finally, the abnormal tone variable (dTone) indicates firms that 
use overly optimistic (dTone > 0) or overly pessimistic (dTone < 0) language. The earn-
ings quality measure can be interpreted in the same way. Positive discretionary accruals 
(dAcc > 0) indicate income-increasing while dAcc < 0 implies income-decreasing earn-
ings management. Panel B of Table 37 shows normalized values. 
Table 38 presents Pearson correlations of all measures (objects). As high correlation can 
distort the results of cluster analysis, highly correlated variables should be excluded. 
However, the coefficients are well below established thresholds (e.g., Backhaus 2016). 
The highest correlations exist between hardInfo and Read (0.415) as well as Length and 
Read (-0.279). Problems based on correlated objects should not be an issue.  
 
  
Table 38: 
Correlation matrix for financial reporting properties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Lag 1.000         
(2) Length 0.115 1.000        
(3) Similarity -0.127 -0.004 1.000       
(4) dTone 0.042 0.027 -0.012 1.000      
(5) |dTone| 0.048 0.194 -0.041 -0.050 1.000     
(6) Read -0.033 -0.279 0.036 0.000 -0.015 1.000    
(7) hardInfo 0.068 -0.120 -0.213 0.165 0.041 0.415 1.000   
(8) dAcc 0.007 0.049 -0.024 0.022 -0.022 -0.037 0.017 1.000  
(9) |dAcc| 0.029 -0.069 -0.005 -0.009 -0.042 0.013 0.037 -0.148 1.000 
          
Notes: Table depicts Pearson correlation coefficients of financial reporting properties. Significant correla-
tions (at 5 %) are denoted in bold. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
All variables are defined as described in Appendix A. 
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4 Results  
4.1 Five-dimensional clustering 
4.1.1 Classification of firms: spotting disclosure profiles 
To address my first research question, I classify sample firms using cluster analysis as 
described above. In a first step, I only focus on variables that are not based on inferences-
in-residuals. Thus, I omit |dAcc| and |dTone|. Both variables are extremely skewed due 
to the underlying statistical method, which potentially could affect clustering outcomes. 
I add them in Section 4.2. 
Hence, I start with the year-wise clustering of firms based on five dimensions. Figure 17 
provides an extract of the so-called dendrogram for 2012, which shows the sequential 
building of clusters at different fusion levels (starting from an eight-cluster solution and 
ending at a one-cluster solution). A major task of the researcher is to identify an appro-
priate number of clusters which (i) is feasible but (ii) provides an adequate level of detail. 
For simplification, I generally chose to keep the number of clusters as low as possible. 
However, to reinforce the decision more formally, I apply the stopping rule by Calinski 
and Harabasz (1974). This criterion suggests choosing the number of clusters with the 
highest Calsinski-Harabasz index (CH), which is a ratio of the mean between-cluster var-
iance to the mean within-cluster variance. In 2012, the peak of CH amounts to 104.32 in 
a three-cluster solution as indicated in Figure 17 by ellipses.101 Given the outcome stop-
ping at three clusters, the algorithm categorize 207 firms to Cluster A, 144 firms to Clus-
ter B, and 254 firms in Cluster C, based on their similarity in case of five financial report-
ing properties. Table 39 reports the median values of the normalized variables for each 
cluster (A, B, and C). To verify the effectiveness of the clustering, I test the differences 
between the clusters using ANOVA. The results in Table 39 provide evidence that clus-
ters are distinctive and all differences are significant. I also rank the median of each var-
iable across the clusters from the lowest (1) to the highest (3) value variables. Higher 
(lower) values indicate more opaqueness (more transparency). The ranking already re-
veals that there seems to be no superior strategy for providing disclosures, which achieve 
the highest or lowest scores over all metrics. This suggests substitutional associations 
                                                 
101  The CH of a two-cluster solution (four-cluster solution) amounts to 102.14 (96.21). The CH of 2013 
and 2014 data also suggests choosing a three-cluster solution with peaks at 128.45 and 132.4. 
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between individual financial reporting choices. Figure 18 depicts percentile-ranked vari-
ables in radar graphs. In the following, I briefly describe the three identified clusters for 
the year 2012:102 
• Firms in Cluster A file management reports with the highest degree of textual stick-
iness, i.e., copy-paste (median: 0.78) and the shortest reports (0.64). However, Clus-
ter-A firms provide documents with the best readability scores and the highest level 
of specificity, as they use the greatest extent of hard information in their manage-
ment reports.  
                                                 
102  For parsimony, I refrain from characterizing the clusters for each year (depicted in Figure 18). The 
shapes of clusters is relatively stable over time. However, the cluster size varies. 
Figure 17: 
Dendrogram 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the partial dendrogram from a eight to a one cluster solution of data for the year 2012 
using Ward’s method and correlations as dissimilarity measure (n=605). Ellipses indicate the chosen three 
cluster solution. 
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Table 39: 
Median values and ranks of variables by clusters 
     
 Cluster    
2012 A n=207 
B 
n=144 
C 
n=254 
all firms 
n=605 ANOVA F p 
Lag 0.50 (2) 0.44 (1) 0.58 (3) 0.50 6.31 < 0.001 
Length 0.64 (3) 0.38 (1) 0.61 (2) 0.55 117.85 < 0.001 
Similarity 0.78 (3)  0.73 (2) 0.46 (1) 0.65 214.44 < 0.001 
Read 0.38 (1) 0.61 (3) 0.49 (2) 0.49 65.99 < 0.001 
hardInfo 0.51 (1) 0.70 (2) 0.76 (3) 0.66 182.86 < 0.001 
     
 Cluster    
2013 A n=313 
B 
n=187 
C 
n=105 
all firms 
n=605 ANOVA F p 
Lag 0.55 (2) 0.55 (1) 0.58 (3) 0.56 20.05 < 0.001 
Length 0.58 (2) 0.34 (1) 0.59 (3) 0.52 128.29 < 0.001 
Similarity 0.71 (3) 0.67 (2) 0.25 (1) 0.64 326.73 < 0.001 
Read 0.40 (1) 0.66 (3) 0.47 (2) 0.50 160.92 < 0.001 
hardInfo 0.62 (1) 0.68 (2) 0.72 (3) 0.66 21.82 < 0.001 
     
 Cluster    
2014 A n=340 
B 
n=146 
C 
n=119 
all firms 
n=605 ANOVA F p 
Lag 0.46 (2) 0.46 (1) 0.56 (3) 0.48 26.23 < 0.001 
Length 0.55 (3) 0.30 (1) 0.54 (2) 0.50 110.75 < 0.001 
Similarity 0.77 (3) 0.71 (1) 0.35 (1) 0.71 386.04 < 0.001 
Read 0.43 (1) 0.68 (3) 0.46 (2) 0.49 129.01 < 0.001 
hardInfo 0.58 (1) 0.74 (3) 0.72 (3) 0.65 65.14 < 0.001 
       
Notes: Table depicts normalized median values of variables by clusters. The ranking (1-3) of each variable 
across clusters is given in parentheses. A higher rank indicates greater opaqueness. Differences of variables 
between clusters are tested using analysis of variance (ANOVA). All variables are defined as described in 
Appendix A. 
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• Cluster B consists of the lowest number of firms (n=144) and is characterized by 
the longest management reports (0.38) and the shortest reporting lag (0.44). Both 
are associated with higher transparency. However, the firms in this cluster provide 
less readable reports. 
• Finally, firms in Cluster C (n=254) file the most modified management reports 
(0.46), but exhibit the highest disclosure delay (0.58). This indicates a potential 
substitutional relationship between disclosure timing and the extent of revision. 
Moreover, these firms are distinctive as they provide narratives with the lowest 
amount of quantitative information. 
Nonetheless, classifying the clusters as a more or less transparent disclosure strategy is 
difficult; therefore, it would be necessary to weight variables’ influence on firms’ infor-
mation environment.103 Based on naïve equal weighting, one could describe Cluster-B 
firms as slightly more transparent compared to firms in Clusters A and C. 
  
                                                 
103  For example, it would be necessary to quantify whether delaying disclosure is (i) equally, (ii) less, or 
(iii) more effective in influencing firms’ information environment than decreasing readability. 
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Figure 18: 
Radar graphs of financial reporting profiles (five dimensions) 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts median of percentile ranked variables (financial reporting properties) of each cluster 
in radar graphs by year. Values are calculated by year-wise clustering using Ward’s method and correla-
tions as dissimilarity measure. Variables are aligned that higher values are associated with greater opaque-
ness. All variables are defined as described in Appendix A. 
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4.1.2 Determinants of cluster affiliation  
The next analysis refers to the question of who pursues which disclosure strategy. To 
examine if there are differences in firms’ fundamentals across clusters, I employ the fol-
lowing logit regression model:  
 
 
(3)  
Cluster_u is a binary variable indicating whether a firm belongs to Cluster u, where u is 
either A, B or C. I test cluster affiliation regarding typical fundamentals in private firms’ 
accounting research as capital structure, performance, ownership, and size. I use the in-
dustry-adjusted total debt net of cash ratio (tDnoCadj) as well as the industry-adjusted 
return on assets (RoAadj). Moreover, I employ a binary variable, indicating if a natural 
person holds more than 50 % of shares (Family). Companies’ size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Size) and growth as the yearly percentage difference in 
revenues (Growth). All controls are based on the model of Bernard (2016).104 A (more) 
detailed definition of variables can be found in Appendix A. Results for 2012 are depicted 
in Table 40.105 First, higher leveraged firms are significantly more likely to exhibit dis-
closure profiles, which are best described by Cluster B and are also less likely to report 
as Cluster-C firms. Second, there are differences regarding the ownership structure. Firms 
that are designated as family firms, based on the above-mentioned definition are more 
likely to reveal disclosure profiles as in Cluster C, which means longer reporting lags and 
less specific management reports. Moreover, family firms are less probable to belong to 
Cluster B, which is characterized by lengthy reports and higher timeliness. Third, there 
are significant differences regarding company size. Larger firms are more likely to belong 
to Cluster B and significantly less likely to be affiliated to Cluster A. Fourth, there are 
slight differences regarding firms’ performance and growth. Companies whose perfor-
mance is above the industry average are less likely to be classified according to Cluster 
C. Firms with higher growth rates are more likely to appear in Cluster B.  
                                                 
104  Compared to Bernard (2016), I only omit the control East (a binary measure indicating whether a firm 
is located in former East Germany). I do so because the average disposable income of residents of the 
federal state where the firms are located (IncomePerCapita) is highly correlated with East. 
105  The results for other years are presented in Appendix B. 
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Taken together, Cluster-B firms are greater in size, leveraged to a higher extent, less likely 
to be family-owned, and show lower growth. In contrast, Cluster-C firms exhibit lower 
leverage scores, lower performance compared to industry peers, and are more likely to be 
a family firm. Firms in Cluster A do not significantly differ with respect to analyzed char-
acteristics.  
Table 40: 
Firm-level determinants of cluster affiliation (five dimensions) 
 (3a) Cluster A 
(3b) 
Cluster B 
(3c) 
Cluster C 
tDnoCadj 0.123 0.857** -0.749** 
 (0.36) (2.11) (-2.24) 
RoAadj 0.513 1.201 -1.488* 
 (0.58) (1.19) (-1.67) 
Family -0.232 -0.448* 0.506*** 
 (-1.22) (-1.94) (2.79) 
Size -0.185* 0.429*** -0.177* 
 (-1.75) (3.82) (-1.72) 
Growth 0.248 -1.482** 0.835* 
 (0.49) (-2.34) (1.70) 
Intangibles 0.849 1.805 -2.633 
 (0.49) (1.01) (-1.35) 
PublicRival 0.021 0.055 -0.076 
 (0.11) (0.25) (-0.41) 
HighLaborEnforce -0.494 0.713* -0.122 
 (-1.31) (1.88) (-0.35) 
IncomePerCapita 0.016 -0.022 0.001 
 (0.53) (-0.62) (0.04) 
HHI -2.539 2.298 -0.098 
 (-1.24) (1.18) (-0.05) 
YearIncorp 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.18) (0.11) (-0.32) 
Constant 0.348 -6.011 2.910 
 (0.07) (-1.08) (0.61) 
    
n 605 605 605 
Pseudo R² 0.01 0.06 0.03 
    
Notes: Table depicts logit regression results of Model (3) with Cluster_u as binary dependent variable and 
data from 2012. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level (two-tailed test). The 
t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defined as described in Appendix A. 
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4.1.3 Switching disclosure strategy over time 
In this section, I examine whether firms’ disclosure strategy is stable over time or if a 
substantial number of firms switches clusters during the period from 2012 to 2014. Figure 
18 graphically reveals the shapes of disclosure profiles in the form of radar graphs. I 
depict percentile ranks to meaningfully present and interpret variables. Moreover, all var-
iables are aligned, so that higher values imply greater opaqueness.106 The graphs show 
that the cluster shape is relatively stable over time. In particular, the characterizing fea-
tures of clusters are sticky. For example, the shape of Cluster A in 2012 is quite similar 
to Cluster A in 2013 and 2014. The same holds for Cluster B and Cluster C. However, 
the number of firms affiliated to each cluster differs between years. There is a remarkable 
increase in cluster-A firms, which are characterized by the least narrative revision, the 
lowest amount of information and a high portion of quantitative data in all three years. 
The cluster size increases by over 60 % from 207 firms in 2012 to 340 firms in 2014. This 
could be interpreted as an indication of convergence over time. Firms might align their 
disclosure practice. The size of Cluster C has nearly halved. In other words, the number 
of firms with a substantial revision of narratives (low similarity), short reports, and a great 
reporting lag decreased. Cluster B, which is associated with higher transparency, is rather 
stable regarding both its shape and its cluster size.  
To provide further insights, I track the cluster affiliation of firms over time. Figure 19 
provides a so-called alluvial diagram, which illustrates yearly movements from 2012 to 
2014. It shows whether and where firms are switching. The greatest fluctuation is in 2013, 
when 106 firms change from Cluster C to Cluster A. However, for most firms, the cluster 
affiliation is sticky in two consecutive years. In 2013 (2014) about 60 % (70 %) of firms 
remain in the same cluster as in the previous year. 
This is even the case for the whole investigation period. About a quarter of sample firms 
(151) is constantly affiliated to Cluster A, and does not change it over time (AAA). There 
are 72 firms which are constantly allocated to Cluster B (BBB) and 56 firms to Cluster C 
(CCC). In sum, 279 firms (46 %) do not switch their cluster affiliation and exhibit a stable 
disclosure practice over three years. However, this means that more than a half of the 
firms change their disclosure profile at least once in three years. The most frequent non-
                                                 
106  As this, hardInfo and Length are multiplied by minus one so that higher values are associated with 
greater opaqueness.  
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stable disclosure practice movement pattern is in the change from Cluster C to Cluster A 
in 2013 (CAA), which can be observed for 72 firms. Other changes are relatively rare.107 
While it is less surprising that disclosure practice is relatively sticky over time, firms that 
switch between clusters are potentially interesting. Thus, it could be fruitful, to study 
firms that do not behave like the majority and instead switch patterns in an abnormal way 
(indicated by thin “waves” in the alluvial diagram). For example, it would be interesting 
to come to know, why a few firms switch from Cluster A in 2012 to Cluster B or C in 
2013. Moreover, it would be fruitful to determine whether firms switch to a cluster that 
is associated with higher or lower transparency compared to the prior year cluster. How-
ever, I refrain from further interpretation concerning the low number of observation and 
the underlying explorative approach including a couple of assumptions. 
                                                 
107  The second most common non-stable pattern is CBB including 30 firms (6.3 %); all other patterns are 
≤ 5 %.  
Figure 19: 
Alluvial diagram of cluster movements (five dimensions) 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the alluvial diagram of cluster movements from 2012 to 2014. Clusters are based on 
five dimensions using Ward’s method and correlation as dissimilarity measure (n=1,815). 
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4.2 Seven-dimensional clustering 
Following the same approach as outlined before, I repeat the clustering procedure with 
all previously described variables and include |dAcc| and |dTone|. For terms of compara-
bility, I also choose to present a three-cluster solution.108 Again, I cluster each year sepa-
rately. In 2012, the hierarchical clustering groups 347 firms to Cluster A, 144 firms to 
Cluster B, and 114 to Cluster C.109 Table 41 reports the median values of the normalized 
variables of each identified cluster (A, B and C). Consistent with Section 4.1, I briefly 
characterize the clusters of 2012: 
• Cluster A is the largest (n=347) and reveals the least distinctive features. Most 
variables exhibit average values. However, the reports are relatively long (median: 
0.47) and show the best tone properties (lowest degree of discretionary tone 
(0.20)).  
• Cluster B is characterized by the greatest similarity among management reports 
(0.81). However, affiliated firms file their financial reports timelier (0.45) and 
their narratives contain the highest volume of quantitative data (0.45). 
• Finally, firms in Cluster C exhibit reports with the lowest extent of narrative sim-
ilarity (0.42), but have the longest reporting lags (0.60). This substitutional rela-
tionship has already been documented previously in Section 4.1. Moreover, these 
firms exhibit the highest degree of abnormal tone (0.59).  
Regarding the newly introduced dimension of earnings quality, there are no major differ-
ences in 2012. Cluster A differs only slightly from Cluster B and C in terms of earnings 
management. Interestingly, it changes in subsequent years, as shown in Figure 21. In 2013 
and 2014, the clustering algorithm groups a small number of firms which are strongly 
engaged in earnings management (Cluster B).110 In 2013, affiliated firms (45) clearly re-
veal the highest portion of discretionary accruals. Moreover, they provide reports with 
the lowest readability. This also holds for 2014, where Cluster B does not differ substan-
tially compared to the prior year. Cluster A, which seems to contain firms with ordinary 
financial reporting properties, and Cluster C are also stable over time. However, 
                                                 
108  In 2012, the CH score is highest in case of a two-cluster solution (73.65). However, the CH score of the 
three-cluster solution is only slightly lower (72.68). In 2013 (2014), the CH approach suggests choosing 
three (five) clusters. 
109  The order and naming of clusters are arbitrary and completely independent of the results in Section 4.1. 
110  In 2013, from the top 10 (top 20) firms with the greatest extent of earnings management, five (seven) 
belong to Cluster B. 
PART D: OVERALL 
174 
 
Table 41: 
Median values and ranks of variables by clusters (seven dimensions) 
     
 Clusters    
2012 A n=347 
B 
n=144 
C 
n=114 
all firms 
n=605 ANOVA F p 
Lag 0.46 (2) 0.45 (1) 0.60 (3) 0.50 13.46 < 0.001 
Length 0.47 (1) 0.64 (2) 0.68 (3) 0.55 71.36 < 0.001 
Similarity 0.65 (2) 0.81 (3) 0.42 (1) 0.65 114.73 < 0.001 
|dTone| 0.20 (1) 0.37 (2) 0.59 (3) 0.27 90.81 < 0.001 
Read 0.56 (3) 0.34 (1) 0.40 (2) 0.49 60.49 < 0.001 
hardInfo 0.72 (3) 0.45 (1) 0.68 (2) 0.66 184.95 < 0.001 
|dAcc| 0.11 (3) 0.10 (2) 0.09 (1) 0.11 5.93 0.003 
     
 Cluster    
2013 A n=375 
B 
n=45 
C 
n=185 
all firms 
n=605 ANOVA F p 
Lag 0.55 (1) 0.56 (2) 0.57 (3) 0.56 1.32 0.268 
Length 0.51 (2) 0.34 (1) 0.58 (3) 0.52 13.91 < 0.001 
Similarity 0.70 (3) 0.65 (2) 0.39 (1) 0.64 159.27 < 0.001 
|dTone| 0.20 (1) 0.23 (2) 0.50 (3) 0.26 117.65 < 0.001 
Read 0.50 (1) 0.56 (3) 0.51 (2) 0.50 1.52 0.220 
hardInfo 0.63 (1) 0.68 (2) 0.72 (3) 0.66 13.95 < 0.001 
|dAcc| 0.11 (2) 0.89 (3) 0.10 (1) 0.12 515.89 < 0.001 
     
 Cluster    
2014 A n=374 
B 
n=43 
C 
n=188 
all firms 
n=605 ANOVA F p 
Lag 0.48 (2) 0.47 (1) 0.51 (3) 0.48 2.20 0.111 
Length 0.47 (2) 0.40 (1) 0.57 (3) 0.50 22.63 < 0.001 
Similarity 0.75 (3) 0.64 (2) 0.50 (1) 0.71 103.72 < 0.001 
|dTone| 0.21 (1) 0.23 (2) 0.48 (2) 0.26 94.45 < 0.001 
Read 0.51 (2) 0.52 (3) 0.46 (1) 0.49 2.67 0.070 
hardInfo 0.64 (1) 0.65 (2) 0.69 (3) 0.65 9.88 < 0.001 
|dAcc| 0.11 (2) 0.72 (3) 0.09 (1) 0.11 467.22 < 0.001 
       
Notes: Table depicts normalized median values of variables by clusters. The ranking (1-3) of each variable 
across clusters is given in parentheses. A higher rank indicates greater opaqueness. Differences of variables 
between clusters are tested using analysis of variance (ANOVA). All variables are defined as described in 
Appendix A. 
 
PART D: OVERALL 
175 
 
compared to the analysis presented in Section 4.1, clusters are less stable. I can provide 
two reasons to explain this. First, from a technical side, the high dimensionality (seven 
variables) entails more noise, resulting in less stable clustering. Second, the integration 
of the earnings management dimension might contribute to this finding. An increase in 
discretionary accruals in year t is followed by a decrease in subsequent years, and vice 
versa. Given the reversal effect of accruals, firms cannot be engaged in earnings manage-
ment over a longer period of time. The alluvial diagram graphically supports this (Figure 
20). Most firms in Cluster B, which is characterized by higher discretionary accruals, 
switch either to A or to C in subsequent years. Over the whole investigation period, only 
one of 605 firms is constantly assigned to Cluster B (BBB). 
 
 
  
Figure 20: 
Alluvial diagram of cluster movements (seven dimensions) 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts the alluvial diagram of cluster movements from 2012 to 2014. Clusters are based on 
seven dimensions using Ward’s method and correlation as dissimilarity measure (n=1,815). 
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Figure 21: 
Radar graphs of financial reporting profiles (seven dimensions) 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure depicts median of percentile ranked variables (financial reporting properties) of each cluster 
in radar graphs by year. Values are calculated by year-wise clustering using Ward’s method and correla-
tions as dissimilarity measure. Variables are aligned so that higher values are associated with higher 
opaqueness. All variables are defined as described in Appendix A. 
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5  Robustness checks and limitations 
Of course, the results and implications from this study are subject to several limitations. 
In particular, the methodological approach involves a high degree of freedom and judge-
ment. Cluster analysis requires various decisions, e.g., the selection of variables, the num-
ber of clusters, the underlying clustering algorithm or the dissimilarity measure. All pa-
rameters potentially affect the outcome. There are only conventions, as opposed to clear 
rules or guidance. In addition, it is difficult to evaluate the clustering quality without la-
beled data (i.e., lacking of predefined groups or a hold-out sample). However, to validate 
the results and to ensure that the outcome is not a methodological artifact, I alter some 
parameters to assess the sensitivity of my results. I alternatively use k-means as a parti-
tional clustering approach instead of a hierarchical method. Based on a predefined num-
ber of clusters (centroids), k-means assigns every firm to a randomly selected centroid. 
To optimize the position of the centroid, this step is repeated as long as there is a stable 
clustering solution or the given number of iterations has been reached. Nevertheless, var-
ying the clustering method leads to similar cluster shapes and sizes, and thus only has 
limited impact on the emphasized results.  
Moreover, high dimensionality contradicts a stable cluster solution.111 To tackle this prob-
lem, I use principal component analysis to reduce dimensions. Based on the included set 
of seven variables in Section 4.2, I extract four components.112 Table 42 depicts compo-
nents and their loadings. Performing a clustering procedure on extracted components 
yields a slightly more stable solution with more distinct clusters since the number of ob-
jects (variables) has nearly halved. Cluster sizes are comparable to the seven-cluster so-
lution. However, as components load on different domains of financial reporting proper-
ties (in particular Component 1 and 3), the results are more difficult to interpret. For de-
scriptive purpose, I therefore decide to rely on “raw” variables.  
                                                 
111  Compared to five-dimensional clustering, clusters are less distinctive with respect to certain attributes. 
This is, e.g., indicated by a lower variance uncovered by ANOVA in Table 41. 
112  Three components have an eigenvalue greater than one. I add a fourth component as its eigenvalue is 
only slightly below the threshold of one. The four components explain 70 % of variance.  
PART D: OVERALL 
178 
6 Discussion and avenues for further research 
Without capital market data, it is even harder to empirically approximate a firm’s infor-
mation environment. Moreover, corporate transparency cannot be proxied by relying on 
a single measure. It is rather the sum of managerial discretion from different domains. 
Hence, I provide a methodological approach that considers multiple firm-level proper-
ties.113 Specifically, I use cluster analysis to form groups of private firms based on their 
financial reporting properties. Overall, the research questions and the methods are explor-
atory in nature. Thus, the results should be treated as tentative and could be considered as 
implications for further research opportunities.  
The major aim of this study is to discover patterns and associations in financial reporting 
properties. While admittedly exploratory, I believe that the results allow for some note-
worthy insights into the financial reporting behavior of private firms, which add to the 
prior literature. First, I present descriptive evidence for a wide range of textual properties, 
                                                 
113  Compared to a simple overall score, e.g., based on a rank sum, cluster analysis considers substitutional 
and complementary relationships between certain properties. 
Table 42: 
Principal component analysis on financial reporting measures 
 1st Component 2nd Component 3rd Component 4th Component 
Lag  0.508 -0.363  
Length -0.470 0.386   
Similarity  -0.519  0.445 
|dTone|  0.450 0.488 0.508 
Read 0.624    
hardInfo 0.579 0.343   
|dAcc|   -0.661 0.702 
     
Variance explained 0.227 0.186 0.150 0.136 
Cumulative 0.227 0.414 0.564 0.700 
     
Notes: Table shows results of principal component analysis based on three components with eigenvalue 
greater than one. A fourth component (eigenvalue = 0.955) is added to explain 70 % of total variance. For 
simplicity, unsigned factor loadings below 0.3 are omitted. All variables are defined as described in Ap-
pendix A. 
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which have not been studied in case of private firms (in particular readability, report stick-
iness, and tone). Second, the applied clustering algorithm identifies three distinct and 
time-invariant financial reporting profiles. The differences between clusters and cluster-
specific peculiarities suggest that firms pursue heterogeneous financial reporting strate-
gies (regarding timeliness, textual properties, and earnings properties). Fourth, the anal-
ysis of determinants implies that firms’ fundamentals are associated with cluster affilia-
tion. Hence, this aspect adds to the rich literature investigating the relationship between 
firm-specific incentives and financial reporting practice. In particular, financing structure, 
ownership, performance, and company size are correlated with cluster affiliation. Third, 
the results suggest some relations between single financial reporting properties. In partic-
ular, the substitutional and complementary associations across different domains are po-
tentially interesting. As such, the findings of all specifications of the cluster analysis im-
ply a potential trade-off between management report modification and timeliness. Firms 
belonging to the cluster with the most updated reports (lowest degree of copy-paste in-
tensity) file their documents with the greatest delay. Reports with a higher portion of 
copy-paste intensity are published more timely. Untabulated uni- and multivariate tests 
support this association. In addition, firms that delay disclosure exhibit the highest 
amount of abnormal tone in all three years. In the light of creating a more opaque infor-
mation environment, both seem to be interesting topics for future research. The same 
holds for earnings management which potentially correspond to a decreased readability 
of firms’ reports, as suggested by Cluster B (Section. 4.2). This association has already 
been documented for public firms and could be attributed to managerial obfuscation (Lo 
et al. 2017). Other relationships have to be interpreted with more caution. Although cor-
relation analysis reveals only minor dependencies, some proxies could be related through 
technical measurement issues (e.g., document length and readability). Fifth, is becomes 
apparent that cluster affiliation is relatively sticky within the investigation period. How-
ever, some firms switch between clusters. Hence, it seems promising to examine firms’ 
decision to switch cluster affiliation in more detail. Yearly clustering and tracking of clus-
ter movements allows to identify such firms and to analyze underlying incentives.  
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Appendix A: 
Variable definitions and data sources 
Financial reporting properties 
 Definition Source 
Lag is the difference in days between a firm’s fiscal year end and the 
date of public filing. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Length is the natural logarithm of the number of words in firms' man-
agement report scaled by Size. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Similarity is the cosine similarity between a management report in year t 
and t-1 considering term weighting which gives lower weight to 
common words (term frequency-inverse document frequency 
approach (tf-idf)). 
Federal 
Gazette 
|dTone| is the absolute value of the residual of the expected tone model 
by Huang et al. (2014). Dependent variable is Tone, which is 
the number of positive words minus negative words scaled by 
total number of words in firms' management report. Positive 
and negative words are identified using the wordlist of Bannier 
et al. (2019) while considering negation. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Read is the first principal component of the following four measures 
of readability: "Vierte Wiener Sachtextformel" (WSTF), SMOG 
readability, Flesch Reading Ease (FLESCH) and LIX for Ger-
man language. 
Federal 
Gazette 
hardInfo is the ratio of informative numbers in firms' management report 
to the total number of words multiplied by 1,000. 
Federal 
Gazette 
|dAcc| is the absolute firm-level value of discretionary accruals based 
on the cross sectional modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 
1995) calculated using data on the population of large private 
firms in Amadeus. 
Amadeus 
Lag is the difference in days between firms' fiscal year end and the 
date of public filing. 
Federal 
Gazette 
Firm characteristics 
 Definition Source 
tDnoCadj is the firm's total debt net of cash, scaled by total assets, minus 
the mean of this ratio for all other firm the same industry based 
Fama/French 48-classification. 
Amadeus 
RoAadj is the ratio of operate income to average total assets, minus the 
mean of this ratio for all other firm the same industry based 
Fama/French 48-classification. 
Amadeus 
△RoA is the difference of RoA between year t and year t-1. Amadeus 
StDRoA is the standard deviation of RoA over the last three years. Amadeus 
Loss is a binary variable equal to one if the operating income is nega-
tive. 
Amadeus 
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Appendix A: 
continued 
 Definition Source 
Family is a binary variable equal to one if a natural person holds more 
than 50 % of shares (controlling shareholder). 
Amadeus 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Amadeus 
Growth is the growth in revenues scaled by revenues in t-1. Amadeus 
Intangibles is the firm’s intangible assets, scaled by total assets. Amadeus 
PublicRival is a binary variable equal to one if there is at least one public 
German company in firms' four-digit NAICS code. 
Amadeus 
HighLaborEnforce is a binary variable equal to one if firm operates in an industry 
that is subject to additional scrutiny under German labor laws. 
That is if a firm is in the three-digit NAICS codes 113, 236, 
237, 238, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 721, and 722 
as well as four-digit NAICS codes 3116, 5612, and 5617. 
Amadeus 
IncomePerCapita is the average disposable income of residents in the district 
where the firm is located in thousands. Data are provided by the 
"National Accounts of the Federal States". 
Destatis 
HHI is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index formed by three-digit SIC 
codes and constructed using total assets from the population of 
German firm in the Amadeus database. 
Amadeus 
YearIncorp is the year the firm was incorporated. Amadeus 
Additional variables 
 Definition Source 
WSTF is the readability of the management report based on the follow-
ing formula: 0.2744 * number of words with more than two syl-
lables + 0.2656 * average sentence length – 1.693 (Bamberger 
and Vanecek 1984). 
Federal 
Gazette 
SMOG is the readability of the management report based on the follow-
ing formula: sqrt(number of words with more than two syllables 
/ number of sentences * 30) – 2 (Bamberger and Vanecek 
1984). 
Federal 
Gazette 
FLESCH is the readability of the management report based on the follow-
ing formula: 180 – average sentence length – (58.5 * average 
syllables per word) (Amstad 1978). 
Federal 
Gazette 
LIX is the readability of the management report based on the follow-
ing formula: average sentence length + (number of words over 
six letters / number of words *100) (Björnsson 1968). 
Federal 
Gazette 
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